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ABSTRACT 
Infrastructure development is considered a key facilitator for achieving economic growth in 
developed as well as developing world, and has a direct impact on the growth and overall 
development of an economy. Iraq, similar to many developing countries, has a considerable 
lack of infrastructure. Nevertheless, it has been found that attracting Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) can play an important role in addressing this lack. A vital step for 
governments to attract FDI is to create an organisational environment attractive to 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs).  
Iraq is internationally recognised as a country whose government organisations are highly 
corrupted and hard to do business with, a situation which has also significantly contributed to 
the underdevelopment of infrastructure in the country. A number of organisational 
performance improvement models, such as EFQM, Baldrige and PROBE, can identify and 
improve organisational practice and reduce performance weaknesses. However, these 
approaches are lengthy and their implementation can thus jeopardise any improvement due to 
the lack of quick wins. Given the urgency of addressing Iraq’s infrastructure needs, this 
research focuses on developing an approach to help Iraqi decision makers create an 
organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion. 
To achieve this goal, four research stages were established. The first was conducting an 
extensive literature review; this identified six critical steps in creating an organisational 
environment attractive to MNCs. The second, or exploratory, stage applied these steps, 
assessing Iraqi organisational practices, comparing them to world-class standards and 
identifying key weaknesses and strengths. The third, development, stage focused on using the 
findings from the exploratory stage and the literature to develop and propose an approach to 
creating an organisational environment attractive to MNCs. This framework was validated in 
the fourth stage, using case studies.  
The key results of this research showed that an effective and quicker approach for decision 
makers of Iraqi government organisations to creating an organisational environment attractive 
for MNCs is by establishing separate spinout organisation(s) dedicated to working exclusively 
with MNCs throughout the lifecycle of infrastructure development programmes. Their 
successful implementation will pave the way for large-scale reform for government 
organisations in Iraq. However, such an approach is entirely dependent on achieving top 
management support and commitment to change. This research contributes to knowledge by 
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providing an alternative approach to the existing improvement methods that can help 
government organisations similar to the ones in Iraq, overcome their performance weaknesses 
and create effective organisational environment in the short term.     
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This research has been triggered to answer the general question Why are so few multinational 
corporation (MNCs) accepting work in Iraq, and how to attract them?. This question comes 
as a result of the researcher’s observation of the lack of necessary infrastructure in Iraq, 
supported by a number of reports, such as those by JAPU (2013), Sait and Nkuuhe (2013) and 
WorldBank (2012). Infrastructure development in Iraq is conducted as part of the public 
procurement by the state of Iraq, acting through ministries or federal agencies, government 
units including regions and governorates, and all other subdivisions of the state that may 
commit public funds. Given the recent crisis in the price of oil in mid-2014, the 2017 Iraqi 
budget deficit has increased to more than $19billion, about 21% of total expenditure (Neely 
and Fenton, 2016; Rudaw, 2017), which has made it more difficult for the country to address 
its infrastructure investment needs (Bowler, 2015). In response to this problem, the 
government of Iraq (GOI) has passed a new regulation that allows government organisations 
to enter into contracts with MNCs to build the infrastructure projects in Iraq, improving 
services like water supply, power and education (USDC, 2013). This new regulation allows 
government agencies, such as ministerial offices, local governments or any government 
agency responsible for the development of infrastructure, to basically take out loans with 
MNCs tasked with the jobs, and then repay them annually, in a form similar to Public Private 
partnership (PPP), Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) and Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) 
contracts. Contracts such as PPP, according, to Thomsen (2005) and Kadarisman (2015), have 
provided a principal vehicle for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in public utilities and 
infrastructure in the developing world. In the case of such contracts, the function of 
government organisations is to regulate and facilitate public service developments. Related 
government ministries and agencies are responsible for identifying strategic development 
programmes as well as project execution, beginning from the planning stage, devising the 
project tender and contracting procedures through to supervision of the execution stage. This 
reflects the tremendous impact that government organisations’ performance can have on the 
number of MNCs accepting to work in the country. However, since 2003 and despite the 
government efforts to attract MNCs to FDI, Iraq still have unattractive organisational 
environment compared to elsewhere in the region (BEBA, 2016; WorldBank, 2012). Given 
the urgency to address the infrastructure in Iraq, this research looks at the relation between 
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FDI and the performance of government organisations of the host country, such as Iraq, and 
aims at developing a solution that can help decision makers in Iraq facilitate the development 
of an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step change fashion to foster FDI 
inflows to address the country’s infrastructure investment needs.  
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The literature review was conducted with the aim of understanding the facts surrounding FDI 
and the factors that can attract or hinder MNCs from working and/or investing in any country. 
A number of government/country-level and organisation-level factors have been found to 
have a considerable impact on attracting/deterring MNCs and thereby affecting the flow of 
FDI to host countries. Government/country-level factors include, but are not limited to, 
political, social and economic stability, market size and business conditions (OECD, 2008; 
Asfour and Murphy, 2006; Shapiro and Globerman, 2001; Globerman and Shapiro, 1999; 
Dunning, 1993). At the organisation level, three interrelated factors have been found to 
increasingly deter MNCs and thereby reduce FDI inflow: non-transparency, bureaucratic red 
tape and corruption. These factors are considered by researchers as indicators of the quality of 
government organisations of the host country and have been found to have a significant 
impact on the level of FDI inflows into the developing world. Moreover, it has been argued 
that even in the presence of a conducive macroeconomic environment, such organisational 
factors can deter foreign investors from investing in any country (Smarzynska and Wei, 2000; 
Wei, 2000; Rivlin, 2001; Drabek and Payne, 2002; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; Onyeiwu, 
2003; Johnson, 2006; Dahlström and Johnson, 2007; Al-Sadig, 2009; Tingvall, 2011). Thus, it 
has been argued that a significant step towards attracting MNCs and quickly fostering FDI 
inflows, is for governments in the developing world to strive to improve the overall 
performance of their government organisations in a step-change fashion.  
There are numerous research studies that have discussed factors related to the 
government/country level, providing recommendations for decision makers in the developed 
and developing world, such as Iraq, on how best to address such factors to help create an 
environment attractive to MNCs to foster FDI inflows. However, no research has provided 
recommendations (such as an approach, model or framework) for decision makers in the 
developing world, or elsewhere in the world, to help them expeditiously overcome their 
performance weaknesses and create an organisational environment attractive to MNCs.       
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Given this gap in the literature, and because the quality of government organisations’ 
performance is considered one of the significant factors that can deter/attract MNCs from 
investing in any country, this study focuses on understanding the organisational environment 
of government organisations in Iraq; it aims to identify an approach that can help them 
overcome their performance weaknesses and create an organisational environment attractive 
to MNCs.  
The research has found that Iraq is seen by the international community as a country whose 
government organisations are highly corrupt and hard to do business with, (TheWorldBank, 
2016; TransparencyInternational, 2015; BEBA, 2016). Moreover, most Iraqi government 
organisations, such as local government and ministerial offices, have also been reported as 
having a very poor performance when executing their allocated investment budget to address 
the infrastructure needs within their jurisdiction. However, only a few of these reports and 
studies have touched on some of the reasons behind this poor organisational performance, 
such as public corruption, poor planning, poor procurement processes and poor project 
management (Al-Tameemi, 2009; JAPU, 2013; JAU, 2014m). 
Thus, it can be argued that, the overall organisational environment in Iraq is weak and not 
attractive for MNCs to come and work with Iraqi government organisations. However, this 
argument is based on the very few data available in the literature and thus, an exploratory 
study was required to further assess the overall practice and performance of government 
organisations in Iraq and identify key weaknesses and strengths. In the light of this, it is 
imperative for decision makers in Iraq to follow an approach that can help improve their 
organisational environment in a step-change fashion. This should become a priority for Iraqi 
decision makers. Thus, the question raised is What can decision makers in Iraqi government 
organisations do in order to overcome their performance weaknesses and create an 
organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion.? 
The literature does not offer solutions capable of overcoming such organisational problems in 
the short or even the medium term. Nor does it provide a framework or an approach that can 
guide decision makers in the developing world on how to overcome their performance 
weakness and create an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step change 
fashion. However, it does emphasise the role of using a family of innovative tools for 
continuous improvement in the public sector, that fall under the umbrella of Total Quality 
Management (TQM), such as EFQM, Baldrige, Lean and Six Sigma, to improve the 
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performance of organisations, and in turn help to streamline their problems and develop a 
capacity for continuous improvement. Such models focus on leadership, people, service 
processes, performance management and results which could have a significant impact on the 
improvement and achievement of their organisational goals. In doing so, it is important to 
assess the organisations’ overall level of practice, in terms of leadership, people, processes 
and performance management, and their impact on performance/results, compared to those of 
world-class organisations, working in the same field, in order to identify the areas for 
improvement. To do that, a standard practices and performance benchmarking tool 
(excellence model) could be used to identify and prioritise the overall organisational 
weaknesses and strengths. Having identified the gaps, the traditional solution is to adopt an 
organisational performance improvement technique for conducting incremental improvements 
to the identified gaps. However, depending on the organisation’s level of maturity, this 
approach can be lengthy, and its implementation therefore can japerdise any improvement due 
to the lack of quick wins. This is because numerous factors hinder the implementation of such 
apparoches within the public sector, as identified by Guo (2004), Woodard (2005), Radnor 
and Bucci (2007), Radnor and Walley (2008), Radnor (2010) and Sokovic, Pavletic and Pipan 
(2010). Moreover, there are no solutions to bridge the gap between these existing performance 
improvement methodologies and the speed at which government organisations need to 
transform their performance sufficiently to attract FDI. 
Accordingly, since the situation in Iraq calls for immediate FDI to engage in the development 
of the country’s infrastructure, an alternative approach applicable to the Iraqi context is 
required, to act as quickly as possible. 
In this context, examination of the performance improvement approaches (e.g. business 
excellence, innovation and change management models, as well as effective tools such as 
strategic planning, project management and integrated IT solutions), should suggest a solution 
to facilitate attracting FDI within a reasonable period of time. The literature does not cover 
these solutions collectively, hence the need for this research. 
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1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES   
This research study aims at developing a strategic approach to assist decision makers in Iraqi 
government organisations to overcome their performance weaknesses and create an 
organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion.  
The objectives are to:  
• Develop an understanding of the concept of FDI: its definition, contribution to 
economic growth and how the host country’s organisational environment may deter 
MNCs and thereby fail to attract FDI;  
• Identify, understand and evaluate the available organisational improvement 
approaches and highlight the critical steps to follow in creating an organisational 
environment attractive to MNCs;  
• Explore the overall practice and performance of a government organisation in Iraq and 
identify key weaknesses and strengths;    
• Propose an approach that can help decision makers in Iraq create an organisational 
environment attractive to MNCs in a step change fashion;  
• Validate the applicability, suitability and effectiveness of the approach using case 
studies; and develop the final strategic approach.   
1.4 METHODOLOGICAL STEPS 
To achieve the research aim and objectives, three main stages are followed:  
Stage 1: Literature Review 
• Develop an understadning of the concept of FDI and its contribution to infrastructure 
development; and to identify and evaluate the factors that can attract or hinder MNCs 
from working and investing in a given country. The research highlights the impact of 
the performance of the host country’s government organisations on the flow of FDI; 
• Develop an understanding of the available approaches, tools and techniques for 
effective organisational performance improvement;  
• Identify the critical steps guiding the development of an approach to address the aim 
of this research; 
• Explore the status of Iraq’s infrastructure and its organisational environment;    
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• Identify the philosophical stance of the research and  suitable research design and data 
collection methods  
Stage 2: Exploratory and Development Stage 
• Conducting an exploratory study to assess the overall practice and performance of a 
government organisation in Iraq and compare it to world-class standards, identifying 
key weaknesses and strengths. This study is conducted for two main reasons: first to 
help identify key organisational practice and performance weaknesses influencing the 
development of the required approach; second to close the gap in the literature about 
Iraq’s organisational environment;  
• Using the findings from both the exploratory stage and the literature to develop and 
propose an approach to assist decision makers in Iraqi government organisations to 
establish an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step change fashion. 
Stage 3: Validation, Discussion and Conclusions Stage 
• Validate the feasibility of the proposed approach using three case studies. The aim of 
the validation process is to present the proposed approach to the decision makers and 
solicit their opinion about its applicability, suitability and effectiveness within their 
organisational context.  
• Conduct cross-case discussion to identify the general findings, including common 
features and differences among interviewees and amend the proposed approach 
accordingly. This will lead to the development of the final strategic approach that is 
intended to address the research aim and establish conclusions and recommendations 
for its successful implementation.  
These stages are illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
1.5 CONTENTS/STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS AND RESEARCH PROCESSES 
The thesis consists of Nine chapters: (see Figure 1.1) 
This chapter gives an introduction and background to the research, the research aims and 
objectives and a summary of the work undertaken to achieve the aim and objectives. It also 
provides a brief explanation of the methodological steps used to carry out the research, along 
with a guide to the content of the thesis.  
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Exploratory and 
Development 
Stage
Validation, 
Discussion and 
Conclusions Stage 
Infrastructure development, 
Foreign direct investment 
and the quality of 
government Organisations
(Chapter Two)
Critical Steps to Guide the research 
toward the development of the step 
change organisational performance 
improvement approach
(Chapter Three) 
Confirmation of the Proposed Approach via three 
case studies
 (Chapter Seven)
Case Study 
A
Case Study 
B
Case Study 
C
Development Stage: the 
Proposed Approach 
(Chapter Six)
Cross cases discussion and Development 
of the Final Strategic Approach
 (Chapter Eight)
Discussion, Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
(Chapter Nine)
Literature Review 
Stage
a new concept for achieving a 
step change organisational 
performance improvement to 
attract FDI 
(Chapter Three)
Introduction and Research 
Background
(Chapter One)
Achieving Effective 
Development of 
Infrastructure in Iraq 
through FDI 
(Chapter Four)
Research Methodology
(Chapter Five)
Exploratory Stage: a case study to assess the 
overall practice and performance of a government 
organisation in Iraq via three data collection steps
(Chapter Six)
Data 
Collection 
Step One
Data 
Collection 
Step Two
Data 
Collection 
Step Three
Identify How Weak is the overall Practices and 
performance of the Case Study Organisation and 
highlight key weaknesses and strengths
(Chapter Six)
 
Figure 1.1: Research Structure and Processes 
Chapter two discusses the concept of FDI in a number of aspects, including its benefit and 
role in economic and infrastructure development, as well as the factors that deter/attract 
MNCs and foster the flow of FDI to developing countries. It highlights the impact of the 
quality of government organisations’ performance on attracting MNCs. It also emphasises the 
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need for decision makers in the developing world to understand their performance weaknesses 
and follow an effective approach to overcome these weaknesses. This has become the aim of 
this research. In the quest for such an approach, the chapter sheds light on the available 
organisational performance improvement approaches and on their benefits in helping to 
improve performance., The chapter also stresses that such approaches are lengthy; 
organisations, especially in the public sector, require a long time to fully absorb the concepts 
and standards encapsulated in these models and to emulate world-class performance. Thus, 
the chapter concludes by expressing the need for an alternative approach to fulfil the aim of 
the study.   
Chapter three seeks an alternative approach to help decision makers in the developing world 
attract MNCs. It reviews existing models, frameworks and approaches, such as innovative 
implementation approaches, tools and techniques to step change the performance of 
organisations during project delivery, and change management factors to ensure successful 
implementation of improvement approaches. The collective understanding of these 
approaches, factors, tools and techniques identifies six critical steps to guide the research 
toward the development of the intended step-change performance improvement approach. The 
first step requires understanding and assessing the overall practice and performance of a 
government organisation in the host country, Iraq, as well as highlighting key weaknesses and 
strengths and comparing them against world-class standards.   
Chapter four provides a background about Iraq and the status of its current infrastructure. It 
discusses the GOI’s approaches of addressing the lack of infrastructure and its need for FDI. 
It also explores the country’s organisational environment, the performance of its government 
organisations and how they are perceived by the international community.    
Chapter five presents the research methodology. It discusses the philosophical stance of the 
research and the research design and data collection methods adopted.  
Chapter six focuses on the analysis and interpretation of the data collected during the 
exploratory stage, assessing the overall practice and performance of a government 
organisation in Iraq and identifying the weakness level in its overall practice and 
performance. The findings of this stage and the literature review provide the basis for 
developing and proposing the approach for the Iraqi decision makers.  
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Chapter seven presents the results of three case studies carried out to obtain the perspectives 
of decision makers in Iraqi government organisations on the applicability, suitability and 
effectiveness of the proposed approach for achieving the aim of this research.  
Chapter eight offers a cross-case discussion to identify general results and key findings, 
including common features and differences in the interviews. Finally, it validates the elements 
of the proposed approach and develops the final strategic approach. 
Chapter nine discusses how the aim and objectives of the research have been achieved, what 
are the main conclusions and contributions of the research, together with its limitations and 
recommendations for future work.        
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CHAPTER 2: INFRASTRUCUTRE DEVELOPMENT, FDI AND THE QUALITY OF 
GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS  
2.1 INTRODUCTION   
The majority of countries in the developing world suffer from a considerable lack of 
infrastructure: transport networks, water and sanitation facilities, telecommunications and 
energy distribution, as well as schools and health centres. Their governments have insufficient 
financial resources to address their infrastructure investment needs. Infrastructure 
development is considered a key facilitator for achieving economic growth in the developing 
world.  
Meeting the significant infrastructure investment needs will require greater involvement of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). However, attracting FDI is not an easy task, and 
governments must create an environment attractive to Multinational Corporations (MNCs) to 
foster FDI inflow.     
Accordingly, this chapter discusses the role of infrastructure development in economic 
growth; it defines FDI and discusses its benefits and the kind of environment that will attract 
MNCs. It also underlines the impact of the performance of government organisations in 
attracting MNCs and FDI. The potential of existing schemes to improve the performance of 
government organisations in a step-change fashion is then discussed. The chapter finally 
highlights the scope and main aim of this research study.  
2.2 INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  
Economic growth helps raise people’s income, reduce poverty, create jobs and build a more 
stable future in the developing world. However, a number of challenges hinder these countries 
from successfully stimulating and sustaining economic growth. These include weak 
institutions, a high unemployment rate, poor infrastructure, no access to a wide range of 
financial services, and unsuitable laws and regulations (Greening, 2014b). Several studies 
show that the underpinning causes for these challenges are corruption and bureaucratic red 
tape, poor education systems, inefficient use of resources, lack of resources and excessive 
government intervention (Pearson, 2014; Cuaresma, Doppelhofer and Feldkircher, 2012; 
Trpkova and Tashevska, 2011; Looney, 2005; Onyeiwu, 2003).  
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According to Pearson (2014), countries worldwide have followed different approaches to 
improve their economic growth, with various degrees of success. For example some countries, 
such as the former Soviet Union, Argentina and Uganda, relied on their abundant supplies of 
natural resources. However, this approach was not effective as their economic growth was 
slow compared to other countries. In contrast, a more effective approach to economic growth 
was followed by countries such as Switzerland, Japan and Singapore. These countries, despite 
having fewer natural resources, have enjoyed rapid rates of economic growth based on 
investment in education and entrepreneurial ability. More recently, countries such as the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and East/Southeast Asian nations have rapidly achieved 
economic growth (as reflected in their investment, exports and employment over two and a 
half decades) because of their considerable investment in infrastructure (Chatterjee, 2005; 
Straub, Vellutini and Warlters, 2008). The latter case highlights that infrastructure 
development can be a key facilitator for achieving economic growth in developing countries 
(Greening, 2014a). 
In fact, the success of a country’s economic growth entirely depends on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of its infrastructure (UNCTAD, 2013), which contributes to growth by 
stimulating economic activity, productivity and enhancing the quality of life (WorldBank, 
1994; Nataraj, 2012). Conversely, Sahoo (2011) argues that lack of infrastructure creates 
breaks in sustainable growth and poverty reduction, although having adequate financial 
resources is a significant factor in developing their infrastructure. 
According to Fay and Toman (2010), infrastructure development has been very limited in the 
developing world except in certain parts of East Asia, largely because of the lack of finance 
(UNCTAD, 2013). UNCTAD (2008) asserted that meeting developing countries’ significant 
infrastructure investment needs will require greater involvement of FDI through MNCs. 
Therefore, governments in the developing world are required to understand the common 
needs of international investors and how to successfully attract FDI to address their 
infrastructure investment needs. The next section looks at FDI in more detail: its definition, 
benefits and the factors affecting its flow. 
2.3 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) 
FDI can play a significant role in economic growth and development of a healthy 
infrastructure in the developing world. This section defines FDI definition, discusses its 
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concepts and benefits and identifies the main factors that contribute toward attracting FDI to 
developing countries. 
2.3.1 Definition  
FDI is a key component of international capital flows worldwide (Protsenko, 2004). The 
literature provides a number of definitions. For example, the IMF (1993) and OECD (1996) 
defines it as “a category of international investment that FDI reflects the objective of 
obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) in an entity 
resident in an economy other than that of the investor (direct investment enterprise). The 
lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor 
and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise”. Protsenko (2004) 
explains that a significant degree of influence and a long-term relationship are the key terms 
distinguishing FDI from other types of investment, specifically short-term activities 
undertaken by institutional investors. Moran (2012) explains that “FDI takes place when a 
corporation in one country establishes a business operation in another country, through setting 
up a new wholly-owned affiliate, or acquiring a local company, or forming a joint venture in 
the host economy”.  
Interestingly, Protsenko (2004) classifies FDI into two main types: horizontal and vertical. 
Horizontal FDI is applied when it is too costly to serve the foreign market by exports because 
of transport costs or trade barriers. For instance, “Ford assembles cars in the United States. 
Through horizontal FDI, it does the same thing in different host countries such as the UK, 
France, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia and Australia. Vertical FDI takes place when a firm performs 
value-adding activities stage by stage in a vertical fashion in a host country; in other words, 
when a MNC fragments the production process internationally, locating each stage of 
production in the country where it can be done at the least cost. For example, if Peugeot (the 
French automaker) assembles cars but does not manufacture components in France, but in the 
UK, it can be said that the company enters into components manufacturing through FDI. This 
pattern is called upstream vertical FDI. In a similar vein, if Volkswagen (the German car 
manufacturer) does not engage in car distribution in Germany and, instead, invests in car 
dealerships in Saudi Arabia (a downstream activity), it can be said that Volkswagen is 
engaged in downstream vertical FDI” (KB, 2013).  
FDI also takes the form of service provision to governments in the host country, similar to 
public private partnership (PPP) or private finance initiative (PFI) contracts. This form of FDI 
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involves a contract between a public sector authority in the host economy and a private party, 
in which the latter provides a public service or project and assumes substantial financial, 
technical and operational risk in the project. In return, the public sector authority will agree to 
repay the cost of the service or the project over a fixed period of time. This form of 
investment has provided a principal vehicle for FDI for public utilities and infrastructure in 
developing countries (Thomsen, 2005; Kadarisman, 2015).  
Given the above, and the aim of the research, this study defines FDI as a form of investment 
whereby an MNC establishes a lasting interest in the host country’s infrastructure assets, 
giving it a satisfactory return on its investment over time. 
Having established that FDI can be a successful vehicle for developing countries to drive their 
infrastructure development, a general understanding of the key benefits of FDI to the host 
countries follows.  
2.3.2 Benefits 
FDI has been a stimulus to the economic growth of developing and developed countries in 
both the short and the long run (Freckleton, Wright and Craigwell, 2012). Many countries 
have realised that it is essential for effective economic growth and the prosperity of their 
citizens (Asfour and Murphy, 2006). “This is because the very essence of economic growth is 
the rapid and efficient transfer and adoption of best practice across borders. FDI is particularly 
well suited to effect this and translate it into broad-based growth”, particularly positive 
spillovers such as productivity gains, knowledge and technology transfer and human capital 
enhancement (Klein, Aaron and Hadjimichael, 2001b; OECD, 2002; BKPM, 2010; Akinlo, 
Akinsokeji and Oziegbe, 2013; Wang, Gu, Tse and Yim, 2013). “It lays the foundation for 
local investors, SMEs and entrepreneurs to prosper in a more efficient, market-driven and 
professional atmosphere,  enabling them to add value to their economies” (Asfour and 
Murphy, 2006).   
Wang et al. (2013) explain the ways in which FDI contributes to the host country economy. 
They argue that as well as the provision of investment funds, FDI triggers economic growth in 
the host country via the transfer of advanced technologies and human capital development, 
having a first-level effect on the host economy. The second level occurs when these advanced 
technologies, management systems and skilled labour force are transferred to local firms. 
This, in turn, makes the environment of the host country able to absorb more FDI, helping to 
create clusters of FDI and pools of skilled managers and labours. This is supported by the 
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empirical evidence of Long, Yang and Zhang (2015), who confirm that the presence of FDI 
leads to institutional improvement in the host region.  
To summarise, FDI is an effective means for development, being not only an effective source 
of finance but also a mechanism for developing countries to benefit from the advanced 
technologies and expertise of MNCs. Nevertheless, “the benefits of FDI do not accrue 
automatically or evenly across countries, sectors and local communities. National policies and 
the international investment architecture matter in attracting FDI and reaping the full benefits” 
(OECD, 2002). Thus, in order to formulate a favourable environment for MNCs to foster FDI 
inflows, it is important to understand their own common needs and requirements. The next 
sub-section answers to the following question: What should developing countries do to create 
an environment attractive to MNCs to foster FDI inflows?  
2.3.3 Factors Affecting the Flow of FDI 
In order to formulate appropriate investment strategies and policies, governments in the 
developing world must understand the requirements of international investors. The literature 
shows that many factors contribute to the formation of a favourable investment environment, 
classified here on two levels: the government/country level and the organisation level; see 
Figure 2.1.  
• Government/Country Level Factors 
According to Asfour and Murphy (2006) the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) classifies these factors into three categories:  
• Political and social stability, labour costs, utilities costs, labour availability and 
utilities reliability; 
• Real estate, business conditions, infrastructure, market access, e-taxes;  
• Living conditions.  
The OECD (2008) included market size and real income levels, skill levels in the host 
economy, the availability of infrastructure and other resources that facilitate efficient 
specialisation of production, trade policies, and the political and macroeconomic stability of 
the host country. The OECD argues that the significance of these factors differs depending on 
the type of investment.   
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FDI may also be influenced by various incentives offered by governments to attract MNCs, 
including tax incentives, financial incentives (such as grants and preferential loans), market 
preferences and monopoly rights (OECD, 2008).  
• Organisation Level Factors 
The literature highlights a number of other interrelated factors concerning the organisational 
environment of the host country: non-transparency, bureaucratic red tape and corruption of 
government organisations (Drabek and Payne, 2002; Onyeiwu, 2003; Dahlström and Johnson, 
2007).  
• Transparency is a mechanism that facilitates the release of information about policies, 
capabilities and preferences to outside parties or the market (Finel and Lord, 1999). 
Particularly in the public sector, it also implies outside access to the mechanisms by 
which decisions are made and implemented (Lebovic, 2006). The lack of transparency 
facilitates arbitrariness and helps to mask bribery (Zurawicki, 2003). For example, it 
imposes transaction costs on a business when additional information important for 
making an investment decision has to be secured at extra time and cost (Seyoum and 
Manyak, 2009). Bribery is non-transparent not only because it is normally illegal but 
also because payments to the host country officials do not have a market value, and 
hence raise the cost of goods/services when compared to a competitive market. 
(Drabek and Payne, 2002; Wei, 2000; Smarzynska and Wei, 2000). This can be a 
major disincentive for foreign investors (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002).  
Drabek and Payne (2002) confirmed that transparency in the activities of government 
institutions is vital in attracting foreign investment. They found that “on average a 
country could expect a 40% increase in FDI from a one point increase in its 
transparency ranking, while non-transparent policies translate into lower levels of 
FDI”. This has been seen in number of countries such as Indonesia, Nigeria and 
Slovakia, where the lack of transparent policies has been suggested as one of the main 
reasons why foreign investors have demonstrated extreme caution. This reflects the 
growing suspicion of investors about the intentions of governments and their 
commitment to policies (Drabek and Payne, 2002). 
• Bureaucratic red tape and corruption also deter investors. “If the quality of 
government service is unpredictable, companies’ exposure to additional risks is 
 Page | 16  
 
increased, and their ability to cover against these risks is hindered by the unpredictable 
nature of government service” (Drabek and Payne, 2002). The OECD (1997) and 
Onyeiwu (2003) show that bureaucratic inefficiency hinders economic activities by 
imposing additional costs on investors. It affects investment effectiveness and 
efficiency in a number of ways, such as delaying the process of licensing, and leading 
to unpredictable and arbitrary enforcement of rules and regulations.  
Onyeiwu (2003) added that corruption and bureaucratic red tape are a significant 
factor in explaining why MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries receive less 
FDI than other countries. In fact, even in the presence of favourable government 
policies and incentives, corruption and red tape can deter foreign investors (Rivlin, 
2001). According to Al-Sadig (2009), a one-point increase in the corruption level 
leads to a reduction in per capita FDI inflows of about 11%. This is supported by a 
number of other studies, including Habib and Zurawicki (2002), Egger and Winner 
(2006), Johnson (2006), Hakkala, Norbäck and Svaleryd (2008) and Freckleton et al. 
(2012), which all found corruption to be detrimental to FDI. The impact of these 
factors is summarised in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: Factors affecting the flow of FDI in developing countries 
It is clear that organisation level factors act as indicators of the quality of the host country’s 
government organisations. This has a considerable impact on attracting MNCs and fostering 
FDI inflows, and thereby on infrastructure development. This understanding is further 
explained in the following sub-sections. 
Level of 
FDI Inflows
Government or 
Country level 
Factor
Organisation 
level Factors
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2.3.4 The Quality of Government Organisations, FDI and Infrastructure Development  
The organisation level factors, discussed above, are considered in a number of studies to 
reflect the institutional quality of the host country, e.g. Mocan (2004), Caetano and Caleiro 
(2005), Abramo (2007) and Dahlström and Johnson (2007). In fact, such factors are 
considered to be “a result of, rather than a cause for, an underdeveloped institutional 
framework” (Dahlström and Johnson, 2007). Therefore, by acknowledging that such factors 
“can be viewed as a general index of institutional quality, evidence suggests that weak 
institutions hamper incoming FDI” (Tingvall, 2011). According to Al-Sadig (2009), the 
quality of a country’s institutions is very important in encouraging FDI inflows. He stressed 
that, “ceteris paribus, a country with sound institutions is able to attract as much as 29% more 
FDI than one with poor institutions”. Hence, it can be argued that the quality of government 
organisations in the developing world has a significant impact on the flow of FDI. Thus, 
having government organisations that emulate the very best is a key ingredient not only for 
fighting non-transparency, bureaucracy and corruption, but also for the creation of an 
organisational environment attractive to MNCs and FDI, as depicted in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: Spheres of Influence of the Organisational Factors Affecting FDI Inflows  
In the light of this argument, and as discussed in section 2.2, attracting FDI is an effective 
means for developing countries to address their infrastructure investment needs. Effectively, a 
The Quality of Host 
Country Government 
Organisations
Non-transparency, 
Bureaucratic 
inefficiency and 
Corruption
Level of FDI 
Inflows
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country’s infrastructure development is a government activity normally conducted by 
government organisations through government procurement.  
In brief, government procurement is an important economic activity involving large amounts 
of public money (OECD, 2010b). It is the “acquisition of goods and services from a third 
party on behalf of a public agency”, such as public sector organisations or local government 
(Brack, 2013). Government procurement includes “much that supports the work of 
government and ranges from routine items” (e.g. stationery, temporary office staff, furniture 
or printed forms), to complex spend areas (e.g. construction, PFI/PPP or supporting major 
change initiatives) (OGC, 2008). Government procurement is also a principal vehicle for FDI 
to enter the developing world and  it can also be affected by public procurement policies 
(WBG, 2012). This is supported by the cross-section analysis of Mardas, Papachristou and 
Varsakelis (2008) which indicated that it is a statistically significant determinant of FDI. As a 
government activity, government procurement is, therefore, particularly vulnerable to 
corruption (OECD, 2010b). In the Cameroon, for example, “high-level officials in charge of 
the execution of public investments declared that administrative and bureaucratic red tape was 
the reason for the insufficient financial execution rate of the investments. The insufficient 
qualifications of the employees in charge of the follow-up of the contracts was included in the 
description of administrative red tape” (Le messager 2008 cited in OECD (2010b)).  
Thus, in addressing their infrastructure investment needs through FDI, in forms such as PPP, 
PFI or similar, the function of government organisations is to regulate and facilitate public 
service developments (Kadarisman, 2015). Ministries and related agencies are responsible for 
identifying strategic development programmes as well as project execution, from the planning 
stage, the project tender and contracting procedures through to supervision of the execution 
stage. MNCs contact government organisations as soon as they start their activities in the host 
country, and the latter naturally have a large effect on the continuing operations of the MNCs 
(Dahlström and Johnson, 2007). Therefore, poor-quality government organisations will not 
only affect the flow of FDI by deterring MNCs; they will also affect governments’ ability to 
efficiently and effectively execute infrastructure development programmes, which in turn will 
have an impact on the quality of the infrastructure, as illustrated in Figure 2.3.  
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Figure 2.3: The Impact of the Quality of Government Organisations on the 
Infrastructure 
Accordingly, in order to attract FDI in the short-term and achieve effective and efficient 
infrastructure development, governments in the developing world are required to find ways to 
improve the overall quality of their government organisations, in line with international 
standards, in a step-change fashion.    
2.3.5 The Need for a Step-Change Organisational Performance Improvement Approach 
The studies discussed in sub-sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, and others (Jadhav, 2012; Akinlo et al., 
2013; Méon and Sekkat, 2004; Teixeira and Grande, 2012; Jude and Levieuge, 2013), have 
investigated, identified and discussed the factors that affect MNCs’ decision to work/invest in 
various countries. These studies provide valuable recommendations and insights for policy 
makers in the developing world on the sort of policies and incentives they are required to 
adopt to create an environment attractive to MNCs. These studies also emphasise the need for 
governments to fight corruption, increase transparency and reduce bureaucracy.  
The review of these studies has shown that, to create an environment favourable for MNCs to 
foster FDI, governments in the developing world must not only legislate appropriate policies, 
incentives, regulations and procedures. They also need to improve the performance of the 
government organisations responsible for executing them. Without such interrelated efforts it 
will be difficult to achieve their aim.  
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However, none of these studies has suggested an approach to guide governments in the 
developing world on how to overcome their organisational performance weaknesses and 
create an attractive organisational environment. This research therefore focuses on developing 
such an approach.  The following sections/chapters of the literature review will attempt to 
answer the following question: What can decision makers in government organisations in the 
developing world do to deliver effective and efficient organisational performance to MNCs in 
a step-change fashion?   
2.4 ORGANISATIONAL IMPROVEMENT METHODOLOGIES  
There is universal agreement in the literature that a fundamental approach for organisations to 
survive in any market is by continually improving their organisational performance. In the 
quest for achieving performance excellence, Boyne (2003) argued that “analysis from sixty-
five empirical studies of the determinants of public service performance suggests that the 
most likely sources of improvement are extra resources and better management”. The 
literature describes a number of approaches to achieving organisational improvement, 
including Management By Objectives (MBO), Balanced Scorecard (BSC) and Total Quality 
Management (TQM).   
According to Dinesh and Palmer (1998) MBO, “introduced by Drucker (1955) more than six 
decades ago, is a system of management based on goal congruence as a means of improving 
performance. BSC, which Kaplan and Norton (1992) introduced almost 40 years later, is also 
based on goal congruence as a means of improving performance”. These are management 
systems that align tangible objectives with an organisation’s vision. On the other hand, TQM 
is a “strategic management approach that aims to improve business as a whole and add value 
for customers. TQM interventions, such as statistical process control and failure analysis help 
identify and eliminate mistakes, reduce waste, and improve productivity, leading to 
continuous improvement of organisational processes and products, and enhancing the 
efficiency of people and machine” (Nayab and Bowen, 2013).  
A major difference between TQM, MBO and BCS is their scope of application. “TQM is 
wide in scope and extends to reducing defects, eliminating waste and improving quality 
throughout all processes in the organisation, for long-term benefits. The others are narrower in 
scope and aim at setting and evaluating specific short-term targets for individual employees. 
Although MBO objectives usually relate to corporate goals and vision, the scope of the targets 
framed to meet such objectives remain confined to day-to-day applications, and need not 
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necessarily relate to quality or eliminating waste” (Nayab and Bowen, 2013).The use of MBO 
and BSC has been reduced since the introduction of TQM in the early 1980’s (Dinesh and 
Palmer, 1998), as TQM is a more comprehensive approach to organisational improvement 
and provides holistic solutions to organisational performance weaknesses.  
A number of studies have shown that organisations can achieve effective performance by 
adopting the principles of TQM, including Ahmad, Zakuan, Jusoh, Yusof and Takala (2014); 
Valmohammadi (2011); Baird, Jia Hu and Reeve (2011); Bou-Llusar, Escrig-Tena, Roca-Puig 
and Beltrán-Martín (2009); Rahman and Bullock (2005) and Klefsjö, Wiklund and Edgeman 
(2001)). TQM is a fundamental approach that shows organisations how to utilise effective and 
efficient management practices to drive performance towards excellence.  
“TQM originated in the 1950s but has only become popular since the early 1980s. It is a 
description of the culture, attitude and organisation of a company that strives to provide 
customers with products and services that satisfy their needs. The culture requires quality in 
all aspects of the company’s operations, with processes being done right the first time and 
defects and waste eradicated from operations” (Leon, 2008). According to Bou-Llusar et al. 
(2009), experts tend to see TQM as an approach to management characterised by some 
guiding principles or core concepts that embody the way the organisation is expected to 
operate, which, when effectively linked together, will lead to high performance. Their review 
of the literature shows general agreement regarding the assumptions included in the TQM 
concept, which can be summarised in three main points: 
1. “The core concepts of TQM can be classified into two broad categories or dimensions: 
social or soft TQM, and technical or hard TQM. The social issues are centred on 
human resource management and emphasise leadership, teamwork, training and 
employee involvement. The technical issues reflect an orientation toward improving 
production methods and operations and seek to establish a working method through 
the establishment of well-defined processes and procedures to make possible the 
constant improvement of goods and services to customers”.  
2. “The management of social or technical TQM issues cannot be performed in isolation. 
Social and technical dimensions (and the core concepts that form them) should be 
interrelated and mutually support one other reflecting the holistic character of TQM 
initiatives. This holistic character is also extended to the expected results of a TQM 
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initiative, as a balance of the stakeholders’ interests should be considered when the 
firm defines TQM practices”.  
3. “The optimal management of TQM core concepts will lead to better organisational 
performance. The basic theoretical foundation for this relationship is based on the 
assumption that TQM provides superior value to the customer by identifying 
customers’ expressed and latent needs, responsiveness to changing markets, as well as 
through improving the efficiency of the processes that produce the product or service”.  
Several concepts, principles and values reside under the umbrella of TQM. For example, Sila 
and Ebrahimpour (2003) have analysed and compared 76 empirically validated TQM studies 
and the impact of factors on various performance measures across countries. The following 
were the most commonly extracted factors: top management commitment and leadership, 
customer focus, information and analysis, training, supplier relationship and management, 
strategic planning, employee involvement, human resource management, process 
management, teamwork, product and service design, process control, benchmarking, 
continuous improvement, employee empowerment, quality assurance, social responsibility 
and employee satisfaction. Klefsjö et al. (2001) showed similar values falling under the 
umbrella of TQM: top management commitment, focus on customers, focus on processes, 
improve continually, let everybody be committed and base decisions on facts.  
A number of tools and methodologies are available to help organisations to adopt the core 
concepts or values of TQM, including the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award 
(MBNQA), the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) Excellence Model, 
Six Sigma, Diagnostic Benchmarking, ISO 9000, Kaizen and the Theory of Constraints 
(TOC) (Klefsjö et al., 2001; Gershon, 2010; Olofsson, 2015). Some of these approaches are 
used as guidelines for organisations to self-assess their current practices and performance 
against the concepts and standards encapsulated in the models themselves, to help drive TQM 
implementation, e.g. MBNQA, EFQM and Six Sigma (Bou-Llusar et al., 2009). There are 
other approaches organisations can use to self-assess the quality of their practices and 
performance against both the concepts and standards encapsulated in the model as well as 
against the practice and performance of other peer organisations. These approaches are known 
as diagnostic benchmarking (Yarrow, 2006).  
Yarrow (2006) asserted that diagnostic benchmarking is a variant of the popular processes of 
assessment, particularly self-assessment, i.e. EFQM and MBNQA. He emphasised that these 
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approaches are so similar that in effect they are different names for the same activity; the 
distinction, if there is one, might be that during benchmarking per se the organisation 
compares its practices and performance not only with a model of excellence but also with the 
extent to which others achieve the standards the model describes. Some approaches to using 
excellence models invite users to compare their enablers and results only against the concepts 
and standards encapsulated in the model. Others approaches, such as the diagnostic 
benchmarking tools, use the model as a medium through which the user compares their 
enablers and results both with the elements of the model and the standards achieved by other 
organisations. One of the popular diagnostic benchmarking tools is PROmoting Business 
Excellence (PROBE) (Yarrow, 2006).  
According to Radnor (2010), the tools within these methodologies are used for three main 
reasons: assessment, improvement and monitoring. The assessment process itself takes 
normally a short length of time, about a day, where a certified facilitator assesses the 
organisation’s overall practice and performance against the concepts and standards embedded 
in the tool, using a self-assessment questionnaire. The generated data from the questionnaire 
will then be processed using data analysis software and a final result showing the position of 
the organisation compared to best practice will be revealed, highlighting the organisation’s 
key weaknesses and strengths. Based on the findings from the assessment process, the 
organisation can then move ahead to actually set action plans to address its weaknesses by 
adopting the best practice set by the model during the improvement process. This process can 
be time and resource consuming and the period required for the organisation to successfully 
complete this phase and achieve the desired outcome depends entirely on how weak is its 
overall practice compared to best practice. Afterwards, during the monitoring process, the 
organisation will set a monitoring plan to make sure that it is properly addressing its 
weaknesses in accordance with the adopted improvement model and that the desired benefits 
are being achieved.     
Accordingly, the role of this family of innovation tools for organisational improvement, such 
as EFQM, Baldrige and PROBE, is to help organisations identify their practice and 
performance weaknesses, which in turn will help to streamline their problems and develop 
capacity to continuously improve themselves. Given the comprehensiveness of the diagnostic 
benchmarking tools and the benefit they can bring to organisations by comparing them to 
other organisations in their sector, the following sub-section will consider PROBE, as a 
popular diagnostic benchmarking tool (see Appendix 3 for a list of PROBE-related 
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publications). This tool will be used later in this research to assess the overall practice and 
performance of a government organisation in Iraq. 
2.4.1 PROBE  
Yarrow, Hanson and Robson (2004) stated that the ‘Made in Europe’ findings have exerted a 
significant influence on public policy and business support strategies, and the studies’ original 
research tools have subsequently developed into a leading-edge suite of benchmarking tools 
known collectively as PROBE: PROmoting Business Excellence. Clear evidence of PROBE 
tools’ ongoing effectiveness and broad applicability lies in their resonance and compatibility 
with the principles embedded in definitive frameworks such as the Baldrige criteria and the 
EFQM Excellence Model, and in contemporary implementation methodologies such as Lean 
Thinking, Six Sigma and Best Value. The best practice principles at the core of PROBE are 
universal and timeless, drawing on the concepts of Lean Thinking, TQM, Continuous 
Improvement and the Service Value Chain. PROBE has evolved and adapted to developments 
in fields such as people management and development, organisational learning, information 
technology and e-business, social and environmental responsibility and sustainable business 
(PROBE, 2016). 
The PROBE suite is used by a number of organisations in different countries and in various 
sectors to achieve excellence in their overall organisational practices and performance (Al-
Tameemi and Alshawi, 2014). For example, Rohlfer (2004) explored the role of public 
authorities in the UK and Germany in promoting and supporting benchmarking, and found 
diagnostic benchmarking tools and schemes to be prominent amongst their activities. 
According to Rohlfer (2004) the UK has in place a number of  “best practice schemes and 
tools” (p. 527) intended to support the benchmarking activities of individual organisations 
across a wide spectrum, and One of the main schemes described is PROBE. Rohlfer (2004) 
(p. 527) adds that the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) hosted the “Fit for the Future” 
campaign, and “alongside this campaign has ... a suite of … benchmarking tools under the 
name of PROmoting Business Excellence (PROBE) for helping member organisations to 
learn from each other. These tools utilise the methodology of a self-assessment questionnaire 
which is filled in by a cross-functional and multi-level team of the benchmarking company.” 
Rohlfer (2004) (p. 533) reproduces an explanation, from the CBI’s website, of the aim of the 
PROBE benchmarking scheme: 
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In a highly competitive business environment, it is essential for organisations to 
improve their performance in order to survive and grow. ... Best practices 
benchmarking will help measure your current performance level. Benchmarking will 
also help you identify operational strengths and areas for improvement. It will enable 
you to compare your organisation with competitors and should be used as a strategic 
management tool on an ongoing basis to track performance gains. 
The PROBE suite consists of a number of diagnostic benchmarking tools, each designed to fit 
a different type of organisation including the public sector and manufacturing. For example, 
the PROBE for Public Service model is based upon more than a decade of applied research 
that began with the findings of a ground-breaking best practice study conducted during the 
1990s by Professors Chris Voss, Aleda Roth and Richard Chase. The study’s findings inform 
the model of world-class standards (see Figure 2.4), which sits behind PROBE for Public 
Service, which has been refined and enhanced by ongoing research driven by the deployment 
of PROBE tools internationally (PROBE, 2016). 
 
Figure 2.4: PROBE for Public Service – Practice & Performance Model (Sources: 
PROBE, 2009) 
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According to Appleby, Robson and Owen (2003) (p. 254) the Public Service PROBE model 
is based on the premise that “Excellent leadership creates an environment in which the 
organisation’s people contribute to their full potential, deploying effective and efficient 
service processes and managing performance in order to ensure the achievement of optimal 
results. The central hypothesis of PROBE is that better business practices lead to superior 
operational and business performance.” The same links can be found in the EFQM excellence 
approach, where excellence in the enablers leads to superior results. Figure 2.5 shows PROBE 
compares with the EFQM excellence approach. 
 
Figure 2.5: Relationship between PROBE and EFQM excellence model, source: 
(Appleby et al., 2003) 
When PROBE assesses an organisation, it shows how its overall practice and performance 
compare against the World Class Best Practice Model that underpins PROBE for Public 
Service model (figure 2.4) and how the organisation or service compares with others in their 
own sector and globally against a relevant subset of the 7,000+ organisations and business 
users in over 40 countries that are on the PROBE database. PROBE for Public Service 
measures the practice and performance of individual service organisations in five broad areas: 
leadership, people, processes, performance management and the resulting indicators of 
performance outcomes, which are service quality, customer growth, result for stakeholders 
and business performance  (PROBE, 2016); see Figure 2.6.  
EFQM 
PROBE 
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Figure 2.6: Themes of the Overall Practice and Performance (Source: PROBE, 2009) 
More details about these themes can be found in Appendix 1 
The practice and performance questions used in the PROBE for public service survey uses 
scores on a scale from 1-5, where 5 represents world-class attainment for the particular 
measure. For an organisation to achieve world-class status, it must average 80% attainment in 
both business practices and operational performance. The PROBE result is represented as a 
scatter diagram, taking the consensus scores for all of the practice questions and assigning an 
index of overall practice for the organisation; similarly, an index of overall Performance is 
calculated. These indices are plotted on the scatter diagram with practice on the horizontal 
scale and performance on the vertical scale (PROBE, 2016); see Figure 2.7.  
 
Figure 2.7: PROBE World-Class Grid, source (PROBE, 2010) 
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The resulting position alone will say much about an organisation (PROBE, 2016):  
• Scores in excess of (80 practice, 80 performance) place the organisation in the world class 
or leaders category, and those between (60, 60) and (80, 80) are labelled as contenders or 
potential winners.   
• Organisations with a practice score above 60 and performance below 60 are considered 
promising because they appear to have invested in sound practices but have yet to realise 
the performance they deserve from their investment. The improved performance can 
reasonably be expected to materialise in due course. 
• Those with performance above 60 and practice below 60 are considered vulnerable. They 
appear to be achieving good performance, but it is not underpinned by equivalently good 
practices. This may reflect some sort of protected situation for the organisation, 
historically or currently. It might suggest that individuals rather than the processes are 
maintaining the performance. Clearly, a reduction in the level of protection or the loss of 
key personnel would be likely to have a serious impact on performance, hence the 
vulnerability tag. 
• Organisations below (60, 60) have the potential to do substantially better. A key challenge 
may be prioritising a large number of opportunities for improvement. 
The exact benchmarking process takes only one day to complete, during which the 
organisation will be presented with the benchmarking results and understand their position on 
the PROBE world-class grid and their key practice and performance weaknesses. However, 
the process of addressing the identified practice and performance weaknesses, the 
improvement process, can take a long time, depending on organisation’s existing position 
compared to world-class organisations.  
For the purpose of this research, PROBE is used as one of the methods to assess the overall 
practice and performance of a government organisation in Iraq. More details about the factors 
that have led to using PROBE in this research are explained in chapter 3.  
Thus, the improvement process can be costly and time consuming for organisations and is 
required to overcome numerous challenges to achieve the desired outcome. The following 
section examines the main barriers to successful implementation of organisational 
improvement.     
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2.5 BARRIERS TO SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF ORGANISATIONAL 
IMPROVEMENT METHODOLOGIES 
The purpose of using organisational improvement methodologies, such as EFQM or PROBE, 
is “to improve an organisation’s processes, products/service and organisation by identifying 
and addressing specific problems. It works forward from the current position without, at least 
initially, challenging the overall goals, strategies and operating assumptions. It is an approach 
which mostly sustains and reuses the capabilities, structures and processes of the organisation, 
and is much less likely to be disruptive” (Katsigiannis et al., 2014). It includes the provision 
of focused training of existing staff, applying changes to existing processes and structures as 
well as any other necessary organisational change that leads to performance improvement.  
Nevertheless, it is well known that people are resistant to any sort of change. This is 
especially true in the case of transformational change. Many factors contribute to this, 
including fear of the unknown, habit, the possibility of job insecurity, threats to social 
relationships, and failure to recognise the need for change (Nadler, 1993; Longo, 1997). The 
importance of identifying these factors prior to change is therefore critical to success. 
Depending on its existing culture and the degree to which the proposed change differs from 
that culture, an organisation may or may not be ready to successfully absorb the change. This 
is especially difficult when there is no apparent performance crisis in the organisation, i.e. no 
serious threat to the existence of the organisation.  
The issue of leadership is also critical when discussing transformational changes, which often 
occur in the implementation of quality improvements. “Resistance to change is especially 
relevant if the vision of a leader differs from the values and beliefs of the existing 
organisational culture. If that is the case, then cultural issues must be addressed. It is easy to 
overlook this during major change. If the organisational culture fails to assimilate the vision 
and its implications, the desired change will never become accepted and will ultimately fail” 
(Almaraz, 1994). 
Therefore, holistic organisational improvement is not an easy task, and number of studies 
have discussed various obstacles to the achievement of a fruitful organisational improvement 
initiative. For example, Radnor and Walley (2008) and Radnor and Bucci (2007) have 
discussed a number of barriers to the successful implementation of organisational 
improvement methodologies in the public sector, including:  
• Public sector culture. 
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• A lack of clear customer focus. 
• Too many procedures. 
• Employees working in silos. 
• Too many targets. 
• A lack of awareness of strategic direction. 
• The general belief that staff are overworked and underpaid. 
• A lack of understanding of the effect of variation, systems thinking and process flow. 
Through the literature analysis by Radnor (2010) some of these points have been expanded 
upon and additional ones noted: 
• The professional versus managerial role within public services. 
• Not understanding the process at either the front line or across organisational 
boundaries. 
• The transient nature of political leadership. 
• Lack of resource and/or investment to fully implement the improvement methodology. 
• Improvement methodologies are seen as manufacturing initiatives with little relevance 
to the public sector. 
Other studies provide examples of why some organisational improvement initiatives have 
failed. For instance, Guo (2004) highlighted that as much as 70% of Business Process 
Reengineering (BPR) initiatives fail as a result of the lack of leadership in dealing with work 
processes, performance measurement and skills requirements. Typically, the implementation 
of BPR in public organisations emphasises only first- and second-wave initiatives that 
focused on functional improvements. “These changes led to even greater fragmentation, 
compartmentalisation and specialisation – rather than reengineering the system, with 
management focussed on improving individual processes” (Guo, 2004).  
Additionally, the political and financial environment in which public sector organisations 
operate can lead to a selection environment that constrains change (Katsigiannis et al., 2014). 
For example, according to Blair, Taylor and Randle (1998), low customer satisfaction caused 
by inefficient processes blocking the supply chain results in the need for change in a particular 
public service. However, technical, financial and political restraints lead to the 
implementation of only a mixed version of the old and new systems. Political issues mean 
that, even though employees feel they are not being targeted or left to dissipate, they still have 
special interest in preserving as much of the status quo as possible. As a result the suggested 
modifications were conservative.  
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Furthermore, Radnor (2010) explains that impediments to the effective organisational 
benchmarking process include resistance to change because senior managers or heads of 
department feel that they cannot learn from others or do not accept the validity of the 
information they are being provided with. Woodard (2005) adds that although TQM in 
concerned public organisations has had some successes, “the gradualism and constant 
attention of implementation can make the approach unappealing.” 
  
In addition, according to Sokovic et al. (2010) and Radnor (2010), such organisational 
improvement methodologies imply a long-term programme and not a short-term fix. 
Depending on the maturity of an organisation, they may involve more complex and 
demanding methodologies and therefore need more time and resources for their proper 
implementation (Sokovic et al., 2010). For example, Radnor (2010) explains that taking a 
holistic approach, as was done within HMRC, DWP and Royal Bolton Hospital, means that 
such methodologies can become embedded only over a long period of time (up to seven 
years).  A study of management practices and performance conducted by Prabhu, Robson, 
Yarrow, Appleby and Mitchell (2001) examined 450 service organisations in the North East 
of England, (including the public services sector) where PROBE was used. Asked how soon 
their organisation would be competing with the best in class, a greater than expected number 
of those identified as contenders/world class felt that they had already reached that stage or 
would do so within the next three years. However, a greater than expected number of those 
identified as could do better organisations believed it would take five to ten years.  
As discussed in section 2.2, this research is focusing on finding an approach to assist decision 
makers in the developing world to effectively transform their poor organisational environment 
in a step-change fashion to attract FDI. From the discussion above, it can be argued that using 
existing organisational improvement methodologies is an effective but long-term approach to 
achieving a holistic organisational performance improvement. However, time is of the essence 
for those developing countries suffering from lack of infrastructure, so creating an 
organisational environment favourable for MNCs to foster FDI inflows is therefore urgent. 
Therefore, these organisational improvement methodologies do not serve as an answer to the 
question raised in section 2.3 and an alternative approach must be found. Chapter 3 will 
discuss some available alternative approaches.  
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2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that a key pillar of a county’s economic growth is the development of 
its infrastructure. Unfortunately, there is a serious lack of infrastructure development in the 
developing world, where it is most needed. One reason is that governments lack sufficient 
financial resources to address their infrastructure investment needs. Attracting FDI could be 
the solution. However, this is not an easy task, and governments in the developing world must 
create an environment favourable to MNCs to foster FDI. Several factors have been identified 
as affecting MNCs’ decision to work/invest in any country, divided into government/country-
level and organisation-level factors. As well as creating the right policies and incentives, 
governments must also improve the quality of their own organisations in order to create the 
required environment. The chapter also revealed that despite much work on encouraging 
MNCs to work/invest in a country, no research has attempted to identify a suitable approach 
for doing this.  
Consequently, this chapter attempted to shed light on the organisational improvement 
methodologies available to assist decision makers in the developing world to improve their 
performance weaknesses in a step-change fashion. However, organisations normally require a 
long time to fully absorb the principles of these holistic methodologies and translate them into 
a world-class performance, and time is something that governments in the developing world 
cannot afford. Therefore, the following chapter explores the literature for an alternative 
approach to guide decision makers in the developing world to create an appropriate 
organisational environment.  
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CHAPTER 3: A NEW CONCEPT FOR ACHIEVING A STEP-CHANGE 
ORGANISATIONAL PERFORAMNCE IMPROVMENT TO ATTERACT FDI 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The discussion in chapter two revealed that developing countries need the involvement of 
MNCs in the development of their infrastructure. A key factor for attracting FDI is the 
development of an organisational environment attractive to MNCs. Although the 
organisational performance improvement methodologies explored in chapter two were 
successful in the right context, organisations require many years to fully absorb best practice. 
Since time is of the essence for developing countries, decision makers of government 
organisations need to find an alternative approach to deliver effective performance. This 
means that they need to innovate and follow a suitable approach to implement change 
effectively.  
Iraq is a developing country in the Middle East, currently badly in need of funding to address 
its infrastructure investment requirements. The government of Iraq (GOI) has opened its door 
for investors to participate in the development of infrastructure, yet many MNCs have 
demonstrated extreme caution. Apart from problems of security and political instability, Iraq 
is internationally known as a country whose government organisations are highly corrupt and 
hard to do business with (see discussion in chapter 4). Therefore, a crucial role the GOI can 
play to attract MNCs in the short term is by improving the performance of government 
organisations in a step change fashion. Decision makers must adopt and apply best practice, 
accepting innovations enable them to emulate a world-class performance.  
This chapter discusses innovation, linking it to organisational performance, explaining why 
some innovation implementations fail and suggesting methods for successful implementation. 
The chapter also looks at some organisational tools and techniques and their role in helping 
government organisations carry out infrastructure development programmes effectively.  It 
also highlights the main considerations for managers when implementing organisational 
change. The chapter concludes by presenting six synthesised steps intended to guide the 
research towards developing and proposing an approach to help government organisations’ 
decision makers overcome performance weaknesses and create an organisational environment 
attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion.     
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3.2 INNOVATION AND ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
In all sectors innovation has become more critical for performance, and a focus for 
organisational change. At the same time approaches to innovation are changing (Katsigiannis 
et al., 2014). According to de Vries, Bekkers and Tummers (2014) innovation is used to 
achieve numerous objectives, such as increasing effectiveness and efficiency, responding to 
the external environment, ensuring customer satisfaction, involving citizens and, finally, 
involving private partners. It is essential to differentiate between the types of innovation, as 
future decisions that may be vital to the success of the implementation depend on 
understanding the type of innovation (Trott, 2011). This section sheds light on some of the 
main definitions and types of innovation and possible approaches to their successful 
implementation, in the context of this research. 
3.2.1 Innovation: Definition and Types 
The business dictionary defines innovation as “the process of translating an idea or invention 
into a product or service that creates value and often results when ideas are applied by the 
company in order to further satisfy the needs and expectations of the customers” (BD, 2016). 
This definition suggests that innovation is a process of transforming an invention or idea into 
a product or service which can be exploited commercially and consequently benefit 
consumers. This is in line with’ Mars (2013) definition of innovation as “the introduction of 
something new that positively impacts mankind in meaningful and contextually specific 
ways”. This definition highlights the context within which innovation is implemented, 
implying that the context of an organisation or an industry is the trigger for the innovation 
process. This is supported by Feimi and Kume (2014) and Stone, Benjamin and Leahy (2011), 
who stress that innovation is the successful implementation of creative ideas within an 
organisation, often identified as a critical aspect of continued growth and competitiveness in 
industry and business in general.O'Sullivan and Dooley (2008) acknowledge these various 
aspects of innovation, highlighting its importance as a tool for continuous improvement and 
defining it as “the process of making changes to something established by introducing 
something new that adds value to customers and then learning from that process so that 
innovation can be repeated continuously”. Inspired by these definitions and in the context of 
the aims of the study, this research defines innovation as a process that utilises existing best 
practices and translates them into something that can help improve an organisation’s 
performance to better deliver its service to customers.      
 Page | 35  
 
A number of studies have classified innovation by how managers respond to the various 
organisational challenges and the impact of their response on the existing organisational 
framework. For example, in (1997) Harvard business professor Clayton Christensen published 
his influential book The innovator’s dilemma, which established his reputation in the study of 
technological innovation in commercial enterprises. In this and subsequent work he 
articulated the basic theory of disruptive technology, characterising two broad types of 
innovation: 
• Sustaining innovation is about making a good product/service better (Christensen, 
2012). Sustained innovations have a constantly improving track record within a typical 
level of competition. Organisations are continually improving their products or 
services in response to customer demands. This dynamic approach is predictable and 
can guarantee success because needs remain stable over time (Bower and Christensen, 
1995; Christensen, 1997).  
• Disruptive innovation describes “a process by which a product or service takes root 
initially in simple applications at the bottom of a market and then relentlessly moves 
up market, eventually displacing established competitors” (Christensen, 2015). It “is 
not a breakthrough innovation that makes good products better; it has very specific 
definition that is, it transforms a product or service that historically was so expensive 
and complicated that only few people with a lot of money and a lot of skills had access 
to it. A disruptive innovation makes it so much more affordable and accessible that a 
much larger population have access to it.” (Christensen, 2012) 
Unlike sustained innovations, disruptive innovations do not constitute an improvement in the 
quality or performance of an existing product or service. Instead of maintaining a constantly 
improving track record, they tend to disrupt this track record, generating a product or service 
radically different from the one being offered, radically changing the rules of the game, and 
allowing access for actors not covered under the traditional model (Bower and Christensen, 
1995). Disruptive innovation is a powerful mean of broadening and developing new markets, 
attracting new customers and providing new functionality, which in turn may disrupt existing 
market linkages (Yu and Hang, 2010). Such an approach pushes an organisation to “identify 
possible new ways and desirable futures, and is suited to addressing complex problems or 
situations where past approaches have failed to gain traction. It reflects a re-framing approach 
where it is essential to explore alternative futures without being conceptually locked- in to 
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past strategies. In this approach the strategies, structures, routines and capabilities of an 
organisation are more likely to be re-assessed and disrupted” (Katsigiannis et al., 2014).  
According to Davila, Epstein and Shelton (2006) (p. 57) “disruptive innovation is a broader 
term that addresses both technology and business model changes. Disruptive innovations 
include technology-driven innovation (semi-radical technology innovation; upper-left 
quadrant see Figure 3.2). It also can mean changes to the business model – a semi-radical 
business model innovation (lower-right quadrant) …. However, sometimes disruptive 
innovations include a combination of technology change and business model change – a 
radical innovation (upper-right quadrant) …. the disruptive innovation can be a key source of 
growth and is widely sought after by CEOs”. 
Accordingly, innovation can be sustaining or disruptive to an organisation depending on the 
organisation’s existing ability to implement the innovation; see Figure 3.1. According to 
Christensen and Kaufman (2006) what is disruptive to one organisation might have a 
sustaining impact on another.  
 
Figure 3.1: Organisational capability and innovation, (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000) 
According to Christensen and Overdorf (2000), when an organisation faces a business 
challenge that requires the organisation to innovate, such as developing a new product or 
service or improving an existing one to attract a new customer segment, the manager’s action 
plan to address the challenge will either have a sustaining or disruptive impact on the 
organisation’s values and priorities embedded in its existing business model. For example, 
when the development or improvement of a product or service requires managers to adopt 
new values and priorities, such as following a new supply chain, procurement, marketing 
Disruptive 
Innovations 
Sustaining 
Innovations 
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and/or profit system(s), this type of innovation is considered as disruptive because it disrupts 
not only the market with the new or improved product or service, but also disrupts the 
organisational culture and the current way of doing things within the organisation. On the 
other hand, when the organisation’s existing values and priorities fit well with the 
requirements of implementing the innovation, and new processes to successfully execute the 
innovation may or may not be required, this is considered as sustaining innovation. Managers 
can follow the existing business model and may only need to improve or develop new 
processes or enabling technologies to successfully implement the innovation.  
Davila et al. (2006), (2012) also classified the types of innovation by taking into consideration 
the change the innovation will bring to the organisation’s current use of technology and its 
business model. They follow a similar approach to Christensen, classifying innovations based 
on the impact they will have on the organisation’s existing capabilities. They outlined a two-
dimensional plane in which one axis is innovation on a technology basis, and the other is 
innovation on a business model basis. The greater the change, the further one moves along the 
axis, resulting in the matrix shown in Figure 3.2. For example, when a new/improved 
performance such as developing a new product/service is needed, and when this 
new/improved performance suggests the need for significant change to the existing 
technology and business model, such innovation/improvement is called radical; with 
consideration of significant change to one or more of the technology and business model 
levers, see Table 3.1. Innovation that requires a small change to either the business model or 
technology to achieve the desired outcome is called incremental innovation. A significant 
change along one, but not the other, axis is called a semi-radical innovation (Badawy, 2006). 
 
Figure 3.2: Innovation Matrix, (Davila et al., 2006) 
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In Table 3.1, Davila et al. (2006) (p. 40-41) show that incremental innovation always firmly 
embraces the existing technologies and business model; although some elements may change 
slightly, most stay unchanged. Semi-radical innovations include little or no change to the 
levers of one of the innovation drivers. Radical innovations include changes to levers in both 
the technology and business model, but usually not to all the six levers of innovation 
described below. Innovation is always about combining something old and something new 
from the technology and business model levers. 
Table 3.1: The Levers for the Three Types of Innovations, source:(Davila et al., 2006) 
            Levers 
 
Types  
of Innovation 
Business Model Levers Technology Levers 
Value 
Proposition 
Value 
Chain 
Target 
Customer 
Product 
and 
Service 
Process 
Technology 
Enabling 
Technology 
Incremental Small change in one or more of the six levers 
Semi-Radical  
Business Model 
Driven  
Significant change in one or 
more of the three levers 
Small change in one or more of the 
three levers 
Semi-Radical 
Technology 
Driven 
Small change in one or more 
of the three levers 
Significant change in one or 
more of the three levers 
Radical Significant change in one or 
more of the three levers 
Significant change in one or 
more of the three levers 
Davila et al. (2012) (p1-9) explain that a company has three technology levers: product and 
service offerings, process technologies and enabling technologies. A change to the product or 
service offered by the organisation is the most visible form of technology change, apparent to 
customers, competitors and partners. Less visible are changes to the processes used to create 
or deliver the product or service. Likewise, changes to enabling technologies, such as quality 
or inventory control, are hidden to all but a selected few. Some companies depend almost 
exclusively on technology innovation, although competitors quickly match these. The 
technology innovation thus creates a huge competitive churn but little or no competitive 
advantage. Thus, innovation is more than changing technologies to create products and 
services that are better, cheaper and faster. Innovation also thrives on business model 
innovations. 
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 Davila et al. showed that business model levers change how a company creates, sells and 
delivers value to its customers. Business model change can drive innovation in three areas: 
value proposition, value networks, and target customer. A company innovates its business 
model in three basic ways: it can update its value proposition, modifying the value it delivers 
to customers; it can rewire the value network, transforming how it delivers and captures 
value, by radically changing the supply chain or the revenue, cost; and margin model; or it 
can change its target customer, altering the sector to which it delivers value. These are three 
fundamental elements of every business strategy and logical focal points for innovation 
(Davila et al., 2012).  
Accordingly, this research classifies innovation into two main types (see Figure 3.3): 
1. Disruptive innovation, entailing disruption of the organisational business model. 
Successful implementation depends on the organisation making significant changes to 
its existing value proposition, value chain or targeted customer, with or without the 
need for a change to its existing product/service, processes or enabling technologies.  
2. Sustaining innovation fits well with the organisation’s existing business model and 
may or may not require the organisation to make significant changes to its existing 
product/service, processes or enabling technologies.     
 
Figure 3.3: Research Definition for Innovation, inspired by (Davila et al., 2012 & 2006; 
Christensen and Overdorf, 2000) 
Nonetheless, given the difference in the impact of innovation implementation on an 
organisation’s existing organisational framework, it is important to understand the possible 
Disruptive 
Innovations 
Sustaining 
Innovations 
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approaches managers can follow to achieve successful implementation. This will be discussed 
in the following section.  
3.3 INNOVATION IMPLEMENTATION  
Applying innovation is not an easy task; whether it is applying a new managerial system or 
adopting a new processes or technology to deliver a new product or service, innovation will 
face a similar organisational response to any change initiative within an organisation. 
O'Sullivan and Dooley (2008) asserted that ‘organisations spend on average just under 4% of 
turnover on innovation, trying to achieve goals such as better quality, lower lead times, more 
product variety and increased market share. Most innovation fails to achieve these goals and 
some analysts argue that failure could be as high as 90%. The causes of failure are varied, 
although some are common across most organisations’. O’Sullivan and Dooley classify 
causes into ‘cultural and process failures. Cultural failures, such as poor leadership and 
organisation, are clearly important but take time to improve. Process failures such as 
definition of goals and aligning actions with goals are also important but can be remedied in 
the shorter term through better information and knowledge management’.   
Klein and Knight (2005) (p2-3) agree that the implementation of organisational innovation is 
difficult for numerous reasons: innovation may fail if it requires would-be users to acquire 
new technical knowledge and skills, which many people may find tedious or stressful; or 
because individuals are required to change their roles, routines and norms, or to coordinate 
their activities and share information when previously they had worked independently. 
Innovation may also disrupt the status hierarchy, requiring individuals who have previously 
worked as boss and subordinates to now work as peers. While these sorts of change trigger 
strong resistance from personnel, another important reason for failure is that implementation 
of innovations is time consuming, expensive and has an initial negative effect on 
organisational performance. Effective implementation may require substantial investment of 
time and money in technology start-up, training, user support, monitoring, meetings and 
evaluation. This situation may push targeted users and their managers to feel greater pressure 
to maintain pre-existing levels of performance than to invest in the uncertain and long-term 
potential of innovation implementation. Klein and Knight (2005) added that organisations’ 
failure to adopt, and certainly to implement, potentially beneficial innovations is because the 
organisations are themselves a stabilising force, their norms and routines fostering 
maintenance of the status quo. Even when organisational members recognise that a specific 
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change would be beneficial, they often fall prey to the knowing–doing gap. Unsurprisingly, 
observers estimate that some 50% of attempts to implement major technological and 
administrative changes end in failure. 
In order to implement innovation successfully, O'Sullivan and Dooley (2008) ascertain that 
every organisation would like to achieve a return on their investment. The causes of 
innovation failure give an indication of the areas in which most organisations need to improve 
to increase the impact of innovation. They suggest that the innovation funnel (Figure 3.4) 
offers a structured approach to managing innovation, reduces the effects of the main causes of 
failure, while and simultaneously achieving goal attainment. 
 
Figure 3.4: Innovation Funnel, source (O'Sullivan and Dooley, 2008) 
O'Sullivan and Dooley (2008) explain that the funnel emphasises that organisations can 
achieve successful innovation implementation by having better definition of goals, more 
effective alignment between actions and goals, greater participation of individuals in teams, 
better monitoring of results and great communications and building of communities. Klein 
and Knight (2005) also showed that achieving effective innovation implementation can be 
obtained by satisfying a number of critical factors, These include organisations establishing 
effective implementation policies and practices, ensuring that employees have a shared 
positive perception of the importance of innovation implementation within the team or 
organisation; achieving strong, convincing, informed and demonstrable management support 
for implementation; ensuring the availability of financial resources; introducing an 
organisational learning orientation or set of interrelated practices and beliefs that support and 
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enable employee and organisational skill development, learning, and growth; and, 
importantly, for managers having patience and accepting long-term orientation.  
 The innovation implementation model of Klein, Conn and Sorra (2001a) (Figure 3.5) 
emphasises that innovation effectiveness is significantly correlated to implementation 
effectiveness; and organisational differences in implementation effectiveness (innovation use) 
are significantly related to management support, financial resource availability, policies and 
practices, and implementation climate.  
 
Figure 3.5: The Link Between Implementation Effectiveness and Innovation 
Effectiveness, source (Klein et al., 2001a) 
In all circumstances, the degree of impact of innovation implementation on the organisation 
will determine the level of resistance it receives. This is because 'antibodies are an 
organisation’s natural response to change. Incremental changes are usually tolerated well, as 
they are small and not very threatening. However, breakthroughs/semi-radical and radical 
innovations are rightfully perceived as disruptive to the way things usually work. The 
innovation might change the way traditional business is done in such areas as revenue and 
margin generation, and product and service delivery. Sometimes the innovation could 
cannibalise existing business. This type of change evokes a strong antibody response from the 
existing business' (Davila et al., 2012). 
However, despite the fact that innovation implementation can be disruptive to an 
organisation’s day-to-day routine, change is inevitable and necessary for an organisation’s 
continual survival in its market. Several studies argue that organisations need not pay 
attention to a single market direction and or focus only on increasing the efficiency of their 
products to target those that can pay more, when there are other businesses (disrupters) that 
can provide products (disruptive innovation) that are much affordable and can serve the same 
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purpose. These disrupter organisations will not only attract customers that the disrupted 
businesses have overlooked, but will eventually overtake the high-paying customers, 
destroying the market of these businesses. An example of disruptive innovation is the steel 
mini-mills which have significantly disrupted the market of the large integrated steel mills; 
and the laptops and PCs and that have gradually destroyed the market of mainframe 
computers; see for example Bower and Christensen (1995), Christensen (1997), Christensen, 
Raynor and Anthony (2003) and Christensen (2013). Another example of disruptive 
innovation is the Lexus, used  by Toyota to disrupt the marketplace in luxury cars previously 
occupied only by BMW, Mercedes and the like; see Liker (2004).    
Effectively, in order to avoid having their organisations end up like the integrated steel mills 
and mainframe computer companies, managers are required to take the risk and consider 
making radical organisational change to adapt to the market environment. According to HBR 
(2013), in order to succeed managers must develop their own disruptive innovations and treat 
them as a separate unit with a different business model and growth expectations, asking what 
job customers need to be done and then segmenting customers by job rather than by product, 
market size or demographics. Then they need to develop basic low-cost, transparent solutions 
to complete the job for customers. Eventually these new disruptive solutions will help these 
companies to dominate the market again, keeping or increasing their customer base and 
ultimately keeping their business alive.  
In summary, organisations must continually innovate to attract more customers and maintain 
their market position. However, as discussed above, innovation implementation can cause 
overall organisational disruption, leading to resistance and failure to achieve the innovation 
goals. An effective approach to solving this dilemma is for managers to treat innovations as 
separate units, with dedicated teams to work on their implementation. Two examples of 
establishing a separate organisation to deal with an immediate organisational challenge are: 
• Cook (2014) described the cornerstone of China’s economic development and growth, 
from the 1980s when the economy was a wreck and people were starving on the street. 
The Chinese government did something that no government had done before, setting 
out policies through an experimentation approach to find the best policies to address 
the country’s needs. Instead of legislating, the government ran experiments to test 
proposed policies. They fenced Shenzhen city, for example, and ran it with different 
economic rules while the rest of the country remained under the communist economy. 
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Shenzhen had free market rules with foreign investment allowed, and this is where the 
Chinese economic miracle started. Jobs were created, companies, investment and 
people from other cities started to cross the fences to get to Shenzhen. Eventually, 
when that formula had proved successful, it was expanded to the rest of China. 
• Liker (2004) described the development of Lexus, which was meant to disrupt the 
luxury car market in Europe and America, one of the best examples of the Toyota 
Way in action. In developing the first Lexus car, managers first needed to convince 
Toyota’s conservative management that the idea of a car to compete with the best in 
the world would work. The innovation was building a prototype car that showed 
quality, efficiency and effectiveness better than the competitors’ luxury cars. In order 
to achieve this, they created a functional team from the best engineers in Toyota, 
which eventually produced the first Lexus car and changed Toyota’s production path 
ever after.   
However, Christensen and Overdorf (2000) questioned how separate such a division needed 
to be. A new physical location is not always necessary, the primary requirement being that the 
project not be forced to compete for resources with projects in the mainstream organisation. 
Projects that are inconsistent with a company’s mainstream values will naturally be accorded 
lowest priority, and whether the independent organisation is physically separate is less 
important than its independence from the normal decision-making criteria in the resource 
allocation process. Christensen and Overdorf (2000) also explained that managers confronting 
change, such as delivering effective performance for MNCs, need to ask the following 
questions: 
I. Does the organisation have the right resources required to succeed? 
II. Are the processes by which work habitually gets done in the organisation appropriate 
for this new problem? 
III. Will the values of the organisation cause this initiative to get high priority or to 
languish? 
The answer will help managers decide on the approach that can best address the required 
change to deliver the required performance. They proposed a matrix to help managers 
understand what kind of team should work on the project and what organisational structure 
that team needs to work within; see Figure 3.6.  
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Figure 3.6: Fitting the Tool to the Task, (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000) 
The matrix supposes that an organisation needs to react to or initiate an innovation. The 
vertical axis asks the manager to measure the extent to which the organisation’s existing 
processes are suited to getting the new job done effectively. The horizontal axis asks them to 
assess whether the organisation’s values will permit the company to allocate the resources the 
new initiative needs. The different types of team required are illustrated Figure 3.7. For 
example, when a manager faces a disruptive change such as the one in region C or D, this 
suggests the need for a change of business model, and a spin-off or spinout organisation 
should be created, with a heavyweight development team, as shown in Figure 3.7(d). The 
spinout will allow the project to be governed by a business model with different values and 
priorities from those of the parent organisation. According to Barahona and Elizondo (2012), 
the spinout is an 'independent organisation with other values and skills, not threatened by new 
ways of doing things, and not seeing the possible market in the same way as the threatened  
parent organisation. It does not keep anything from its parent. At the highest level, it may 
have contacts that facilitate the use of existing resources, but the new organisation “forgets” 
how the original one did things and how it saw its customers', including MNCs. 'Otherwise, 
there is a risk that the new organisation will remain immersed in the assumptions, values and 
decisions of the parent organisation'. The heavyweight team will ensure that new processes 
can emerge. 
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Christensen and Overdorf (2000) explain that in region A, the project is a good fit with the 
company’s processes and values, so no new capabilities are called for. A functional or 
lightweight team, as in Figure 3.7(a) & (b), can tackle the project within the existing 
organisational structure. A functional team works on function-specific issues, then passes the 
project on to the next team. A lightweight team is cross-functional, but team members stay 
under the control of their respective functional managers. In region B, the project is a good fit 
with the company’s values but not with its processes. It presents the organisation with new 
types of problem and therefore requires new types of interaction and coordination among 
groups and individuals. The team, like the team in region A, is working on a sustaining rather 
than a disruptive innovation. In this case, a heavyweight team has advantages, although the 
project could be executed within the mainstream company. The members of the heavyweight 
team, as shown in Figure 3.7(c) work solely on the project and are expected to behave like 
general managers, shouldering responsibility for the project’s success; new processes and new 
ways of working together can then emerge.  
 
Figure 3.7: Type of Teams, Source Christensen and Kaufman (2006) 
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This concept is supported by Ito (1995) who explained that 'when parent firms have higher 
technological capabilities they may not need to spin off firms, because the new business may 
be the application of the parent’s technology in different industries and it may not require a 
different management system. On the other hand, in order to survive, less technologically 
advanced parent firms are more likely to create spinoffs with less intervention; this is 
especially the case when the new business is in a high-technology industry and thus requires 
different management that cannot be managed by the old system'. 
Accordingly, the concept that can be extracted from the discussion above is that the 
implementation of an innovation may require an organisation to change its current 
management system, incorporating new values and priorities into its existing business model. 
In this case, in order for decision makers to implement such an innovation successfully, it is 
better to establish a separate spinout organisation/unit having the required management 
system, values and priorities to carry out the implementation of the innovation. However, 
when the innovation implementation does not necessitate adopting a new management system 
or when the core concepts of the existing business model fit well with the requirements of 
implementing the desired innovation, there is no need for a spinout organisation or unit, and it 
is better to assign the implementation of the innovation to a team within the main organisation 
where they can take advantage of existing resources. 
Hence, this concept can provide an answer to the question raised in chapter two, section 2.3, 
about finding an approach enabling decision makers of government organisations in the 
developing world to create an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change 
fashion. Instead of focusing on applying the required improvement to an entire government 
organisation and facing the inevitable challenge of resistance to change, the decision makers 
can establish and dedicate a separate division or team to emulate the required world-class 
standards, by working exclusively and effectively on addressing the needs of the new 
customers, in this case MNCs. This should reduce the time required to create the 
organisational environment favourable to MNCs. This potential answer to the research 
question – (section 2.3.5) will be examined in more detail in the next section, to show how the 
concept can help in addressing the aim of this research. 
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3.4 A STEP-CHANGE APPROACH TO ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
IMPROVEMENT  
When considering MNCs as new customers fostering FDI, the decision makers need to 
innovate and ensure that their government organisations are able to deliver high-quality 
performance throughout the lifecycle of the infrastructure projects. As discussed in section 
2.4, achieving high-quality performance requires the organisation to adopt best practices, 
although this may mean adopting new and disruptive technologies, such as e-procurement. 
According to Christensen (1997), this may entail disruption to the government organisations’ 
business model as it changes the relationship between the organisation and its customers and 
suppliers, changes the traditional way of doing things and disrupts the financial arrangements 
created for its current marketing and technology. Barahona and Elizondo (2012) confirmed 
that technologies used to improve the performance of government procurement, such as e-
procurement, fits the category of disruptive innovation. In line with Davila et al. (2012), they 
argue that public entities, by their very nature, are less flexible when making structural 
changes.  Just as in introducing e-procurement, the adoption, implementation and diffusion of 
a disruptive or radical innovation within a public organisation is more prone to non-
compliance or failure, than to success and the satisfaction of interested parties. Therefore, 
addressing this challenge requires decision makers of government organisations to follow an 
approach that will overcome their organisational performance weaknesses and deliver better 
performance in a step-change fashion, without disrupting the existing system.  
The concept identified in section 3.3 can play a significant role in addressing this challenge 
and in forming an appropriate organisational performance approach. Accordingly, decision 
makers of government organisations should establish a separate organisation or team and 
dedicate it exclusively to work with MNCs. This organisation or team should follow best 
practices to deliver high-quality performance.    
More specifically, in order to apply this concept to the context of government organisations in 
the developing world, it can be argued that if a country such as Iraq has poor overall 
organisational practices, adopting best practice would entail a significant business model 
change. These decision makers of such government organisations would be advised to 
establish a separate spinout organisation, run by a heavyweight team, dedicated to working 
exclusively with MNCs and with complete responsibility for success. On the other hand, if 
government organisations exhibit good overall practices, the sustaining type of change is 
preferable, with consideration of small technological or business model changes. The decision 
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makers would be advised to establish a lightweight or functional team (see section 3.3) within 
the existing organisation to work on addressing MNCs’ needs during the lifecycle of the 
infrastructure project, offering a world-class performance to satisfy the MNC.  
Another question is how decision makers of government organisations in the developing 
world can learn the level of change or improvement required in their existing overall 
practices, to decide on the type of organisational structure to dedicate to the work. Essentially, 
the findings obtained from the self-assessment process of PROBE (section 2.4), or similar 
tools, can inform decision makers of the level of the gap between best practices and their 
existing overall practices. 
For example, the PROBE world-class grid (Figure 2.7), shows that organisations falling in the 
could-do-better or vulnerable categories have much poorer practices, compared to best 
practice, than organisations in the promising or contender categories. Consequently, those 
developing world, government organisations responsible for the delivery of infrastructure that 
fall in the former group are more likely to need to adopt best practice, resulting in business 
model disruption such as the adoption of e-procurement, than those in the latter group. In the 
context of the models of Christensen and Overdorf (2000) and Davila et al. (2012) (discussed 
in section 3.3), if the decision makers of could do better organisations are to make the change 
without disrupting their existing system, they would be advised to establish a separate spinout 
organisation and dedicate it to work exclusively with MNCs. The spinout organisation will be 
operated by a heavyweight team trained to deliver world-class performance during the 
lifecycle of the infrastructure projects. On the other hand, organisations in the promising or 
contender categories can dedicate an in-house team (lightweight, cross-functional or 
heavyweight team as needed) to make sure that MNCs receive the required services in the 
way they desire. By combining these proposals, a new model can emerge, helping decision 
makers of government organisations in, say, Iraq, to overcome their performance weaknesses 
in a step-change fashion without disrupting their existing organisational system; see Figure 
3.8.  
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Benchmark the Organisation Existing 
Practices Against the Sought Best 
Practices and Identify the Gap
If the Gap is Small
Establish a Team to work in an 
organisational structure within the 
existing organisation in line with best 
practices and dedicate it to work with 
MNCs
If the Gap is 
Significant
Establish a Separate Spinout 
Organisations in line with the best 
practices and dedicate it to work with 
MNCs
 
Figure 3.8: A Synthesised Method for Helping Decision Makers Deliver Attractive 
Organisational Performance in a Step Change Fashion 
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Table 3.2 summarises the discussion above by showing the scenarios which can be used by 
these decision makers to deliver effective performance according to where their organisations 
fall on the PROBE world-class grid, without disrupting their existing systems.   
Table 3.2: Rationales on Selecting the Right Team and Organisational Structure to 
Work with MNCs 
If a government 
organisation fall in the . . 
.  
Select this type of team to work with 
MNCs. . . 
To operate . . .  
CONTENDER Category 
of PROBE World-Class 
Grid  
Functional teams who work sequentially 
on issues, or  
lightweight teams — ad hoc cross-
functional teams who work simultaneously 
on multiple issues  
Within the 
existing 
government 
organisation 
 
PROMISING Category 
of PROBE World-Class 
Grid  
Heavyweight team dedicated exclusively 
to the innovation project, which aim at 
delivering world-class performance with 
complete responsibility for its success 
 
Within the 
existing 
government 
organisation 
 
VULNERABLE 
Category of PROBE 
World-Class Grid  
Heavyweight team dedicated exclusively 
to the innovation project, with complete 
responsibility for its success 
 
In a separate 
spinout 
or acquired 
organisation 
 
COULD DO BETTER 
Category of PROBE 
World-Class Grid  
Heavyweight team dedicated exclusively 
to the innovation project, with complete 
responsibility for its success 
 
In a separate 
spinout 
or acquired 
organisation 
(Note: these rationales are inspired by (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000; Davila et al., 2006, 
2012; PROBE)) 
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In summary, to achieve the above, decision makers are required to carry out the following 
steps:  
• First assess their organisation’s overall practice and performance;  
• Second identify the level of change or improvement required to their existing 
practices to be able to emulate world-class performance; and,  
• Third decide on a suitable team and organisational structure for the team to work 
within, and dedicate it exclusively to work with MNCs, as depicted in Figure 3.8 and 
Table 3.2.       
This is in line with Yusof and Aspinwall (2000), who argued that effective design of an 
organisational improvement approach requires thorough analysis of the organisation and its 
operating environment. This will lead to the provision of a sound foundation for the path to 
successful implementation. Therefore, the above three critical steps will be followed in this 
research as a method to help the researcher identify and propose, for decision makers a 
suitable team and organisational structure to dedicate to working with MNCs during the 
lifecycle of infrastructure development programmes within their jurisdiction.  
However, these three steps provide only part of the answer to the question raised in section 
2.3.5, and other considerations need to be taken into account.  First, understanding some of 
the critical organisational elements that can help the new organisational structure achieve a 
step-change performance in the delivery of infrastructure projects. Second, given that the 
organisational structures (Figure 3.8 and Table 3.2) are intended to work within the general 
context of the public sector,  it is important to understand the key characteristics of effective 
change management within the context of public sector organisations. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 
shed light on these two important aspects respectively.     
3.5 CRITICAL ELEMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE STEP-CHANGE INFRASTRUCUTRE 
DEVELOPMENT  
The literature shows that strategic planning, project management and information technology 
are very effective tools and techniques for improving organisational performance. This 
section will discuss these concepts and their benefits, and their connection to organisational 
performance.    
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3.5.1 Strategic Planning and Organisational Performance  
According to Sahoo (2011), as well as having adequate financial resources, infrastructure 
development requires strong planning and coordination. Public organisations with a culture 
that supports effective and efficient strategic planning and management can judge whether the 
best approach to delivering services to citizens is sustaining or disruptive. Bryson (2011) 
defines strategic planning as a “deliberative, disciplined approach to producing fundamental 
decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organisation (or other entity) is, what it 
does, and why”. Strategic planning of this kind can help leaders and managers successfully 
address major issues or challenges facing an organisation, issues or challenges not amenable 
to simple technical fixes. Strategic planning can be helpful for purposes of: (1) gathering, 
analysing, and synthesising information to consider its strategic significance and frame 
possible choices; (2) producing considered judgments among key decision makers about 
desirable, feasible, defensible and acceptable missions, goals, strategies and actions, along 
with complementary initiatives, such as new, changed or terminated policies, programmes, 
and projects, or even overall organisational designs; (3) addressing in effective ways key 
organisational issues or challenges now and in the foreseeable future; (4) enhancing 
continuous organisational learning; and (5) creating significant and enduring public value 
(Bryson, 2011,  p. 7-8). Figure 3.9 provides more information about the strategic planning 
process.  
 
Figure 3.9: The ABCs of Strategic Planning, source (Bryson, 2011) 
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In fact, strategic planning is one part of an organisation’s management and is seen by some as 
its principal part (Edwards, 2012). The correlation analysis results of Arasa and K'Obonyo 
(2012) indicated the existence of a strong relationship between strategic planning and 
organisational performance. They found that all strategic planning steps are positively related 
to a company’s performance. Additionally, VNG (2005) argued that a comprehensive 
strategic plan will help government organisations understand what they want to accomplish, 
by when, and what qualities, skills and resources will be needed to achieve their envisaged 
goals. It should set out ambitious but achievable goals and targets and a coherent and logical 
set of actions to meet these goals and targets. Edwards (2012) also found that when local 
governments implement a comprehensive strategic planning process, this planning will be 
associated with better performance in terms of their efficiency, effectiveness, service quality 
and productivity.  
According to UNCTAD (2008), the massive infrastructure development needed in developing 
countries requires them to draw on contributions from MNCs, but in a way that fits the 
national development plans. Developing countries need to consider when and in what areas to 
involve these companies and they must find ways to ensure that such projects achieve the 
desired outcomes. WBG (2014) adds that when developing countries decide to target higher 
levels of FDI, they need to have a clear and prioritised strategic plan in place. 'It should set 
out the conditions and resources required to make the location fully competitive in attracting 
new investment, such as: legal, policy or regulatory barriers and the steps necessary to remove 
or alleviate them; what infrastructure, skills, and other conditions need to be stimulated; and 
how the location will proactively promote new investment' (WBG, 2014).   
Accordingly, strategic planning can help leaders and managers successfully address major 
issues or challenges facing their organisation, issues or challenges not amenable to simple 
technical fixes. The strategic planning process helps to unify the organisation around a 
common mission, goals, and objectives based upon appropriate internal and external analysis. 
Conducting comprehensive strategic planning can help government organisations responsible 
for the delivery of infrastructure in the developing world to understand the needs of their 
customers’ (either citizens or suppliers such as MNCs); develop effective strategic plans to 
address their needs; and identify how, what and where to attract MNCs to address their 
citizens’ needs. Thus, it can be argued that having a strategic planning office or experts as part 
of the proposed organisational structure (section 3.4) will have a significant impact on 
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achieving effective organisational performance while working with MNCs during the 
lifecycle of infrastructure projects.   
3.5.2 Project Management Office (PMO) and Organisational Performance 
On the other hand, although strategic planning is important for government organisations to 
develop the right policies, regulations and frameworks to attract FDI, finding an appropriate 
way to implement them that is more transparent and less corrupt or bureaucratic is of a 
tremendous importance. According to Bossidy and Charan (2002) and Raffoni (2003), most 
organisations that are successful in their strategy implementation use some sort of project 
management to implement their strategies. Project management must certainly be used in 
some form to drive the implementation of the strategic plan, forming the foundation of the 
plan and its implementation. According to PMI (2013), project management is the application 
of knowledge, skills, tools and techniques to project activities to meet the project 
requirements. It is, in general, a very successful management discipline for driving execution 
and obtaining results (Britz and Buys, 2007).  
Britz and Buys (2007) add that a Project Management Office (PMO) should be established to 
drive the implementation of the strategic projects and measure their progress. The PMO must 
support programme and project managers in tracking the progress of the projects. According 
to PMI (2013), the PMO is a management structure that standardises the project-related 
governance processes and facilitates the sharing of resources, methodologies, tools and 
techniques. Its responsibilities can range from providing project management support 
functions to actually being responsible for the direct management of one or more projects. 
IPMA (2006) states that “A project management office (or programme management or 
portfolio management office) is part of a permanent organisation. Its roles are typically to 
support, to set standards and guidelines for the managers of different projects and 
programmes, to collect project management data from the projects, to consolidate it and to 
report to some governing body. It has to ensure that the projects are aligned to the 
organisation’s strategy and vision”.  
According to Karayaz and Gungor (2013), one of the most important roles of PMOs is to 
collaborate with upper management to integrate the strategies into project management 
efforts; organisations need to establish a strategic framework for significant success, that 
consists of a vision, a mission, values, strategies for success, goals and action plans for daily, 
weekly, and monthly actions. In this manner, PMOs support this strategic framework, 
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constructed by upper-level management. One of the important roles of the PMO is to provide 
project management that fits in with the strategic plan. For this reason, PMOs integrate an 
organisation’s strategies and goals consistently into project management. According to Sirkin, 
Keenan and Jackson (2005), they can help manage portfolios of projects by identifying 
problem projects; focusing execution expertise and senior management attention where it is 
most needed; and defusing political issues. PMI (2013) adds that the PMO can help in 
managing shared resources across all projects administered, by identifying and developing 
project management methodology; best practices and standards; monitoring compliance with 
project management standards, policies, procedures and templates by means of project audits; 
developing and managing project policies, procedures templates, and other shared 
documentation; as well as ensuring that the projects are aligned to the organisation’s strategy 
and vision.  
Therefore, PMOs can be an effective approach to improving the performance of public sector 
organisations in developing countries, helping them to find better ways of providing public 
services. Effective PMOs can help organisations plan and prioritise their projects effectively; 
design best practice processes and procedures for effective project implementation beginning 
from the planning stage; devising project tenders and contracting procedures; through to 
supervision of the execution stage, in which they show integrity, transparency and simplicity 
when dealing with investors such as MNCs. Therefore, building an effective PMO or having 
expert project managers within the organisation or as part of the proposed organisational 
structure (section 3.4) can be of tremendous benefit in effectively managing the 
implementation of infrastructure projects, as well as towards achieving organisational 
performance excellence.     
3.5.3 Information Technology (IT) and Organisational Performance  
The literature review findings have shown that IT is used extensively to improve government 
practices worldwide. For example, Liao, Wang and Tserng (2002) believe that in order to 
achieve efficient, transparent, non-discriminatory and accountable government procurement, 
an electronic government procurement system is required. Vaidya, Sajeev and Callender 
(2006) and Muinde and Shale (2014) agree that a number of public sector agencies worldwide 
have identified electronic procurement (e-procurement) as a priority in the e-government 
agenda, and have implemented or are in the process of implementing buy-side e-procurement 
systems. According to Godfred, Evans, Doumbia and Hanson (2015), the benefits of e-
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procurement include transparency in the procurement process, early delivery of goods, early 
execution of tasks, and cost cutting. The AberdeenGroup (2005) confirmed that the value of 
e-procurement when applied intelligently, is indisputable, adding that through effective 
deployment of e-procurement technology, enterprises can: reduce transaction costs, improve 
process efficiency, reduce or eliminate “maverick” buying, increase contract compliance, 
reduce cycle times and save inventory costs.  
One of the successful steps toward fighting corruption and making procurement procedures 
more transparent to clients is the creation of a client single window. For example, according 
to Casillas, Paredes, Cervantes and Torres (2015), the sixth measure announced by the 
Mexican prime minister, Peña Nieto, will be to create a National Single Window in order to 
simplify administrative and regulatory procedures. This National Single Window aims to 
expedite and simplify information flows between private firms and government officials 
within the trade sector, which will eventually lead to significant benefits for all parties 
involved in cross-border transactions. In Korea, according to Shin and Park (2004), the 
Government eProcurement System (GePS) provides around 30,000 Korean public institutions 
with goods and services needed to carry out their responsibilities and give better service to the 
people. Among the benefits of the (GePS), the most important improvement over the old 
procurement system is the transparency of public procurement. GePS has helped to prevent 
potential corruption, such as the frequent relationship between procurement officials and the 
staff of private companies.  
The use of integrated IT solutions to facilitate project, programme and portfolio management 
has a significant impact on the delivery of projects on time, on budget and to specification. 
For example, Kremer (2015) asserted that projects that have higher Net Present Values and 
Returns on Investment will have a better chance of being considered for funding as long as 
there is a solid balance in their triple constraint. Project management software can help project 
managers and team members visualise the development process so they can clearly define the 
scope and manage their time and budget accordingly. Moreover, according to Ikonić, Kostelac 
and Mikac (2013) the benefits of implementing an enterprise project portfolio management 
(EPPM) system are clear and scientifically proven, and include direct benefits such as 
increased productivity, improvements in order management, reduction in IT and procurement 
costs, improvement in cash flow management, and reductions in transportation and logistics 
costs. Indirect benefits include improved visibility of corporate data, new improved business 
processes, improved responsiveness to customers, unanticipated reduction of cost, increased 
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flexibility, global share of information, improved business performance, improved visibility 
in supply chain management, and improvement in on-time delivery performance.  
Thus, the use of integrated IT solutions can have a significant impact on the performance of 
government organisations in the developing world. They can help in facilitating the 
administrative burden for both civil servants and their customers. Therefore, integrating an 
effective IT solution in a public sector organisation in the developing world, or introducing it 
to a proposed organisational structure (section 3.4) can have an enormous impact on 
achieving high performance during the lifecycle of infrastructure developing programmes.  
3.6 MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE  
The review of the literature has revealed that resistance is a normal response to change within 
an organisation. Depending on how severe or disruptive the change is, managers should take 
into account a number of steps before initiating change, to ensure successful implementation: 
Sirkin et al. (2005), Fernandez and Rainey (2006), Yang and Pandey (2009), Rainey (2009), 
Kuipers et al. (2014), Kelman and Hong (2015) and Choi and Chandler (2015). This section 
sheds light on a number of important change management considerations for successful 
establishment and operation of any of the organisational structures that are to be proposed for 
decision makers in the developing world, to dedicate to work with MNCs (section 3.4).  
3.6.1 Ensuring the Need and Key Stakeholder Support and Commitment  
Several studies have shown that the decision makers of government organisations need to 
ensure top-management support and commitment in successfully conducting change within 
their organisations. Depending on the current quality of the practices adopted, the process of 
persuading key government stakeholders of the need for change can be difficult. It can be 
argued that decision makers of organisations that fall in PROBE’s could do better category, 
for example, find it more difficult to achieve key stakeholder support for change than do those 
organisations in the contender category. In either case, leaders of these public organisations 
are required to conduct this step to ensure smooth and transparent implementation of any 
organisational improvement initiative. It has already been asserted that top management 
support and commitment to change play an especially crucial role in success, but it is vital 
that every individual or group within the organisation champions the cause for change 
(Kotter, 2007; Durant and Durant, 2012; Burke, 2013). Sirkin et al. (2005) stated that top-
level commitment is vital in prompting commitment from those at the front end of the 
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business (i.e. those who are executing the work). If employees do not see that the company’s 
leadership is backing a project, they are unlikely to change (Fernandez and Rainey, 2006). 
Studies such as those by Armenakis and Bedeian (1999), Fernandez and Rainey (2006), 
Kotter (2007), Armenakis and Harris (2009) and Burke (2013) emphasised that in order for a 
change to succeed, an imperative step for managerial leaders is to verify and persuasively 
communicate the need for change. It has been argued that this objective can be achieved by 
creating a compelling vision that is easily communicated, appealing and provides overall 
direction of the change process, acting as a base line for developing strategies for arriving at a 
future end state.  
Fernandez and Rainey (2006) - p. 712 emphasised that decision makers should also realise 
that “successful change usually requires sufficient resources to support the process.” They 
maintain that “… change is not cheap or without trade-offs. Planned organisational change 
involves a redeployment or redirection of scarce organisational resources toward a host of 
new activities”, including:  
• developing a plan or strategy for implementing the change 
• communicating the need for change 
• training employees 
• developing new processes and practices 
• restructuring and reorganising the organisation; and 
• testing and experimenting with innovations. 
Thus, sufficient funding is necessary to staff implementation agencies and provide them with 
the administrative and technical capacity to ensure that they achieve statutory objectives 
Fernandez and Rainey (2006). 
Therefore, given the importance of addressing such factors at the initial and execution stages 
of implementing or introducing a change within the public-sector context, it can be argued 
that in order for decision makers in the developing world to achieve a successful step-change 
in organisational performance improvement, they first need to ensure the support of key 
stakeholders and their commitment to the required change. This can be achieved by following 
number of important steps, such as setting a compelling and comprehensive vision for change 
and communicating and explaining the proposed change through focused training workshops. 
Decision makers (mainly change champions) also need to develop a comprehensive 
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implementation plan for the change, where needs, resources and success criteria are clearly 
defined and communicated with key stakeholders.  
3.6.2 Carrying out Projects and Demonstrating Added Value 
The literature shows that in order to sustain top management support and commitment to 
change, the implemented innovation should demonstrate its ability to show added value and 
achieve the predefined success criteria. Delivering fast, positive results is essential to keeping 
top management continually involved in the change process. According to de Vries et al. 
(2014), one of the main cited influential characteristics of innovation that affects its adoption 
and diffusion within the public sector domain resides in its relative advantage and 
trustworthiness. For example, in considering the PMO as an organisational innovation 
(Hobbs, Aubry and Thuillier, 2008), Spalek (2013) found that  the ability to demonstrate 
added value and a scope definition appear crucial for the survival of PMO. Thus, Spalek 
asserted that during the set-up process, it is advisable to define the success criteria and the 
scope of activities. This will ensure that top management are fully aware of what to expect 
from the implemented change and when those expected benefits will be realised.  
Accordingly, it is imperative to define the success criteria and the scope of activities for any 
organisational improvement initiative within government organisations. Decision makers 
(change champions) should rigorously strive to achieve the objectives of the change and 
communicate and market its successes with key stakeholders to maintain their support and 
commitment. This is an important step to consider when establishing any of the organisational 
structures proposed in section 3.4.    
3.6.3 Institutionalise Change  
The literature shows that when the change has been successfully implemented and its 
objectives achieved, public sector decision makers should also consider spreading the change 
to their entire organisation. However, given the nature of the public sector domain, such an 
institutionalising process may take a long time to achieve its objectives (Fernandez and 
Rainey, 2006; Armenakis, Harris and Feild, 2000).  
According to Fernandez and Rainey (2006), managers and employees must effectively 
institutionalise and embed changes. Organisational changes normally involve behavioural 
changes to the organisation’s members, and thus to sustain the change the members must 
incorporate the new policies or innovations into their daily routines. Kotter (2007) argues that 
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two factors are particularly important in institutionalising change to an organisational culture: 
the change agent must ensure that organisational members are aware of how the new 
practices, including behaviours and attitudes, help to improve organisational performance; 
and the change agent must ensure that the next generation of top management really does 
personify the new approach. “If the requirements for promotion don’t change, renewal rarely 
lasts. One bad succession decision at the top of an organisation can undermine a decade of 
hard work.”  
There are number of models for change institutionalisation. For example, Armenakis et al. 
(2000) have developed a model for reinforcing and institutionalising change under which 
leaders can: 
• modify formal structures, procedures, and human resource management practices 
• employ rites and ceremonies 
• diffuse the innovation through trial runs and pilot projects 
• collect data to track the progress of and commitment to change, and 
• engage employees in active participation tactics that foster learning by doing. 
Thus, by implementing a step-change organisational improvement to attract MNCs, and by 
effectively communicating the successes of this initiative, decision makers can also seek key 
stakeholders’ approval to find an approach to institutionalise this change throughout their 
entire government organisations. This will ensure that government organisations also capable 
of effectively managing the implementation of those infrastructure projects that are not 
implemented by MNCs. This is an important step to consider, after the successful operation of 
the organisational structures proposed in section 3.4.     
3.7 ACHIEVING A STEP-CHANGE ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
IMPROVEMENT 
The findings from the literature reviewed in chapter 2 have revealed that developing countries 
are in urgent need of infrastructure development, in turn requiring active involvement of FDI. 
In order to increase the flow of FDI, one of the main prerequisites is to improve the 
performance of government organisations, especially from those in direct contact with MNCs. 
It has been found that available performance improvement approaches, such as EFQM, can 
help organisations identify their overall practice and performance weaknesses and develop 
action plans to address them. However, the discussion revealed that the concepts and 
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standards encapsulated in these models require a long time to be personified by staff and 
become part of the organisation’s culture, a time that developing countries cannot afford. 
Nevertheless, the literature reviewed here has shed light on a number of critical steps, (Figure 
3.10), which if logically combined can serve as an alternative approach for decision makers in 
the developing world to achieve their goal. These steps are: 
• Step One: Assessing the Organisation’s Overall Practice and Performance   
As discussed in section 3.2, government organisations in the developing world are required to 
emulate world-class performance to attract MNCs. The first thing required of decision makers 
is therefore to assess the overall practices and performance of their organisation and identify 
where they are standing compared to world-class organisations. For the sake of this research, 
the PROBE model, discussed in chapter 2, will be used as a guide for this assessment. Thus, 
these decision makers are required to identify where their organisations fall in the categories 
of the PROBE world-class grid: could-do-better, vulnerable, promising or contender.  
• Step Two: Deciding on a Suitable Team and Organisational Structure and 
Dedicate to Work with MNCs 
Based on the results of Step One, decision makers can identify the gap between their current 
practices and best practices. As discussed in section 3.2, organisations in the  PROBE could-
do-better or vulnerable categories tend to have comparatively poor practices and are more 
likely to require the adoption of best practices that entail disruption of their current 
organisational framework, such as the adoption of e-procurement. The decision makers of 
such organisations are advised to establish a separate spinout organisation or unit and dedicate 
it exclusively to work with MNCs, commissioning a heavyweight development team to meet 
the challenge. However, the promising or contender organisations are expected to have less of 
a gap compared to world-class organisations. Their, decision makers are therefore advised to 
follow a sustaining approach to improvement by commissioning a heavyweight, a functional 
or a lightweight team to work exclusively with MNCs within the existing organisation. This 
in-house team can utilise the organisation’s existing capabilities and, if required, develop the 
necessary processes to meet the challenge.    
• Step Three: Ensure the Need and Key Stakeholders’ Support  
By this stage, our decision makers should have decided on a suitable separate organisational 
structure to work with MNCs, although (section 3.4) they are advised not to overlook the 
change management aspects that can affect the successful establishment and operation of the 
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chosen organisational structure. Step Three suggests that decision makers (mainly change 
champions) need key stakeholders’ support, by considering: 1) setting a vision for change, 2) 
conducting an awareness workshop for key stakeholders to clarify the innovation project, 
ensure the need for change and achieve buy-ins, 3) defining needs, requirements, success 
criteria and the resources needed to establish the chosen team and organisational structure, 
and 4) developing an implementation plan and confirming stakeholders’ commitment and the 
allocation of required resources. 
• Step Four: Establish the Chosen Separate Organisational Structure  
In this step, decision makers should have the agreement of key stakeholders to establish the 
chosen separate organisation, either spinoff or in-house. However, as discussed in section 3.3, 
there are further key considerations which decision makers in the developing world are 
advised to take into account when establishing the chosen approach to achieve effective 
performance. When planning to establish the chosen separate organisation, decision makers 
are advised to:  
➢ Establish a strategic planning expert(s) or office to understand citizens’ needs, develop 
a strategic plan to address these needs, and identify which parts of the strategic plan 
should be addressed by MNCs; 
➢ Establish a project management expert(s) or office to prepare a list of prioritised 
strategic projects; develop the processes and procedures required for effective project 
implementation from the planning stage, through devising the project tender and 
contracting procedures to supervision of their execution stage; show integrity, 
transparency and simplicity to MNCs; and ensure that infrastructure projects are 
successfully implemented on time, on budget, to specification and addressing the aim.    
➢ Implement integrated IT solutions, to facilitate the work and develop a client single 
window. 
• Step Five: Carry out Projects and Produce Quick Wins 
As discussed in section 3.3.3, in order to ensure continuing support and commitment from top 
management and key stakeholders, as well as to pave the way for spreading the best practices 
to the rest of the sector, the newly established separate organisation should strive to achieve 
success criteria measured by the key performance indicators (KPIs) developed during Step 
Three. These include delivering a world-class performance, attract MNCs, developing 
strategic plans and identifying strategic projects. The chosen separate organisational structure 
should be in constant communication with key stakeholders and market its successes locally, 
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nationally and internationally, using performance management tools to check that optimal 
performance is being achieved.  
• Step Six: Institutionalise the Change  
As discussed in section 3.4.3, when the chosen separate organisation has achieved its success 
criteria and embraced higher support from key stakeholders, our decision makers are advised 
to develop a plan to gradually institutionalise the best practices adopted by the new structure 
into the parent government organisations. To institutionalise change, decision makers in the 
developing world can either follow a sustaining or disruptive approach for this.  
For example, if their organisation falls in the could-do-better or vulnerable category, 
necessitating establishment of a dedicated spinout organisation to work with MNCs, this 
means that the existing overall practices of the parent organisations are weak, as is the 
implementation of existing infrastructure projects.  In order to institutionalise best practices, 
decision makers can categorise these infrastructure projects currently being implemented by 
the parent organisation in conjunction with local companies into a number of separate 
programmes, such as a schools portfolio, a hospitals portfolio, or a road and bridges portfolio. 
The decision makers can then gradually relieve the parent organisation of the responsibility of 
implementing these portfolios and transfer them to the separate spinout organisation. This can 
be done by establishing units within the separate spinout organisation dedicated to working 
with MNCs or local contracting companies, and commissioning heavyweight development 
teams to take ownership of these responsibilities and execute the portfolios. Eventually, the 
spinout organisation, which was originally dedicated to working exclusively with MNCs and 
has proven its effectiveness, will now consist of a number of units or departments, established 
in line with best practice, each one assuming responsibility for a specific portfolio of projects 
originally undertaken by the parent organisation. This will eventually lead to the total 
transformation of the parent organisation into one that can compete with the best in class.  
However, those government organisations in the promising or contender categories should 
already have the better practices that enable them to deliver effective performance during the 
implementation of infrastructure projects. However, they still fall short compared to world-
class organisations, and thus decision makers would be advised to commission and dedicate 
an in-house heavyweight, functional or lightweight team, depending on the size of the gap, to 
work with MNCs.  Unlike the previous group, this team will follow a sustaining approach to 
improvement, by enhancing the existing practices to equal best practice, as a baseline when 
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working with MNC. Finally, when these enhanced practices have proven their effectiveness, 
the decision makers can institutionalise them to the rest of the parent organisation using a 
similar sustaining approach, such as focus training workshops.  
 
Figure 3.10 Critical Steps for Transforming the Performance of Government 
Organisations in the Developing World in a Step Change Fashion 
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Figure 3.10 summarises all these critical steps, which will guide the research towards 
developing an approach that aims at helping decision makers of government organisations in 
Iraq to overcome their performance weaknesses and deliver effective performance in a step-
change fashion.     
From the literature reviewed here and in chapter 2, it can be deduced that the above six steps 
can be used as guidelines for achieving the aim of this research. The steps show that by 
understanding the gap between existing practices and the best, our decision makers can 
establish a separate organisational structure, either a spinout or in-house, instead of attempting 
to improve over a long-drawn out period the overall practices of the entire organisation. This 
will reduce the time required for government organisations to deliver high-quality 
performance when working with MNCs, throughout the lifecycle of the infrastructure 
projects.  
Because the study aims at developing a strategic approach to assist Iraqi decision makers  to 
transform the performance of government organisations and attract MNCs, these steps will 
direct the investigation to be undertaken in Iraq during the data collection phase, as outlined 
in Figure 3.10. Based on the first step, an exploration of the overall practice and performance 
of Iraqi government organisations responsible for the delivery of infrastructure is required, 
comparing them with the best in class. Given the effectiveness of the PROBE world-class 
practice and performance assessment model and the fact that the researcher is a qualified 
PROBE facilitator, the PROBE model will be used as one of the data collection methods. The 
findings from the exploration process will be examined through the lens of the six critical 
steps in order to develop and propose an approach for our decision makers to overcome their 
performance weaknesses and create an organisational environment attractive for MNCs in a 
step-change fashion.   
3.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the literature in the quest for an alternative approach to serve as a 
guide for decision makers in the developing world to create an organisational environment 
attractive to MNCs. The literature synthesis has revealed that organisations are required to 
innovate to achieve successful performance. However, innovation implementation is not an 
easy task, depending entirely on the organisation’s existing capabilities and having a 
significant impact on its existing framework. The reviewed literature has shown that to 
successfully implement an innovation, organisations can establish a separate organisational 
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structure, either spinout or in-house depending on their existing capabilities, and dedicate it to 
work on the innovative project with full responsibility for it success.   
The chapter has also shed light on a number of considerations that our decision makers should 
take into account to achieve effective step-change organisational performance: the importance 
of strategic planning, project management and integrated IT solutions, together with top 
management support.  
After careful observation of the findings reported in this chapter, the researcher was able to 
combine them logically into six steps or guidelines for decision makers. The guidelines will 
also direct the research during the empirical fieldwork in Iraq. They emphasise the importance 
of exploring the overall practice and performance of Iraqi government organisations, and 
comparing them with world-class best practice. This assessment will help the researcher to 
fine tune the steps so that they correspond to the Iraqi government organisational 
environment, in order to propose a new strategic approach. This approach will then be 
validated with decision makers of government organisations in Iraq to check its applicability, 
suitability and effectiveness for achieving the aim of this research. The next chapter will 
discuss the current infrastructure and the government organisational environment in Iraq.   
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CHAPTER 4: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
IN IRAQ THROUGH FDI  
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The review of the literature in the earlier chapters has shown that FDI can be an effective 
vehicle for developing countries to address their infrastructure investment needs. However, 
attracting MNCs to foster FDI inflows is not an easy task, requiring governments to create a 
favourable organisational environment. Given the urgent need for infrastructure development, 
the decision makers need to transform the performance of their government organisations 
quickly and in a step-change fashion. The literature synthesis so far has identified six critical 
steps to assist decision makers in creating an appropriate organisational environment. The first 
two steps suggest establishing a separate organisational structure, in line with best practices, 
commissioning a specific team to work with MNCs. However, in order to decide whether this 
separate structure should be a spinoff or in-house, decision makers must assess their overall 
organisational practices and compare them against world-class best practice. Identifying the 
gap between them can help decision makers through the rest of the critical steps identified in 
chapter 3; see Figure 3.10.       
Nevertheless, this research is dedicated to finding an approach to help Iraqi decision makers 
to transform the performance of the government organisations in a step-change fashion to 
attract MNCs to foster FDI inflows to meet infrastructure investment needs. This chapter will 
first describe the status of Iraqi infrastructure, the mechanism followed by the government to 
develop the infrastructure, and the factors that hinder its successful development. The chapter 
also discusses the role of FDI in helping the GOI to address the lack of infrastructure, and 
how urgent it is for the GOI to transform the performance of their government organisations.      
4.2 THE STATUS OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN IRAQ  
Iraq is a developing country in the Middle East. 'Occupying over 430,000 km2, Iraq has 
historically been at the crossroads of civilisations and has played a critical role in regional 
trade, transport and culture. Its abundant natural resources, strategic geography and cultural 
history render it a nation with tremendous potential for diverse economic development' 
(WorldBank, 2012).  
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'Since the destruction of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258 CE, a succession of governments in 
what is now Iraq gradually created and maintained an extensive infrastructure to provide 
essential services such as water, power, communications and transport. However, over the last 
three decades, civil conflict, the long Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988), the wars with US-led 
coalitions in 1991 and 2003, the associated UN sanctions, and the more recent fight with the 
insurgency have resulted in a sharp deterioration of national infrastructure both from direct 
damage and inadequate maintenance' (Gunter, 2013). Iraq consists of 19 governorates, also 
known as provinces: 1) Dohuk, 2) Nineveh, 3) Erbil, 4) Kirkuk, 5) Sulaymaniyah, 6) Saladin, 
7) Al Anbar, 8) Baghdad, 9) Diyala, 10) Karbala, 11) Babil, 12) Wasit, 13) Najaf, 14) Al-
Qādisiyyah, 15) Maysan, 16) Muthanna, 17) Dhi Qar, 18) Basrah and 19) Halabja; see Figure 
4.1. According to recent reports on the status of the country’s infrastructure, 'about 60% of 
Iraqi households are suffering from the lack of at least one of the following: access to a source 
of improved drinking water, access to improved sanitation facility, a minimum of 12 hours a 
day of electricity from the public network, or food security' (JAPU, 2013).  
For example, in Basrah governorate, Iraq’s most oil-rich province, according to the United 
Nations-Inter-Agency Analysis Unit Report (JAU (2014d) although 95.1% of the population 
is connected to the public network, the availability of drinking water is reported as bad or very 
bad by 49.5% of the population.  Less than 1% of the population relies on the public supply as 
the first source of drinking water, while 68.4% rely on bottled water and 30.4% on water 
tankers or similar vehicles. Similarly, in the governorates of Wassit, Missan, Muthanna, Thi-
Qar, Qadissiya, Babil and Najaf, the availability of drinking water is reported as bad or very 
bad by 62%, 81.7%, 83.8%, 69%, 62.9%, 60.8% and 57.5% of the population respectively 
(JAU, 2014b; JAU, 2014d; JAU, 2014f; JAU, 2014g; JAU, 2014h; JAU, 2014i; JAU, 2014k; 
JAU, 2014l).   
 In Basrah, only 24.8% rely on the public sewage system, while 37.8% use a septic tank, and 
26.7% a covered canal outside the house. Similarly, in Salah al-Din, Babil, Muthanna, Najaf, 
Qadissiya, Anbar or Wassit, only 9.2%, 2.4%, 2.8%, 12.5%, 15%, 8.7% and 11.4% of the 
population respectively rely on the public sewage system as the primary system (JAU, 2014a; 
JAU, 2014b; JAU, 2014d; JAU, 2014g; JAU, 2014h; JAU, 2014i; JAU, 2014j; JAU, 2014l). 
The quality of electricity services is rated as bad or very bad by 68.6% of the population in 
Basrah governorate. 22.9% of households connected to the public network reported daily cut-
offs for more than 12 hours per day, while 63% reported cut-offs for 3 to 12 hours per day. 
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Figure 4.1: Iraq Map 
On average, 90% of the population of other governorates, such as Baghdad, Thi-Qar, Salah al-
Din, Babil, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadissiya, Anbar, Wassit, Kerbala or Missan, have rated the 
quality of electricity services as bad or very bad, with some 80% of the households connected 
to the public network in these governorates reporting daily cut-offs for more than 12 hours a 
day (JAU, 2014a; JAU, 2014b; JAU, 2014c; JAU, 2014d; JAU, 2014e; JAU, 2014f; JAU, 
2014g; JAU, 2014h; JAU, 2014i; JAU, 2014j; JAU, 2014k; JAU, 2014l).  
In addition, only 7.1% of the population in Basrah has a home garbage collection service; 
31.7% rely on public containers, and an alarming 29.8% dispose of garbage in open areas. On 
average, less than 30% of the population of the majority of Iraq governorates have home 
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garbage collection services and rely instead on public containers and open areas. In terms of 
health services, public hospitals are the health facilities most used by people in case of illness, 
followed by clinics and government health centres. On average, about 40% of the population 
of the majority of governorates assess the healthcare services in their area as bad or very bad 
(JAU, 2014a; JAU, 2014b; JAU, 2014c; JAU, 2014d; JAU, 2014e; JAU, 2014f; JAU, 2014g; 
JAU, 2014h; JAU, 2014i; JAU, 2014j; JAU, 2014k; JAU, 2014l). With regard to the housing 
sector, according to Sait and Nkuuhe (2013) there is an urgent need for 2 million housing 
units in Iraq.   
It is clear that Iraq suffers from an overwhelming lack of the necessary infrastructure. 
Additionally, given the fact that Iraq is an oil-rich country, the question is how the GOI is 
working on addressing this enormous problem, and what are the mechanisms it follows to 
facilitate the development of infrastructure. This will be addressed in the following section. 
4.3 THE MECHANISM OF INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ  
Infrastructure development is considered a key facilitator for achieving economic growth in 
developing countries (Greening, 2014a). According to Nataraj (2012), improving the 
infrastructure will have a direct impact on the growth and overall development of an 
economy, since it contributes to the growth of production by stimulating economic activity, 
productivity and enhancing the quality of life (WorldBank, 1994). Conversely, lack of 
infrastructure, creates breaks in sustainable growth and inhibits poverty reduction (Sahoo, 
2011). However, Sahoo (2011) argues that infrastructure development requires developing 
countries to have adequate financial resources, strong planning, coordination, decentralisation, 
private sector participation and commercialisation of service providers.   
In Iraq, the major source of funding for infrastructure development projects is the annual 
federal budget, with oil revenues the main source of national income: 93% and 84% in 2013 
and 2015 respectively (JAU, 2015).  
Iraq’s annual federal budget is divided into an operational budget, which is primarily salaries, 
pensions and office expenses; and an investment budget which is the main source for 
infrastructure development projects. Normally, 60%-70% of the total federal budget goes to 
the former and the remainder to the investment budget. The GOI allocates the investment 
budget among the government ministries and local government, and these entities in turn use 
their share to fund the infrastructure projects needed within their jurisdiction (JAU, 2014m; 
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USDC, 2013). The relevant ministries and local governments follow Iraqi public procurement 
procedures to award infrastructure projects to private sector companies (local, international or 
joint venture), which in turn work on the implementation of these projects (Al-Tameemi, 
2009; OECD, 2010a; JAU, 2014m); see Figure 4.2.    
Iraqi public procurement is defined as the procurement of goods, services and construction 
services by the State of Iraq acting through ministries or federal agencies, government units 
including regions, governorates, and all other subdivisions of the state that may commit 
public funds, (OECD, 2010b; JAU, 2014m). 
Based on the UN Joint Analysis Unit Report (JAU (2014m) for the years 2009 to 2013, the 
GOI has allocated 25%, 25%, 30%, 30% and 40% of the annual federal budget for these years 
respectively to investment expenditure. The report shows that during these five years a total of 
about US$138billion was allocated to developing the infrastructure of the various sectors in 
Iraq. This amount is equal to about 13 times Jordan’s 2011 federal budget and twice 
Malaysia’s 2011 federal budget.  
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Figure 4.2: The mechanism of Infrastructure Development in Iraq 
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Thus, with reference to the discussion in section 4.2 and taking into account this huge amount 
of investment budget plus that for the years 2003 to 2009, the question is, why is Iraq’s 
infrastructure is still underdeveloped? The answer will be discussed in the following section.  
4.4 FACTORS IMPEDING INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ 
As discussed in section 4.3, the major source of funding for infrastructure development in Iraq 
is the annual federal budget, more specifically the investment part of the federal budget. 
Related ministries and local governments execute infrastructure projects by following the 
procurement procedures issued by the Ministry of Planning. However, despite the enormous 
amount of funding allocated to investment expenditure during recent years, Iraqi 
infrastructure is still totally inadequate. Based on the available literature on Iraqi budget 
execution, government procurement and infrastructure development, a number of factors have 
been identified as impediments to infrastructure development, discussed in the following sub-
sections.    
4.4.1 Weak Overall Organisational Performance of Government Organisations  
According to Al-Tameemi (2009) and the UN Joint Analysis Unit Report (JAU, 2014m), the 
overall performance of the majority of Iraqi government organisations, i.e. ministries and 
local government, in executing their allocated investment budget and translating it to 
infrastructure development projects, is weak and it is a struggle to provide the necessary 
services to citizens. For example, during the fiscal years (FY) 2009/10, 2011/12 and 2013, 
GOI allocated about 25%, 30% and 40%, respectively, of the annual federal budget for 
investment expenditures, mainly for infrastructure development. According to the JAU 
(2014m) report, for the fiscal years 2009-2012 the government of Iraq (GOI) has consistently 
executed its investment budget at a rate generally lower than 60%-70%, with some ministries 
reportedly failing to execute even half of their annual budgets. Moreover, in FY 2011, the 
execution rate fell to less than 50% in key development ministries including Communications 
(16%), Agriculture (23%), Oil (32%), Industry and Minerals (40%), Municipalities and Public 
Works (47%). This is alarming since not only do these development ministries receive a 
significant amount of the total investment budget, but this also indicates inadequacies in 
operationalising these funds into approved projects (JAU, 2014m). On the governorate level, 
10 out of the 16 governorates and regions were reported with budget execution rates of less 
than 66%, of which Basra’s was 11% and 8% for the years 2010 and 2011 respectively (JAU, 
 Page | 74  
 
2014m). This reflects significant weaknesses in the overall performance of Iraqi government 
organisations and the approaches they use to execute their investment budget.  
4.4.2 Non-Transparency, Bureaucratic Red Tape and Corruption  
One of the main challenges that limiting the ability of the GOI to spend its investment budget, 
apart from security issues, is public corruption (JAU, 2014m). Iraq is seen by the international 
community as a country whose public sector is strongly corrupt and hard to do business with. 
The World Bank ranked Iraq 165out of 190 countries in its 2016 overall “ease of doing 
business” category. Transparency International ranked Iraq 161 out of 168 in its 2015 
Corruption Perception Index. According to the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs of 
the US Department of State (BEBA, 2016), 'while the GOI has moved toward greater 
effectiveness in reducing opportunities for procurement corruption, credible reports of 
corruption in government procurement are widespread, with examples ranging from bribery 
and kickbacks to awards involving companies connected to political leaders. International 
companies may come under pressure to take on well-connected local partners to avoid 
systemic bureaucratic hurdles to doing business'. The presence of corruption in the activities 
of the government organisations was also confirmed by (Al-Nasrawi, 2014). Moreover, 
according to OECD (2010a), 'the execution of public contracts in Iraq is not transparent nor 
even complete. Red tape hinders efficiency in public procurement and can be burdensome for 
private sector representatives, who are required to submit a long list of documents within 
limited timeframes when doing procurement business with the government'. Thus, it can be 
argued that non-transparency, bureaucratic red tape and corruption are paralysing the 
mechanism the GOI has in place to address the lack of infrastructure, and thereby directly 
contributing to the continuous underdevelopment of the country’s infrastructure.       
4.4.3 Lack for Proper Planning and Project Management   
Equally important, other factors that hinder effective budget execution as a whole, and 
thereby infrastructure development, include poor planning, particularly at local government 
level (JAU, 2014m). OECD (2010a) points out that 'the lack of public procurement planning 
is linked to the more general problem of planning in the country'. In an interview published 
online, Al-Nasrawi (2013), a city governor in Iraq, stated that in general infrastructure 
development lacks proper planning, designing, executing, monitoring and controlling 
projects, and therefore development has suffered from underperformance and 
underachievement leading to widespread resentment from the Iraqi people. Al-Nasrawi (2014) 
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claims that Iraq in general lacks an effective and systematic vision for infrastructure 
development.   
This situation has made it difficult for the government organisations in Iraq to deal with the 
issue of infrastructure development even at the project level. Al-Tameemi (2009) asserted 
that, despite the number of infrastructure projects constructed in recent years, however, the 
data collected indicates that more than 75% of these projects are considered as failed. The 
majority have either exceeded their planned time and budget, are of poor quality or have been 
stopped because of their interference with other projects. Projects are randomly implemented, 
and when new development plans emerge some of these projects are abandoned and new ones 
substituted. Batool (2011) argues that the reliance on traditional and outdated project 
management tools and techniques is a major reason for the tremendous challenges and 
difficulties faced during project implementation. Faiq, Rana and Shaymaa (2013) suggest that 
the major reason why projects exceed or deviate from the planned schedule goes back to the 
poor planning and implementation methods adopted by the public and private sectors in Iraq.  
4.4.4 Lack of Qualified Civil Servants   
The literature indicates that government organisations responsible for the execution of the 
investment budget lack qualified personnel who are able to conduct and manage the 
government procurement process effectively. Al-Nasrawi (2014) mentioned that of the many 
factors that hinder the government in effectively addressing the infrastructure needs is that, 
“Iraqi cadres do not have the capability to conduct their assigned work effectively. They are 
unable to provide reports, surveys or develop plans that adhere to the international standards 
and do not resort to experts”. Moreover, according to OECD (2010a), although the GOI 'pays 
particular attention to providing training, not all government procurement officials are 
sufficiently qualified to deal with their assignments'. JAU (2014m) added that the 'low budget 
execution rate in Iraq reflects the weaknesses of the procurement system because of the high 
percentage of skilled labour leaving Iraq'. 
4.4.5 Underdeveloped Private sector 
The literature review also highlighted the underdevelopment of Iraq’s private sector as one of 
the main reasons for the underdevelopment of the infrastructure. According to JAU (2014m), 
one of the main factors hindering the budget execution as a whole, and thereby affecting the 
development of infrastructure, is the limited capacity of local private-sector contractors.  Al-
Nasrawi (2014) comments that the majority of companies that executing infrastructure 
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projects are failed companies. This is supported by WorldBank (2012), which asserts that the 
'Iraqi private sector is both under-developed and unsupported.  Most private businesses are 
small and informal, mainly operating in retail and trade, construction and transport services, 
as well as in light industry in the textile, food, engineering, and chemicals fields. A survey 
coordinated by the United Nations and International Labour Organisation (ILO) found that the 
great majority are owned by sole proprietors, with most of the remainder being family 
partnerships. Many of the employees in these SMEs are unskilled, short-term labourers. Iraq 
only possesses a handful of large, typically family-run multi-industry conglomerates, active in 
retail, trade, telecommunications, construction and other sectors'. 
4.4.6 Lack of Financial Resources 
The GOI, as the primary commercial actor, continues to rely on cash allocations through 
budget provisions, taking advantage of high oil revenues, to fund projects at ministerial and 
local government levels. As discussed in section 4.3, Iraq is an oil-dependent country. Oil 
remains the main source of state revenue with a total share of about 93%, and 84% 
materiality, (JAU, 2015), and thus oil revenues are the major source of funding for the 
development of infrastructure. However, Blanchard (2010) argued that the continued 
fluctuations in oil prices and production may jeopardise Iraq’s fiscal stability and the 
sustainability of its reconstruction and development plans. The sharp fall in oil prices in June 
2014 clearly supports Blanchard’s argument. According to Bowler (2015), this fall in global 
oil prices has significantly affected Iraq’s oil revenue and thereby its federal budget. From 
2010 until mid-2014, world oil prices remained stable, at around US$110 a barrel; however, 
since then prices have more than halved and are continuing to decline. Consequently, since 
then and as of 2017, Iraq’s deficit exceeded US$19billion, which is about 21% of total 
expenditure (Neely and Fenton, 2016; Rudaw, 2017). The large size of the operational budget 
and the increase in the budget deficit have significantly affected the amount of funding 
available to key development sectors, making it even more difficult for GOI to address the 
country’s urgent infrastructure needs (see section 4.2 for details). These factors are 
summarised in Figure 4.3.     
These factors may be the answer to the question posed in section 4.3, concerning the reasons 
for the persistent lack of infrastructure in Iraq. They reflect the weak performance and 
undercapacity of both the public and local private sectors in Iraq to effectively address the 
lack of infrastructure. There is an apparent lack of strategic planning and effective 
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management capabilities in these organisations which, unless improved, it will be difficult for 
Iraq to address. From the above discussion, it can be argued that the overall organisational 
environment in Iraq dedicated to the development of infrastructure is weak in numerous 
aspects. 
 
Figure 4.3: Factors Affecting the Development of Infrastructure in Iraq 
Such an environment cannot be attractive to MNCs and therefore seriously limits the flow of 
FDI to address the infrastructure investment needs. The findings have also revealed that 
currently Iraq has a significant financial gap which has crippled the government from 
continuing to invest in infrastructure. Thus, based on the discussion in chapter 2, it can be 
argued that FDI could play a big role in helping decision makers in Iraq to address the factors 
that are hindering the successful development of infrastructure.    
4.5 THE ROLE OF FDI FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN 
IRAQ  
The discussion above has shown that the current GOI has been put in a difficult situation. 
Apart from the weak performance of government organisations, it has become clear that oil 
should no longer be the only source of finance in Iraq. The current financial difficulties have 
made the GOI unable to fund major and urgent infrastructure projects. However, as discussed 
in chapter two, FDI could significantly help the GOI to address its infrastructure investment 
needs. The presence of MNCs could also have an impact on the performance of public and 
private sector organisations in Iraq.    
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Thus, in response to Iraq’s recent financial crisis, the GOI is now looking to attract MNCs to 
foster FDI inflows to address its infrastructure investment needs. It has recently issued new 
regulations allowing ministries and local government to enter into contracts with MNCs on 
infrastructure projects, improving services in areas like water supply, power and education 
(MoP, 2015). These new regulations would basically allow government agencies to take out 
loans with MNCs tasked with the jobs. repaying them at a later date from their allocated 
investment budget, in a similar form to Public Private Partnership (PPP) or Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) contracts. Nevertheless, the findings from chapter two have revealed that 
attracting FDI is not easy. It is important for the GOI to create an environment attractive to 
MNCs to foster FDI inflows in order to address its urgent infrastructure investment needs.  
4.6 THE NEED FOR A STEP-CHANGE ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
IMPROVEMENT  
Apart from addressing the security, political, social and other government-related issues, it 
has been established that the GOI is required to create an organisational environment 
favourable to MNCs in order to foster FDI inflows (see the discussion in section 2.2.3). 
However, from reference to the discussion in section 4.4, it is clear that the Iraqi 
organisational environment does not possess the basic qualities that would attract a large 
number of MNCs.  
Furthermore, according to the literature discussion in chapter 2, the public sector context is 
not a friendly environment to achieve successful and fruitful implementation for the existing 
performance improvement methodologies, especially a weak and complicated context, like 
the one in Iraq. Despite the lack of literature about Iraq organisational environment, yet Al-
Tameemi and Alshawi (2014) attempted to shed light on a certain aspect of this issue by 
arguing that organisational performance improvement in Iraq is greatly affected by the 
organisational culture and leadership of the public sector. They have identified number of 
aspects that reflect this issue of which they emphasise that the leadership team do not develop 
a service mindset throughout the organisation or drive service culture by example such as 
focusing on anticipating and exceeding needs that actively drive up the ambition of the 
community.   
Consequently, given such an organisational culture, introducing best practices and advance 
technologies to improve the organisation performance will have a significant impact on how 
such public organisations currently work. Introduction of such change to such an old and 
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weak business model will be very alarming to the people who currently operate this business 
model since it will/may have a direct impact on their positions and matters of interests, force 
them to change their habits/ways of doing things and adopt new ways, impose change to their 
social relationship, etc. Thus, such a change initiative may/will face a huge resistance, 
especially from those (corrupt bureaucrats) who are taking advantage from this complicated 
system. Furthermore, since benefits of such change initiatives only appears in the long term 
(as argued in chapter 2), thus, following such an approach can jeopardise any improvement 
due to the lack of quick wins, and may/will ultimately fail. Besides, since the situation in Iraq 
is calling for an immediate need for FDI to engage in the development of the country. 
Accordingly, an alternative approach is required that can “disrupt” the current organisational 
business model, and pave the way for the adoption of best practices. An approach that is able 
to provide a radical change to the current organisational performance and help attract MNCs 
and foster FDI inflows.  
In line with the findings from section 2.2.4, a number of studies (BEBA, 2016; Gunter, 2013; 
TransparencyInternational, 2015; USDC, 2013; USAID, 2009; WorldBank, 2012; OECD, 
2010b) have discussed the investment climate in Iraq and highlighted both the government-  
and organisation-related factors that hinder the effective operation of MNCs, offering a wealth 
of recommendations. However, none of these studies has provided an approach, such as an 
approach, a framework or model, to help guide decision makers in Iraq to improve the 
performance of their government organisations in a step-change fashion. The significant 
impact that organisational performance improvement has on the creation of an environment 
attractive for MNCs, and thereby on infrastructure development in Iraq, is illustrated in Figure 
4.4. Thus, for the sake of expanding the base of knowledge, this research aims at developing a 
strategic approach that can assist decision makers of government organisations in Iraq, in 
direct contact with MNCs, in overcoming their organisational performance weaknesses and 
attracting MNCs.  
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Figure 4.4: The Impact of Government Organisational Performance Improvement on 
MNCs and Infrastructure Development in Iraq   
To do this, the critical steps identified in chapter 3 (section 3.7, Figure 3.10) suggest that 
decision makers can establish a separate organisational structure, in line with best practices, 
either in-house or a spinout, and dedicate it exclusively to work with MNCs. However, in 
order for these decision makers to know if an in-house team is better able to handle the job 
than a spinout organisation, they need to know the size of the gap between their existing 
organisational practices and world-class best practices. If the gap is significant, the critical 
steps suggest establishing a separate spinout organisation and dedicating it to work 
exclusively with MNCs during the lifecycle of infrastructure development programmes. This 
organisational structure is expected to be significantly different from the parent organisation 
as it adopts a completely different management system to work on infrastructure projects. 
However, when government organisations and world-class practices are closer together, the 
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processes/technologies of the parent organisation, or creating new ones if required, during the 
implementation of infrastructure projects.  
Thus, in proposing a suitable organisational structure, spinout or in-house, for Iraqi decision 
makers, it is important to identify the gap between best practices and existing organisational 
practices. However, the available literature on the Iraqi organisational environment, discussed 
in section 4.4, has only provided a glimpse into the performance weaknesses. Nevertheless, as 
discussed in chapter 3, it is a deeper understanding of an organisation’s practices that can 
reveal the reasons for the weak performance. However, there is little or no research on this 
topic or on using any of the available best practice assessment tools such as EFQM or PROBE 
in Iraq.  
Consequently, an exploratory study to assess the overall practices of a sample government 
organisation in Iraq is needed. The findings from this exploratory study will help determine 
the most suitable organisational structure to be dedicated to work with MNCs. They will be 
the base line from which an approach can be developed and proposed to decision makers as 
guidance for transforming government organisations’ performance in a step-change fashion. 
The researcher will then elicit the professional opinion of Iraqi decision makers in multiple 
case studies about the effectiveness and applicability of the proposed approach within the 
context of the public sector in Iraq. This process will lead to the validation of the proposed 
approach and the development of the strategic framework that will address the aim of this 
research.    
4.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed in detail the current state of Iraqi infrastructure, the mechanism 
that the GOI is following to address the country’s lack of infrastructure and the main factors 
hindering the effective, quick and efficient development of infrastructure.  
The literature review has shown that the main source of finance for infrastructure is the 
investment component of the federal budget, allocated to various ministries and local 
governments. These government agencies supposedly use their allocated budget to fund 
infrastructure projects within their jurisdictions, following the government procurement 
procedures to implement these projects. However, the GOI is struggling in its attempt to 
address the persistent lack even of basic infrastructure, such as drinking water and electricity. 
Hence, to understand what keeps Iraq’s infrastructure so underdeveloped, six factors were 
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identified which significantly affect the speed, effectiveness and efficiency of infrastructure 
development in Iraq.    
The first factor is related to the overall significant performance weaknesses of Iraqi 
government organisations in executing their allocated investment budget and translating it 
into tangible, efficient and fit-for-purpose infrastructure projects. The second factor concerns 
the high level of non-transparency, bureaucracy and corruption that is penetrating and 
paralysing the very organisational system that has been put forward to facilitate the 
infrastructure development of the country. The third factor is the public service’s lack of 
effective public procurement planning and project management to effectively and efficiently 
implement the various infrastructure development projects. The fourth factor refers to the 
shortage of skilled and qualified civil servants to conduct public procurement processes 
effectively and facilitate the implementation of infrastructure projects in those government 
organisations. These four factors reflect the weak organisational environment of the public 
sector organisations in Iraq. They represent significant weaknesses in the organisational 
system that the GOI is using to address the country’s lack of infrastructure. The fifth factor 
highlights the underdevelopment and ineffectiveness of the Iraqi private sector, the private 
companies contracted by government to implement their infrastructure projects. The sixth 
factor is the sharp fall in the price of oil, which has led to reduced financial resources and 
prevented the GOI from investing in infrastructure. This crisis made it clear to the GOI that 
oil should no longer be the only source of funding for the government and that alternative 
project financing schemes should be considered.  
Thus, currently attracting MNCs to foster FDI has become a priority for GOI in addressing its 
infrastructure investment needs. Priority for the GOI is to create an organisational 
environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion. The critical steps are identified in 
chapter three; the researcher will fine tune them to suit the context of the Iraqi government 
organisations and propose a strategic framework to guide decision makers in transforming 
their organisational performance in a step-change fashion.  
The following chapter will discuss the methodological approach used by the researcher to 
collect the necessary data for development of the strategic step-change organisational 
performance improvement framework.           
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
The research aims at developing and proposing a strategic approach for decision makers of 
government organisations in Iraq to help them overcome their performance weaknesses and 
create an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion. Two data 
collection stages are required to achieve this aim. In accordance with the critical steps 
outlined in section 3.7, the first stage focuses on acquiring a deep understanding of the overall 
practices and performance of a government organisation in Iraq. The findings generated from 
this exploratory stage form a baseline for developing a step-change organisational 
performance improvement approach. The second stage focuses on proposing this approach to 
decision makers in Iraqi government organisations who are responsible for the delivery of 
infrastructure projects, and soliciting their feedback about the applicability and suitability of 
the proposed approach in the context of the Iraqi government organisations, and its 
effectiveness in helping them to overcome performance weaknesses and create an 
organisational environment attractive for MNCs in a step-change fashion.   
This chapter describes the research methodology appropriate for this research. It discusses the 
philosophical stance and the adopted research design and data collection methods.  
5.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
Research methodology is a key element in any dissertation (Chandler, 2004). It refers to the 
systematic process by which the researcher investigates issues and secures information in 
order to solve a problem (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005). The process involves becoming 
aware of, and then choosing, a particular philosophy, strategies and tools for data gathering 
and analysis. Hussey and Hussey (1997, p. 54) refer to methodology as “the overall approach 
to the research process, from the theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis of 
data”. Thus, research methodology, the science of finding out (Babbie, 2007) is a key driver 
to direct the research along the correct path. The methodology comprises the technical 
practices used to identify the research questions, collect and analyse data and present findings, 
and outlines the conceptual and philosophical assumptions that justify the use of particular 
methods (Payne and Payne, 2004). From this definition it can be seen that research 
methodology is not just about data collection and the rules for evidence, but that it also 
concerns analysis and, as noted by Berry (1983), it embodies a strong concern with the nature 
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of explanation and the means by which explanations are produced. Clearly, therefore, there is 
no one universally accepted scientific methodology, but rather several methodological 
paradigms, which may be used separately or in combination. A number of research 
methodological approaches are available including, for example, the nested approach to 
research modelling developed by Kagioglou, Cooper, Aouad and Sexton (2000); see Figure 
5.1. The outer ring of the nested approach represents the research philosophy which guides 
the research approaches and techniques illustrated in the inner circles. Research approach 
refers to the methods for theory generation and testing of case study, action research, survey 
or experiment; whereas research techniques refer to the data collection techniques such as 
interview, questionnaire, focus group and observation. 
 
Figure 5.1: Nested Research Methodology, (Kagioglou et al., 2000) 
The research design model proposed by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) introduced 
three additional layers to the nested research model. This model was referred to as the 
research onion, illustrated in Figure 5.2, since the six layers of the model resemble the rings of 
an onion. 
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Figure 5.2: The Research Onion, (Saunders et al., 2012) 
The framework for research design presented by Creswell (2014) (see Figure 5.3) is also three 
layered and starts by identifying the philosophical stance of the research, leading to choosing 
a research design suitable to the philosophical stance of the research. Appropriate research 
methods are then chosen to collect the data necessary to achieve the aim of the research.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: A Framework for Research - The Interconnection of Worldviews, Design 
and Research Methods (Creswell, 2014) 
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The similarities and differences in these three models are easily seen. It is clear that all three 
start by highlighting the philosophical stance before looking at suitable research approaches. 
For example, after highlighting the philosophical stance, the research onion requires the 
researcher to underline his/her choice of methodology based on it: whether qualitative, 
quantitative or mixed. The researcher can then choose a suitable strategy for his/her research, 
determine its time horizon, and whether it is going to be a case study, experiment or action 
research. Eventually, the researcher can select the appropriate technique and procedures for 
collecting the required data. With regards to the models of Kagioglou et al. and Creswell, 
these follow a similar approach although they are presented differently in their models. For 
example, after determining the philosophical stance of the research, the nested models require 
the researcher to choose an appropriate approach, that is deciding whether the research is 
qualitative, quantitative or mixed, and choosing the right time horizon and research strategy, 
whether a case study, experimentation or action research, similar to the research onion. 
Suitable research techniques are then chosen to collect the required data. The same is true for 
Creswell’s framework for research. Table 5.1 shows how the research design elements 
overlap in the models proposed by Kagioglou et al. (2000), Saunders et al. (2012) and 
Creswell (2014). 
Table 5.1 The Comparison of elements in the Three Research Design Models 
Nested Research Model 
(Kagioglou et. al, 2000) 
The Research Onion, 
(Saunders et al., 2012) 
Framework for research 
design (Creswell, 2014) 
Research Philosophy Research Philosophy Philosophical Worldviews 
Research Approaches 
Methodical Choice 
Research Designs Research Strategies 
Time Horizons  
Research Techniques Techniques and Procedures Research Methods 
This research will adopt the design framework presented by (Creswell, 2014) as a guideline 
for selecting the research methodology. According to Ginige, Amaratunga and Haigh (2010), 
Creswell’s framework is uncomplicated but comprehensive; the views of several other authors 
have also been referred to. According to Creswell (2014), the research approach is the plan 
and procedures that span the steps from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data 
collection, analysis and interpretation. This plan involves several decisions on which approach 
should be used to study a given topic. Informing this decision are the philosophical 
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assumptions the researcher brings to the study; procedures of inquiry (called research 
designs); and specific research methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation 
(Creswell, 2014). These stages are now discussed.   
5.2 PHILOSOPHICAL WORLDVIEWS OF THE STUDY 
Research philosophy is a set of beliefs in relation to the development and nature of knowledge 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2007). Research philosophy is referred to by different 
authors as research paradigms, epistemologies and ontologies, and philosophical worldviews 
(Creswell, 2014). In most instances, the philosophical background a combination of different 
paradigms (Saunders et al., 2007). Positivism and Interpretivism are the two major 
philosophies in social sciences research; they differ in their assumptions about the nature of 
reality and are considered as the two ends of the spectrum of research philosophy (Remenyi, 
1998; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003; Maylor and Blackmon, 2005; Collis and Hussey, 
2009).  
The positivist paradigm includes alternative terms such as quantitative, objectivist, 
scientific, experimentalist and traditionalist. It claims that the social world is external; the 
properties must be measured by objective methods; the observer is independent; human 
interests should be irrelevant; explanation must demonstrate causality; the concepts need to be 
operationalised; research progresses through hypotheses and deductions; and generalisation is 
through statistical probability (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2002). Amaratunga, 
Baldry, Sarshar and Newton (2002) assert that positivism is not effective in understanding 
processes or the significance that people attach to actions and it is not very helpful in 
generating theories because it focuses on what is, or what has been, making it hard to infer 
what changes and actions should take place in the future. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the interpretive approach, also referred to as 
subjectivism and constructionist, also called social constructionism. It is qualitative, 
subjective, humanistic and phenomenological in character, and uses naturalistic methods to 
understand human experience in context-specific settings (Amaratunga et al., 2002). 
Interpretivism is the approach people take to make sense of the world, and it involves sharing 
their experiences with others via the medium of language (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; 
Aouad, 2011). Nandhakumar and Jones (1997) define interpretive research as a means of 
trying to understand the phenomena from the participant’s viewpoint, while Collis and 
Hussey (2003) observe that it is concerned with understanding human behaviour from the 
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participant’s own perception of the situation. Table 5.2 summarises the main differences 
between positivism and interpretivism.  
Table 5.2: Contrasting Implications of Positivism and Interpretivism. Source (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2008, p59) 
 Positivism Interpretivism 
The observer must be independent is part of what is being observed 
Human interests should be irrelevant are the main drivers of science 
Explanations must demonstrate causality aim to increase general 
understanding of the Situation 
Research progresses 
through 
hypotheses and deductions gathering rich data from which 
ideas are induced 
Concepts need to be defined so that they 
can be measured 
should incorporate stakeholder 
perspectives 
Units of analysis should be reduced to simplest 
terms 
may include the complexity of 
whole' situations 
Generalisation 
through 
statistical probability theoretical abstraction 
Sampling requires large numbers selected 
randomly 
small numbers of cases chosen for 
specific reasons 
This research involves interacting with members of Iraqi government organisations to solicit 
their feedback about issues related to their everyday work and understand their perspectives 
about the approach that will be proposed by this research. Accordingly, the philosophical 
stance of this research is closer to the interpretivist stance than to the positivist. 
Creswell (2014) Framework for Research identifies four main philosophical worldviews of 
research, which fall between the two ends of the philosophical spectrum: the postpositivst, 
constructivist, transformative and pragmatic views. Table 5.3 describe the characteristics of 
these four philosophical worldviews.  
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Table 5.3: The Four Philosophical Worldviews, (Creswell, 2014) 
Postpositivism Constructivism Transformative Pragmatism 
• Determination 
• Reductionism 
• Empirical 
observation and 
measurement 
• Theory verifiaction 
• Understanding 
• Multiple 
participant 
meanings 
• Social and 
historical 
constucution 
• Theory generation 
• Political 
• Power and 
justice oriented 
• Collaborative 
• Change-
oriented 
• Consequences of 
actions 
• Problem-
centered 
• Pluralistic 
• Real-world 
practice oriented 
Creswell (2014) considers that social constructivism or constructivism is often combined 
with interpretivism. Constructivism considers that individuals seek understanding of the 
world in which they live and work, and that meanings are constructed by human beings as 
they engage with the world they are interpreting (Creswell, 2014).  
In the context of this study, the researcher believes that Iraq’s current organisational 
performance weaknesses are based on certain practices of people, that have contaminated the 
culture of Iraqi government organisations. Thus, in order to develop an approach that can 
assist the decision makers to improve their organisational performance in a step-change 
fashion, an identification and careful understanding of organisational practices from the 
participants’ (staff and decision makers) point of view is needed. In addition, since the 
concept of benchmarking organisational practice and performance is fairly new in Iraq, the 
researcher needs to be in direct contact with staff to explain and clarify any ambiguous 
concept and its relationship to their everyday activities, to ensure accurate answers. The 
context of this research means that the researcher must meet key decision makers to solicit 
their feedback on the value of this research.  
Therefore, a constructivist viewpoint is appropriate, following on from the interpretivist 
philosophy, in order to explore and understand the subjective meanings motivating the actions 
of the social actors (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). Three of the related theoretical 
perspectives of constructivism, cited by (Creswell, 2014) and embedded in the philosophical 
assumptions, are given below: 
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• Human beings construct meanings as they engage with the world they are interpreting. 
Qualitative researchers tend to use open-ended questions so that participants can 
express their views.  
• Humans engage with their world and make sense of it based on their historical and 
social perspective; we are all born into a world of meaning bestowed upon us by our 
culture. Thus, researchers seek to understand the context or setting of the participants 
through visiting this context and gathering information personally. They also make an 
interpretation of what they find, an interpretation shaped by the researchers’ own 
experiences and backgrounds (Creswell, 2014). 
• The basic generation of meaning is always social, arising in and out of interaction with 
a human community with the inquirer generating meaning from the data collected in 
the field (Creswell, 2014). 
Having decided on the philosophical worldview of this research, it is important to indicate the 
ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions that inform the choice of the 
research philosophy (Collis and Hussey (2009). Table 5.4 summarises these philosophical 
assumptions and describes them and positivist and interpretivist beliefs in relation to the 
ontological, epistemological and axiological branches of philosophy.     
Table 5.4: The Philosophical Assumptions within Positivism and Interpretivism, Source: 
(Sexton, 2007; Collis and Hussey, 2009; Aouad, 2011) 
Philosophical Assumption Positivism Interpretivism 
Epistemological 
assumptions (what 
constitutes valid 
knowledge) 
Researcher is independent of that 
being researched. 
It applies existing theory to 
develop a hypothesis and testing 
the theory. 
Researcher interacts with 
that being researched. It 
uses to build the theory 
Ontological assumptions 
(the nature of reality) 
Reality is objective and singular, 
separate from the researcher. 
 
Realism is a commonly 
experienced external reality with 
a predetermined nature and 
structure. 
Reality is subjective and 
multiple, as seen by the 
participant. 
 
Idealism is an unknown 
reality perceived in 
different way by 
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individuals. 
Axiological assumptions 
(the role of values) 
Research is value-free and 
unbiased. 
Researcher acknowledges 
that research is value-
laden and biases are 
resent. 
The following sub-sections elaborate the philosophical assumptions of this research study in 
relation tothe three main branches of research philosophy. 
5.2.1 Epistemological Assumptions 
Epistemology is the way of thinking about what constitutes acceptable knowledge in a certain 
field of study (Saunders et al., 2007). When deciding the epistemological stance of the 
research, or what methods should be followed to acquire knowledge to address the research 
problem, (what is the status quo of the organisational practices and performance of iraq 
government organisations and how iraq government organisations can deliver world-class 
performnace in a step-change fashion?), the researcher was not influenced by a pre-
determined view on what is acceptable knowledge. Therefore, the research was not initiated 
with either a positivist or an interpretivist view. Moreover, the research problem was 
considered from a pragmatic view, which argues that the most important determinant of the 
research philosophy adopted is the research problem and not the methods used (Saunders et 
al., 2007; Creswell, 2014). Asking questions about reality and the laws of nature are believed 
by pragmatists to be unnecessary (Creswell, 2014), and pragmatists use many approaches to 
understand the problem, showing that one approach may be better than another for answering 
particular questions (Saunders et al., 2007). Having viewed the research problem from a 
pragmatist viewpoint, it was concluded that this research prefers interpretivism in the 
epistemological thinking since the problem is focused on a group of people and their practices 
and how they might respond to a proposed solution; also, the social roles of others are 
interpreted in accordance with the interpreter’s own set of meanings (Saunders et al., 2007). 
Significantly, the researcher’s intent in interpretivism is to interpret the meanings of others 
about the research problem (Creswell, 2014), and to use that understading as a baseline from 
which a theory to address the research problem can be created. 
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5.2.2 Ontological Assumptions 
According to Bryman (2016), ontological assumptions and commitments feed into the ways 
in which research questions are formulated and the research is carried out. Ontology in social 
research concerns whether social entities are objective entities that have a reality external to 
social actors, or whether they are social constructions built up from the perceptions and 
actions of social actors. In this context, social construction views reality as being socially 
constructed (Saunders et al., 2007). Thus, the epistemological stance leads this research 
towards the ontological belief that reality is continously constructed by social actors. It is 
believed that social actors will perceive different situations in various ways as a consequence 
of their own view of the world, and these different interpretations are likely to affect their 
actions and the nature of their social interactions with others (Saunders et al., 2007). 
5.2.3 Axiological Assumptions 
In addition to epistemology and ontology, the influence of the researcher’s values, personal 
beliefs and feelings creates a part of the philosophical beliefs of a particular research; this is 
called axiology (Ginige et al., 2010). According to Bryman (2012), the researcher’s own 
values can intrude at any or all of a number of points in the process of the research, such as 
choice of research area, formulation of research questions, choice of methods and techniques, 
implementation of data collection, analysis and interpretation of data, and conclusions. 
Therefore, with reference to epistemological and ontological assumptions, this research has 
been identified as value laden.  
Having introduced the philosophical positioning of this research, the following section will 
address the second component of Creswell’s framework. 
5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
According to  Creswell (2014), research designs are types of inquiry within qualitative, 
quantitative and mixed methods approaches that provide specific direction for procedures in a 
research design. In the context of this research, the qualitative approach and strategies of 
enquiry are indicated by the philosophical assumptions. The following sub-sections offer 
more detail on the research approach and strategy of enquiry. 
5.3.1 Research Approach 
The qualitative research approach is a source of well-grounded, rich descriptions and 
explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts, and of exploratory data of people's 
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written or spoken words and observable behaviour, rather than prediction (Amaratunga et al., 
2002; Hakim, 2000). In particular, qualitative strategies are not preferred by the practices and 
the norms of positivism, especially the way in which the social world is interpreted (Ginige et 
al., 2010). Gummesson (2006) (p. 171) argues that for “dealing with the complex reality of 
management issues, qualitative methodology supported by modern natural sciences is 
superior to quantitative methodology emanating from traditional sciences”. This means that 
the qualitative approach is powerful in providing insights into peoples’ thoughts and 
perceptions. Amaratunga et al. (2002) pointed out that qualitative data emphasises people’s 
experiences and is fundamentally well-suited for identifying the importance that people place 
on events, processes and structures, and their perceptions and assumptions. Therefore, this 
research will lead to drawing generalisable conclusions from the observations and will bring 
theory (a strategic approach) as the outcome of the research. According to Glaser and Strauss 
(1967), theory building requires the ongoing comparison of data and theory. Lynham (2000) 
asserted that continuous refinement between theory and practice is also needed for effective 
theory building. 
According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2015), there are three approaches to theory 
development, namely the deductive, inductive and abductive. As noted by Gill and Johnson 
(2002), the deductive approach starts by conceptualising the phenomenon followed by 
empirical observation to test it. Conversely, the inductive approach begins with empirical 
observation to develop theory.  
To Saunders et al. (2015), the  abductive approach (or reasoning) is a third, common, 
approach to theory development; it begins with a ‘surprising fact’ being observed. Instead of 
moving from theory to data (as in deduction) or data to theory (as in induction), the abductive 
approach moves back and forth, in effect combining deduction and induction. Abduction 
begins with the observation of the surprising fact; it works out a plausible theory of how this 
could have occurred and then tests that plausible theory (Saunders et al., 2015). Table 5.4 
summaries the difference among these three approaches. 
In the context of this research, the first stage was conducting an extensive literature review; 
the literature synthesis led to identifying six critical steps to guide the researcher towards 
creating and proposing an approach for decision makers in the developing world which can 
assist them in overcoming their organisational performance weaknesses and creating an 
 Page | 94  
 
organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion (section 3.7). in 
chapter 3. 
Table 5.5: The Difference between the Deductive, Inductive and Abductive Approaches, 
(Saunders et al., 2015) 
 Deduction Induction Abduction 
Logic In a deductive 
inference, when 
the premises are 
true, the 
conclusion must 
also be true 
In an inductive 
inference, known 
premises are used to 
generate untested 
conclusions 
In an abductive inference, 
known premises are used 
to generate testable 
conclusions 
Generalisability Generalising from 
the general to the 
specific 
Generalising from the 
specific to the general 
Generalising from the 
interactions between the 
specific and the general 
Use of data Data collection is 
used to evaluate 
propositions or 
hypotheses related 
to an existing 
theory 
Data collection is 
used to explore a 
phenomenon, identify 
themes and patterns 
and create a 
conceptual 
framework 
Data collection is used to 
explore a phenomenon, 
identify themes and 
patterns, locate these in a 
conceptual framework and 
test this through 
subsequent data collection 
and so forth 
Theory Theory 
falsification or 
verification 
Theory generation 
and building 
Theory generation or 
modification; 
incorporating existing 
theory where appropriate, 
to build new theory or 
modify existing theory 
These steps encouraged the researcher to explore, understand and assess the overall practices 
and performance of a government organisation in Iraq and identify its weaknesses, strengths 
and how it is compares to world-class organisations. Having this understanding has helped the 
researcher to develop and propose an approach to Iraqi decision makers to help them create 
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the step change in the performance of their government organisation, and institutionalise best 
practices. The applicability and suitability of the proposed approach will then be tested.  
Accordingly, this research utilises the abductive approach to theory building as it combines 
the deductive and inductive approaches to help achieve the aim of this study. Having decided 
on the research approach, the next step is to identify a suitable research strategy of enquiry. 
5.3.2 Research Strategy of Enquiry 
Creswell (2014) lists the following strategies as the main types of enquiry in qualitative 
research: 
• Narrative 
This studies the lives of individuals and provides stories about their lives, combined with the 
views of the researcher in a collaborative narrative (Creswell, 2014). 
• Phenomenology 
Phenomenology identifies the real human experience concerning a phenomenon as described 
by the participants in the study. This is also sometimes referred to as a philosophy which 
involves a process of understanding the experiences of participants while attempting to 
bracket the researcher’s own experiences. This design has strong philosophical underpinnings 
and typically involves conducting interviews (Creswell, 2014). 
• Ethnography 
Ethnography researches a phenomenon within the context in which it occurs with the purpose 
of describing and explaining the social world the research subjects inhabit in the way in which 
they would describe and explain it (Saunders et al., 2007). It involves studying the shared 
patterns of behaviours, language and actions of an intact cultural group in a natural setting 
over a prolonged period of time (Creswell, 2014). 
• Case studies 
Case study is an empirical inquiry which investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident (Yin, 2014). 
• Grounded theory 
Grounded theory attempts to derive a general, abstract theory of a process, action or 
interaction grounded in the views of participants in a study (Creswell, 2014). It is a careful 
and systematic procedure to generate theory where little is already known, or to provide a 
fresh slant on existing knowledge through studying the relationships between the individual’s 
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experience and the society and history (Goulding, 1998). Thus, in this context, data collection 
begins without the development of an initial theoretical framework (Saunders et al., 2007). 
According to Creswell (2014), grounded theory and case studies are frequently used by 
researchers to explore processes, activities and events, while narrative and phenomenology 
are used for studying individuals, and ethnography to learn about broad culture-sharing 
behaviour of individuals or groups. Therefore, grounded theory and case studies have been 
identified as the most suitable strategies of enquiry for this research.  
However, according to Yin (2014), there are three aspects that condition the selection of an 
appropriate strategy: type of research questions posed, the extent of the control an investigator 
has over actual behavioural events, and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to 
historical events. In addition, the extent of existing knowledge in the problem area, the 
amount of time and other resources available, and the philosophical underpinning shape the 
selection of research strategy (Saunders et al., 2007).  
In line with the abductive approach selected for this research (section 5.2.1), Eisenhardt 
(1989) noted the importance of having an initial definition of the research question prior to 
beginning theory building; otherwise, the researcher can become overwhelmed by the amount 
of data gathered. Yin (2014) also emphasises the need of pre-established theory or 
conceptualised phenomenon prior to data collection and analysis process. Eisenhardt (1989) 
stated that case study research begins with a deductive approach and moves on to an inductive 
approach to build the theory. Yet, in ground theory data collection begins without the 
development of an initial theoretical framework (Saunders et al., 2007).  
Thus, as discussed earlier, since this research first synthesised the literature and identified 
critical steps to achieve its aim, this clearly involves moving back and forth, combining 
deductive and inductive approaches. Thus, case study has been selected as the most suitable 
strategy of enquiry for this particular study, as the study focuses on a contemporary 
phenomenon with considerable existing background knowledge which allows the 
development of an initial conceptual critical steps and a set of research questions to guide the 
research.  
The case study strategy also has considerable ability to generate answers to the ‘why?’ as well 
as the ‘what?’ and ‘how?’ questions. Thus, the general research questions also dictate the 
choice of case study strategy:   
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• What is the gap between the current organisational practices and best practices?  
• How best can government organisations in Iraq address their performance 
weaknesses and deliver effective performance in a step-change fashion? 
Further, the time constraint on this research was a consideration in selecting case studies over 
grounded theory as the main strategy, since the latter method evolves theory as a product of 
continuous interplay between data collection and analysis, which needs to be carried out until 
saturation of concept categories occurs (Goulding, 1998). Given the character of this study, it 
is not necessary to control behavioural events. Rather, it is asking questions of a ‘what?’ and 
‘how?’ nature. Consequently, it is appropriate to select the case study strategy, which will 
generate the depth of understanding required to appreciate the realities behind the current 
practices adopted by a government organisation in Iraq and developing a step-change 
approach to address the organisational performance weaknesses that is both feasible and 
applicable within the Iraqi context.  
According to Yin (2014), case studies allow the researcher to explore in depth an 
organisation, a programme, an event, an activity, a process, a group, an individual or similar 
related phenomena. Yin (2014) (p. 16) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly 
evident”. The use of a case study strategy is widespread in social science research. It is being 
used when a researcher needs a full and deep understanding of the context as it is a valuable 
way of exploring existing situations and can provide powerful insights (Saunders et al., 2007).   
In addition, a case study strategy usually focuses on exploratory research, which is designed 
to investigate phenomena, identify important categories of meaning, generate further research, 
create more focused research questions or find out more about an emerging area of interest, 
define the questions to be used in a subsequent study, and help the researcher understand the 
research problem. Additionally, the exploratory type of case study can be used when there is 
little literature about a topic, so a real-life subject is investigated in order to identify the topics 
to be covered in a subsequent search project (Marshall and Rossman, 1999; Collis and 
Hussey, 2009). These advantages add up to the reason why a case study strategy has been 
adopted for the current study, which asks questions requiring exploration. Moreover, a lack of 
research in the area of both organisational benchmarking in Iraq and step-change 
organisational performance improvement in the public sector became evident after reviewing 
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the literature, and hence there is a need to delve deeper into particular issues in order to 
achieve the research aim and objectives. 
According to Yin (2014), the following five components affect the design of case study 
strategy: 
• a case study’s question; 
• its propositions, if any; 
• its unit(s) of analysis; 
• the logic linking the data to the propositions; and 
• the criteria for interpreting the findings. 
The rest of this section will discuss the case study design, the unit of analysis and the type of 
case studies selected. 
I. Case Study Design 
According to Yin (2014), case study design can be divided into single case and multiple case 
designs; then, depending on the number of units of analysis, into embedded (more than one 
unit of analysis) or holistic (a single unit of analysis). Thus, four types of case study design 
exist (see Figure 5.4). 
 
Figure 5.4: Type of case based on number of units, source (Yin, 2014) 
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The choice between these two options (multiple or single) or the theoretical sampling of cases 
mainly depends on the nature of the phenomenon being studied (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007). According to Yin (2014), theoretical sampling of single cases could be rationalised if 
the cases fall under any of the following five types: 
• Critical case: the case would be critical to the research theory or theoretical 
propositions. The theory should have specified a clear set of circumstances within 
which its propositions are believed to be true. A single case can then be used to 
determine whether the propositions are correct or whether some alternative set of 
explanations might be more relevant.  
• Unusual case or extreme case, whose characteristics are not replicated in any other 
case. 
• Common or typical case, which provides the circumstances and conditions of an 
everyday situation; again, because of the lessons it might provide about the social 
processes related to some theoretical interest. For example, a study of a small 
business can yield insights into innovations and innovative processes.  
• Revelatory case which gives opportunity for studying a previously inaccessible 
phenomenon. 
• Longitudinal case in which the same needs are studied at different points in time to 
understand how conditions change over time. 
Accordingly, multiple case design has been identified as the appropriate design for this 
particular research, since its cases could not be characterised as any of the above five types. 
Moreover, as discussed in section 5.2.1, the nature of this research requires assessing the 
overall practices and performance of a government organisation in Iraq and uses the findings 
along with the literature synthesis to develop and propose a suitable approach to address the 
aim of the research. Further, this approach will be presented to and validated with Iraqi 
decision makers in a number of government organisations to ensure its feasibility and 
appropriateness in the context of Iraqi government organisations. Thus, this corroborates the 
above and confirms that multiple case study design is more suitable for this particular 
research. Significantly, this also ensure that generalisations can be drawn from the collected 
data, as according to Yin (2014), multiple case studies are generally used to replicate findings 
or support theoretical generalisations. Indeed, multiple case study research increases external 
validity and guards against observer bias (Leavy, 1994). Yin (2014) further suggests that 
“criticisms may turn into scepticism about the ability to do empirical work in a single case 
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study. Having multiple cases can begin to blunt such criticisms and scepticism”. Accordingly, 
multiple case study design is used as part of the case study strategy.  
II. Unit of Analysis 
According to Yin (2014), the design of case study research depends on the unit of analysis, 
i.e. based on what conclusions will be drawn at the end of the study. A case study design can 
have either a single unit of analysis (holistic) or multiple units of analysis (embedded) (Yin, 
2014). As asserted by Miles and Huberman (1994), the unit of analysis of a study is a 
“phenomenon of some sort of occurring in a bounded context”. According to (Collis and 
Hussey, 2003), it is the focal point to which the variables, phenomena and the research 
problem refer and from which the data is collected and analysed. Because of its importance, 
Miles and Huberman (1994) state that the unit of analysis is the focus or heart of the study, 
and the case becomes the unit of analysis when the boundary of the phenomenon is defined 
with settings, concepts, sampling, etc. Remenyi, Williams, Money and Swartz (1998) state 
that determining the unit of analysis is governed by the research questions. It can range from 
an individual, a group of people, to a process or relationship (Yin, 2014; Remenyi et al., 
1998). It is advisable to establish a unit of analysis similar to a previous study’s by 
considering the literature in the subject area rather than establishing it arbitrarily (Yin, 2014; 
Remenyi et al., 1998). With regard to this research, the literature review (chapter 2,3 and 4), 
established that developing countries urgently need to attract FDI to address their 
infrastructure investment needs. A key factor in attracting MNCs to foster FDI inflows is 
improving the performance of government organisations in a step-change fashion. Moreover, 
since this study focuses on the case of Iraq and aims at developing an approach to assist Iraqi 
decision makers overcome their organisational performance weaknesses and deliver effective 
performance in a step-change fashion to attract MNCs, Iraqi government organisations are 
identified as the population from which the case studies can be selected. Hence, the unit of 
analysis is single and is only concerned with government organisations in Iraq; the research 
therefore takes the form of multiple holistic case studies, as shown above in Figure 5.4.  
After establishing the unit of analysis, the next step is to define the boundary of the study. 
This helps the researcher to identify the scope of the study, for example to determine the 
limits of the data collection (Yin, 2014). The study intends first to assess the overall practice 
and performance of a government organisation responsible for infrastructure development in 
Iraq and identify key weaknesses and the gap between best practice and current practices in 
Iraqi government organisations. Second, it uses these findings, corroborated by those from the 
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literature synthesis, to develop an approach to help decision makers in Iraq create overcome 
their organisational performance weaknesses and create organisational environment attractive 
to MNCs in a step-change fashion. After this, the researcher discusses this approach with key 
decision makers in selected government organisations to validate its applicability, suitability 
and effectiveness. Therefore, one of the major requirements is to base the study within 
government organisations which have engaged heavily in the development of infrastructure in 
Iraq and have direct contact with MNCs during the lifecycle of infrastructure development. 
Accordingly, the unit of analysis was extended outwards to cover multiple organisations, 
namely government organisations responsible for the delivery of infrastructure in Iraq, which 
falls within the scope of this study, as depicted in Figure 5.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Research Unit of analysis 
The following section, addresses the third component of building up a suitable research 
methodology, according to Creswell (2014).  
5.4 RESEARCH METHODS 
This section discusses applicable data collection methods, the data collection strategy 
selected, data analysis methods, and the reliability and validity of the adopted research 
methodology. 
5.4.1 Methods of Data Collection 
According to Yin (2014) there are six main sources of data in case studies: documentation, 
archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation and physical artefacts. 
Iraq Government Organisations 
 
 
 
Government Organisations 
Responsible for 
Infrastructure Development 
Case Boundary 
Unit of Analysis 
 Page | 102  
 
Table 5.6 shows the types of data collection techniques along with their key weaknesses and 
strengths. Observation allows collection of data on human behaviours directly in the research 
environment rather than relying on another person’s interpretation (Sapsford and Jupp, 2006). 
Hence, observation facilitates direct information gathering which cannot be explained by the 
participants, and the collection of data from people who cannot take part in surveys or 
interviews (Sapsford and Jupp, 2006). However, observations are time consuming and the 
closeness of the research environment tends to increase observer bias  (Sapsford and Jupp, 
2006; Saunders et al., 2007). People under observation can consciously or unconsciously 
change their behavioural patterns when they know that are being watched. 
Table 5.6: Six Sources of Evidence: Strengths and Weaknesses, source (Yin, 2014) 
Source of 
Evidence 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation  • Stable- can be reviewed 
repeatedly  
• Unobtrusive- not created as a 
result of the case study 
• Specific- can contain the exact 
names, references, and details of 
an event 
• Broad- can cover a long span of 
time, many events, and many 
settings 
• Retrievability- can be 
difficult to find  
• Biased selectivity, if 
collection is incomplete 
• Reporting bias- reflects 
(unknown) bias of any given 
document’s author 
• Access- may be deliberately 
withheld  
Archival 
records 
• [same as those for documentation] 
• Precise and usually quantitative 
• [same as those for 
documentation] 
• Accessibility due to privacy 
reasons 
Interviews  • Targeted- focuses directly on case 
study topics 
• Insightful- provides explanation as 
well as personal views (e.g., 
perceptions, attitudes, and 
meanings) 
• Bias due to poorly 
articulated questions 
• Response bias 
• Inaccuracies due to poor 
recall 
• Reflexivity- interviewee 
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gives what interviewer 
wants to hear 
Direct 
observations 
• Immediacy- covers actions in real 
time 
• Contextual- can cover the case’s 
context  
• Time consuming  
• Selectivity- broad coverage 
difficult without a team of 
observers  
• Reflexivity- actions may 
proceed differently because 
they are being observed  
• Cost- hours needed by 
human observers  
Participant 
observation 
• [same as above for direct 
observation] 
• Insightful into interpersonal 
behaviour and motives 
• [same as above for direct 
observation] 
• Bias due to participant 
observer’s manipulation of 
events  
Physical 
artefacts  
• Insightful into cultural features  
• Insightful into technical operations  
• Selectivity  
• Availability  
Documents are a primary source of data when they are written by people who are directly 
involved in the period of study, or a secondary source if they are about an interpretation or 
judgement of the primary data (Sapsford and Jupp, 2006). In the former situation, the 
document can be considered as original / raw material for the researcher; in the latter, careful 
interpretation is needed as the document could have been prepared for a particular purpose or 
for a group audience. Document reviews are a useful source for data collection within case 
study research, to corroborate or argue against the data collected from other sources (Yin, 
2014). 
Questionnaire surveys provide an efficient way of collecting data from a large sample, as the 
respondents are asked to answer the same set of questions (Saunders et al., 2015). The 
questions can be closed (structured) or open ended (unstructured). The coding can be done 
easily in closed questionnaire surveys. However, like to semi-structured or unstructured 
interviews, open-ended surveys have the disadvantage of difficulty of coding and 
standardisation (Jackson and Trochim, 2002). Another disadvantages is that surveys do not 
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enable the researcher to ask follow-up questions immediately, to improve the understanding 
of a particular answer.  
Interviews can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. Structured interviews are, 
essentially, verbally administered questionnaires, in which a list of pre-determined questions 
is asked, with little or no variation and with no scope for follow-up questions to responses that 
warrant further elaboration. Consequently, they are relatively quick and easy to administer 
and may be of particular use if clarification of certain questions is required or if there are 
likely to be literacy or numeracy problems with the respondents. However, by their very 
nature, they only allow for limited participant responses and are, therefore, of little use if in-
depth information is required (Gill, Stewart, Treasure and Chadwick, 2008). Unstructured and 
semi-structured interviews are time consuming for data collection and analysis. Nevertheless, 
they permit the researcher to follow up questions to clarify issues thus allowing a deeper 
exploration of the subject area (Burns, 2000). (Silverman, 2001) noted that interviews in 
social science strive “…to generate data which give an authentic insight into people’s 
experience”. Further, a good rapport can be built up between the respondent and the 
interviewer and is preferred when extensive, in-depth data collection is required (Burns, 
2000). In contrast to these advantages, interviews can only be used with a limited number of 
people due to time constraints. 
Interviews can also take the form of focus groups; see Table 5.5. A focus group is a group 
discussion on a particular topic organised for research purposes. The discussion is guided, 
monitored and recorded by the researcher (sometimes called a moderator or facilitator) (Gill 
et al., 2008; Yin, 2014). Although group interviews are often used simply as a quick and 
convenient way to collect data from several people simultaneously, focus groups explicitly 
use group interaction as part of the method. This means that instead of the researcher asking 
each person to respond to a question in turn, people are encouraged to talk to one another: 
asking questions, exchanging anecdotes and commenting on each other’s' experiences and 
points of view (Kitzinger, 1995). Table 5.6 shows the key weaknesses and strengths of focus 
group interviews.  
As discussed above, each data collection method has its own advantages and disadvantages 
when used in isolation. To increase the richness of the collected data, methods can be 
combined so that the weaknesses of one are minimised by the strengths of others. Therefore, 
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the deployment of multi-methods is encouraged by many authors (Saunders et al., 2015; Yin, 
2014; Collis and Hussey, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Table 5.7: Focus group strength and weakness, source Sekaran (2003) 
Technique Strengths  Weakness  
Focus 
group 
• It is an economical method; 
participants are interviewed in a 
group 
• It might increase the number of 
participants in the study 
• In helps to collect social data in a 
social environment 
• Focus group have high validity  
• Participants with strong 
personalities may control the 
discussion while others may stay 
silent 
• Participants might produce fewer 
ideas  
• Moderators may influence 
participants’ views 
• Might discourage some participants 
from trusting others 
Saunders et al. (2015) and Yin (2014) point out two main situations where the multi-method 
approach can be used within a study. First, it allows the researcher to use different methods to 
assist different purposes of the study. This facilitates the capture of a holistic view of the 
phenomenon being studied and further increases the depth and breadth of the study. For 
instance, interviews can be used to identify critical issues of a study followed by 
documentation review to explore the identified factors. Secondly, the use of multi-methods 
facilitates methodological triangulation, i.e. the facts or events of the phenomenon being 
studied are supported through different sources of evidence. Methodological triangulation 
increases the construct validity of the study. Moreover, Yin (2014) suggests that in cases 
where access to other sources of evidence is difficult or when no other sources are available, 
querying the same participants several times or on several occasions serves in its own way as 
a set of multiple sources of evidence.    
After considering the appropriateness, strengths and limitations of the above methods, 
interviews were selected as the main mode of data collection for this study, for their ability to 
examine issues in detail. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were adopted for data 
collection with two main objectives: to learn and understand the interviewees’ perspectives on 
the issues surrounding the practices and performance of their government organisation, and to 
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learn whether the interviewees can validate the effectiveness and applicability of the proposed 
approach. Observation and document reviews were also used to corroborate findings obtained 
through the interviews. The following section explains in detail the data collection strategy for 
this research, highlighting when, why and for what purpose the different methods are used 
during the various data collection stages.  
5.4.2 Data Collection Strategy for this Research 
I. Selection of Case Studies 
The primary objective of case study selection is to ensure the researcher chooses the most 
suitable case studies for the data collection, satisfying the requirements of the study. Within 
the case study, identification of the participants who can best inform the researcher about the 
phenomenon is essential. Finally, the types of data source to be investigated and the amount 
of accessibility required must be determined (Yin, 2014).  
Purposive and/or theoretical sampling can be used in selecting the case studies. Purposive 
sampling selects cases which illustrate features or processes that the researcher is interested in 
(Silverman, 2001), although “there is only a slight difference between purposive and 
theoretical sampling where the former selects the cases without theoretical grounds and owing 
to the practicality of the study whereas the latter with a theoretical ground”. Accordingly, the 
researcher used both theoretical and purposive sampling to choose suitable case studies to 
collect the required data and thereby to develop theory.  
Eisenhardt (1989) emphasises the need for deriving a population to select suitable cases for a 
study. As discussed in section 5.2.2b, Iraqi government organisations were identified as the 
population from which case studies could be selected. Having decided on the population, a 
theoretical background or operational criteria (as described by (Yin, 2014) was established to 
qualify the cases. Based on the theoretical background of this research (section 5.2.2b), one of 
the major requirements was to base the study within government organisations that have been 
heavily engaged in the development of infrastructure in Iraq and which have direct contact 
with MNCs during the lifecycle of infrastructure development. In this way, the quality as well 
as the quantity of the research work is assessed.  
Referring back to Figure 4.2, the structure of infrastructure development in Iraq is as follows. 
The GOI is the primary party responsible for developing Iraqi infrastructure. Iraq has a total 
of 19 provinces (governorates or major cities; see chapter 4) and two major sectors, oil and 
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gas, and ports, which represent the main sources of state revenue. Currently, GOI delegates 
the responsibility for infrastructure development to two types of government agency, namely 
local governments and ministries, and each has authority to carry out projects that represent 
its speciality and within its predefined jurisdiction. For example, the Ministry of Oil is 
responsible for carrying out any type of infrastructure project that can help expand and 
increase the production and export of oil and gas; it does this through its line ministry offices 
in the areas of the country where oil and gas are present. With regard to the ports, for instance, 
the Ministry of Transport has the authority to carry out all necessary infrastructure projects 
that have the potential to improve and expand the services that Iraqi ports can provide to 
expand the customer base and increase revenue. Similarly, local governments are responsible 
for addressing the infrastructure needs, such as schools, health centres, roads and bridges, of 
the areas of the province under their jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, a list of Iraqi government organisations involved in various infrastructure 
development programmes which have or could interact with MNCs was prepared, in 
consultation with the supervisors. In light of the experience of the researchers, four suitable 
Iraqi government organisations where chosen. To narrow down the criteria for selecting 
suitable case studies, given that oil and gas is one the biggest sectors in Iraq and attractive to 
MNCs, and given that the biggest area of oil and gas reserves is situated in the south region, 
the line ministry office of the Ministry of Oil in the southern region, namely the South Gas 
Company (SGC), was selected. As the second main source of revenue, also attractive to 
MNCs, the General Company for Ports of Iraq (GCPI), responsible for managing all Iraq’s 
ports, was also selected.  In order to expand the number of potential case study candidates, 
local governments were added to the list of potential organisations.  Cities and provinces with 
high oil reserves are potentially attractive places for MNCs to work and invest. In Iraq, the 
largest oil fields are located in Basra province and the majority of Iraq’s oil exports leave 
from the Basra oil terminal. Nevertheless, the city has a considerable lack of infrastructure 
and the recent crisis of oil prices made it essential to address its infrastructure investment 
needs. Therefore, Basra Local Government (BLG) was also selected as a case study. The 
fourth is the Directorate of Government Commerce (DGC), a government organisation 
within a local government structure, with direct responsibility for the delivery of 
infrastructure in the city within its jurisdiction.   
Next, the access to the case study organisations was established. First, a cross-sectional 
approach explored the existing practices in an Iraqi government organisation, namely DGC, 
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and used the findings to develop the intended step-change performance improvement 
approach. Secondly decision makers’ opinions about the feasibility, applicability and 
effectiveness of the proposed step-change organisational improvement approach within the 
context of the three Iraqi government organisations, namely BLG, GCPI and SGC, were 
solicited. Thus, the researcher needed access during different stages of the study, first to 
conduct interviews and observations to benchmark the existing practices and to better 
understand the organisational system and its key weaknesses and strengths, and then to do a 
series of interviews to validate the proposed approach. The four cases were thus selected to 
fulfil the requirements of the main stages of this research, although, according to Patton 
(2002), the total number of cases could be decided during the course of the study. This is 
further discussed in the following sub-sections. 
II. Data Collection Stages 
This section describes the research stages and those case studies relative to each stage; and 
what the research aims to achieve from each case during the corresponding stage of the 
research. These stages and the process of the case study are presented in Figures 5.9 and 5.10.  
a) Exploratory Stage 
The aim of this stage is to explore and assess the overall practices and performance of a 
government organisation in Iraq responsible for the direct delivery of infrastructure, now or in 
the future in direct contact with MNCs. Therefore, DGC, was selected as a case study to fulfil 
the requirement of this exploratory stage, as indicated in Figures 5.9 and 5.10, because it is a 
government organisation within a local government in Iraq, responsible for planning, 
procurement/tendering and construction of infrastructure projects and in a direct contact with 
customers (i.e. local contracting companies and MNCs). During the exploratory stage three 
data collection steps were carried out:  
The First Step focused on understanding the overall picture of the organisation including its 
structure, the framework of operations used to carry out its projects, and what customers 
(local/international companies) think about the overall organisational performance. Fifteen 
members of staff as well as twelve representatives of local contracting companies were 
interviewed during this step.  
The Second Step focused on assessing the overall practice and performance of the case study 
organisation and compared it to world-class best practice, identifying any gap between them. 
A standard practice and performance benchmarking tool was used during this step to gain a 
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full understanding of all the aspects surrounding the organisational environment of the case 
study organisation in question. Focus group interview sessions using a PROBE survey 
questionnaire were held with five members of the organisation. 
The Third Step focused first on providing training workshops covering a range of topics, 
including business process improvement; management of change; strategic planning and IT; 
project, programme and portfolio management; people and performance measurement 
teamwork practices; and knowledge management. Afterward, assessment was carried out 
based on a post-training questionnaire, designed to assess the impact of the training 
programme on the trainees’ understanding of the delivered materials. The focus was on work 
practices, performance and the need for change. Twelve people (all member of staff trainees) 
were interviewed.  
b) Development Stage 
The findings from the exploratory stage, along with the critical steps synthesised through the 
literature review (see section 3.7), formed the baseline from which to develop the step-change 
organisational performance improvement approach.  
c) Validation Stage 
During the validation/confirmation stage, three Iraqi government organisations were selected 
as case studies (based on the criteria set out in sections 5.2.2b and 5.3.2I above), namely 
BLG, GCPI and SGC. For each, five interviews with key decision makers were conducted 
with the aim of presenting and confirming the proposed approach and its underlying elements; 
the collected data were used to refine the proposed approach. Each case followed the same 
procedures and data collection protocols, to ensure replication of direct results.     
Patton (2002) suggested that the total number of cases could be decided during the course of 
the study. After each case, a quick analysis was made, outlining the major issues mentioned in 
that study. Comparing and contrasting each case study with previous ones, the researcher 
explored whether this would be sufficient to make generalisations from the amount of data 
obtained so far. When it was not enough, a new case was selected in order to achieve either a 
literal or theoretical replication, following the guidelines of Yin (2014); until it was decided 
that the data obtained from these three government organisations was rich enough. Moreover, 
the number of interviews conducted depended on the concept of saturation of data which, 
according to Glaser and Strauss (1967), occurs after many rounds of coding where no new 
categories emerge from the process. Sample size is deemed to be satisfactory only when the 
 Page | 110  
 
key concepts identified from the collected data have reached saturation point; in this research, 
when no new data emerged. 
III. Data Collection Methods Used in this Research 
a) Data Collection Methods Used During the Exploratory Stage  
As discussed earlier, the exploratory stage consisted of three main steps of data collection.  
➢ The First Step used semi-structured interviews as the main data collection 
method, along with observation and document reviews to understand and assess the 
system of the case study organisation and identify key organisational practice and 
performance issues during the lifecycle of infrastructure projects implementation. The set 
of semi-structured questions developed to collect the relevant information is given in 
Appendix 1. 
➢ The Second Step used focus group interview sessions as the main method to 
assess the overall practice and performance of the case study organisation, using the 
standard practice and performance benchmarking tool called PROBE. PROBE for Public 
Service is a diagnostic tool designed to measure the key practices, those that drive the 
organisation and its services forward, and to show how, by improving these key practices, 
it will impact on the organisation’s performance levels (see section 2.4.1 for more detail). 
It does this using the four key stages of:  
• Measurement through self-assessment 
• Analysis against a world-class best practice framework 
• Comparison with other organisations in the same sector and globally against a relevant 
subset of the 7,000+ organisations and businesses that are on the PROBE database 
• Action planning to build on the findings and to identify practical steps towards 
improvement. However, for this particular case study this stage was not included in 
the report as the aim of using this tool was just to understand where the practices and 
performance of the Iraqi government organisation stand against those of the world-
class organisations and identify any gap.   
The following describes the main stages of the PROBE assessment process: the 
methodological process of PROBE benchmarking is presented in Figure 5.6. 
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Stage 1: Measurement and Team Selection 
PROBE for Public Service is a team process. Each organisation is asked to pick a group of 
people within the organisation to participate, representing different levels and functions, 
including different departments and teams. According to PROBE (2016), a team that 
represents the whole organisation in terms of seniority and functionality will be able to 
generate results that reflect the reality of the current situation and as such provide the best 
possible basis for relevant and pertinent improvement activity. For most situations, a team of 
5-6 is appropriate. Ideally, the team should consist of: 
1 Director or equivalent 
1 Senior Manager 
1-2 Middle Managers 
1-2 Others 
Accordingly, five members of DGC were interviewed during this step 
❖ PROBE for Public Service questionnaire 
Once the team has been selected, each member is given a copy of the PROBE for Public 
Service questionnaire (see Appendix 1). This questionnaire contains 52 questions, asking for a 
rank of 1-5 (5= Best Practice) for each question. The researcher (the facilitator of the 
benchmarking process) asks each team member to spend a minute understanding the question 
and giving an answer in pencil. If, after a minute, the question does not make sense or does 
not apply, they should leave it unanswered until the facilitator’s workshop. Since this 
organisational practice and performance benchmarking exercise if new to government 
organisations in Iraq in general and was particularly new to the team members of both the 
case study organisations, the researcher concluded that it was important to conduct a training 
workshop for the members of the teams. During this workshop the researcher explained the 
aim of the study and the benchmarking process and the contents of the questionnaire, so that 
every team member was fully aware of what each concept in the questionnaire meant.  
❖ Pre-meeting 
Before the facilitated workshop the team leader was asked to assemble the team for a short 
preliminary meeting in order to explain what the organisation/service wants to achieve from 
the PROBE exercise, the role the team will play, and the PROBE process. In explaining the 
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process, open and honest debate is encouraged, and an explanation given of what the team 
members are to contribute, including considering the points of others. The main purpose of 
this meeting is to have a general discussion about the questions to ensure that there is a broad 
agreement on what they mean and whether there is already a consensus view on what a 
particular score should be. It is intended to serve as an introductory session where the team 
can further familiarise itself with the questionnaire and as a mechanism to save time where 
consensus scores that require no discussion on the facilitation day can be logged. At the end 
of this meeting the team members keep a record of their individual scores, and the team leader 
keeps a record of any scores where there is already a consensus view. 
Stages 2 and 3: Analysis and Comparison 
❖ The Facilitated Workshop 
At the time of agreeing to undertake a PROBE for Public Service there was agreement on a 
date for the PROBE facilitator (in this case the researcher himself) to meet with the CEO of 
the organisation and the team in a focus group session. Each team member should bring their 
completed questionnaire and some notes on why they have a certain score logged on their 
questionnaire, and show related documentation/archival records where necessary to validate 
the scores. The PROBE for Public Service facilitator leads the team through the questionnaire 
and keeps a log of the consensus scores achieved during this discussion. He also analyses the 
team’s consensus scores and provides feedback in the form of a presentation and discussion 
based on a number of graphical outputs. These show how their scores compare against the 
world-class best practice model that underpins PROBE for Public Service, and how their 
organisation compares with others in their own sector and globally against a relevant subset of 
the 6,000+ organisations and businesses on the PROBE database. 
❖ The PROBE for Public Service written report 
Within two weeks of the facilitated session, the researcher writes a report that summarises the 
findings from the workshop, and sends it to organisation’s key decision makers and the 
PROBE team. It includes narrative explaining the PROBE for Public Service world-class best 
practice model, the organisation’s comparative position against this model and against the 
organisation’s peers already contained on the PROBE database. The report also provides a 
record of the consensus scores from the team and a copy of the graphical outputs used by the 
facilitator to provide feedback at the end of the meeting. Although this is a formal procedure 
for the PROBE facilitator, for the sake of this research study the researcher took this 
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opportunity to meet these individuals in person and ask for their feedback on the results 
contained in the report, in order to confirm that the results are valid.  
 
 
Figure 5.6: PROBE Methodical Process, source PROBE (2009) 
Reference to the benefits of this data collection technique as well as the nature of the 
questionnaire survey used during PROBE benchmarking focus group helped the researcher to 
capture a precise and realistic answer (score) for each question in the questionnaire. The 
questions asked require not merely a yes or no answer, since the questionnaire is designed to 
compare organisations’ existing practices with best practices. Each set of questions asks 
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participants about a particular aspect of their organisation, for example service quality. Each 
aspect is broken down further: for example, one of the questions about service quality is 
reliability. Within each question, there are three statements which portray practice or 
performance which typifies “best practice” (in the right-hand column) and something which 
would be some distance away from “best practice” (in the middle and left-hand columns). 
Participants are asked to choose the statement most appropriate to their organisation. Each 
statement equates to a score to be written in the box provided. Moreover, each question is 
accompanied by guidance notes which set the scene, suggesting that participants are 
considering the ideas described/questions posed in the guidance notes as they make their 
judgments about the score. Underneath each question there are a few lines where they can 
make their own notes. For example, participants can note their reasoning in choosing a 
particular score, as a reminder for their discussions with colleagues Participants should choose 
the statement most appropriate to their organisation, and this gives them a score – the number 
in the coloured band above that statement. If they feel their organisation is between two 
statements, they should choose the number in the coloured band between these two 
statements. In the example below, the organisation questioned felt that statement two was 
most appropriate to them and so they scored 3. If they had felt they were between statements 
one and two, they would have scored 2; see Figure 5.7. 
 
Figure 5.7: Scoring PROBE Questionnaire, source PROBE (2009) 
Document review was used as a secondary source of data to help in reducing bias and 
enhancing the validity of the answers provided during the focus group session. This is 
because most of the structured questions require some evidence to support the answers, such 
as the availability of a vision and a mission for the organisation, an instrument used to 
identify customers (local contracting companies and MNCs) complaints data, etc. Figure 5.8 
is a sample question from the PROBE structured questionnaire. 
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Figure 5.8: Example Survey Question 
➢ The Third Step used semi-structured interviews as the main data collection 
method. The aim was to capture the interviewees’ viewpoints about their current practices 
and performance and about the kind of change their organisation requires in order to 
emulate world-class performance. A copy of the interview guide for this step is presented 
in Appendix 1.  
b) Data Collection Methods used during the Validation Stage 
As stipulated above, the primary aim of this study was to develop a strategic approach that 
can assist decision makers in Iraq to create a step change in government organisations’ 
performance. To fulfil this aim, the validation stage aimed to identify the different views of 
decision makers regarding the feasibility and applicability of the proposed approach within 
the context of Iraq public sectors, and its perceived effectiveness in achieving a step change in 
the performance of government organisations. Therefore, it was necessary to select a data 
collection medium which would provide in-depth insight about the proposed approach and its 
components and gather the different views and opinions of the interviewees. To facilitate 
these requirements, the researcher selected an open-ended form of inquiry, also devising a 
structure/direction to prevent interviewees from deviating from the scope of the study and to 
keep them focused on the main issues. Thus, semi-structured interviews were identified as the 
most suitable data collection technique during the validation stage of this research, helping the 
researcher to gather the data in a flexible and conversational manner but with a focus on the 
study. The case study interviews within the validation stage were terminated when the 
researcher found no new data regarding the area being discussed. 
As Yin (2003) states, for the data collection to be effective, precise communication with the 
participants is needed regarding the purpose of the case study. Thus, a study brief explaining 
 Page | 116  
 
the overall objectives, benefits to the respondents, commitment from the respondents and how 
confidentiality would be dealt with during the exploratory stage was presented. Along with 
this brief, interview guidelines containing the main questions pertaining to the validation 
stage of the case study (see Appendix 2) were distributed among interviewees. These 
guidelines and the proposed approach diagram were given to the interviewees prior to the 
interview, similar to the practices adopted during the exploratory stage of the case study. The 
duration of the interviews in the validation stage was in the range of 45-80 minutes.  
Document reviews were again used during this stage, mainly to understand the details of the 
case study organisations, to obtain details of the interviewees and to confirm some of the 
answers given by them during the data collection process. Figures 5.9 and 5.10 summarise the 
data collection strategy. 
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Figure 5.10: Case studies process, inspired by Yin (2014) 
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5.4.3 Data Analysis Technique 
In terms of the PROBE benchmarking process, the consensus scores generated during the 
facilitated focus group sessions were tabulated along with related textual data in the PROBE 
tool. PROBE is a standard tool designed for the purpose of benchmarking public service 
overall practice and performance. The tool that is used to analyse the data is called the 
PROBE site tool. The site tool software is designed to process and store data that trained and 
accredited PROBE facilitators (like the researcher) gather while facilitating PROBE 
benchmark surveys with their client organisations. The primary purpose of the software is to 
enable the facilitator to generate graphical representations of the benchmark for the client 
organisation. The inputs to the software are textual and numerical data gathered by the 
facilitator from the client organisation via PROBE questionnaires. The software processes the 
data and produces graphs which provide a profile of the organisation’s strengths and 
weaknesses, and compare these with hundreds of others whose data is contained 
(anonymously) in an international sample held within the site tool software. Another 
important purpose of the software is to keep the data gathered from the facilitator’s clients 
safe and confidential, and then to transfer that data out of the site tool in encrypted form and 
transmit it back to the PROBE data-store. Once in the data-store, this new data adds to and 
updates the international sample. In turn, the site tool itself can be updated from the data-
store, so that the international sample it is carrying is renewed and updated on a regular basis. 
On the other hand, before analysing the qualitative data gathered during the case study 
process, the first step is to organise and prepare it. As Creswell (2014) indicated, this involves 
transcribing interviews, scanning materials and sorting and arranging the data into different 
types according to the source of the information. The organised data will then be read 
thoroughly and understood to gain the general views represented (Creswell, 2014). The next 
step of the analysis is to develop different data categories according to the different ideas 
which emerge from the transcribed or sorted data (Saunders et al., 2007). The qualitative data 
collected from each government organisation is then analysed using a combination of 
qualitative coding and interpretation. Coding is used to organise the raw textual data that is 
highly unstructured since the interviewees referred to the same variable in various questions. 
Coding is the process of identifying one or more discrete passages of text or other data items 
that cover the same theoretical or descriptive idea (Gibbs, 2002). As part of the analytical 
process, attaching codes to data and generating concepts enable the researcher to review what 
the data is saying. Coding is usually a mixture of data reduction and data complication since it 
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is used both to break up and segment the data into simpler, general categories and to expand 
and tease out the data in order to formulate new questions and levels of interpretation (Coffey, 
Holbrook and Atkinson, 1996). Following the coding principles, the textual data was broken 
into main subject categories by the researcher. The aim was to capture common 
characteristics and to explore possible relationships which might form a basis for 
interpretation.  
5.4.4 Validity and Reliability of the Research Design 
As Yin (2014) shows, it is necessary to judge the quality and validity of a case study design to 
ensure that it represents a logical set of statements. In this context, it is proposed to use four 
tests which have been commonly used to establish the quality of any empirical research 
including case studies; these are: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability. These tests are explained below with respect to the actions taken in this research to 
satisfy these tests. 
Construct validity means establishing the correct measures for the studied concepts; it can be 
increased by using one of three tactics: using multiple sources of evidence, establishing a 
chain of evidence, and having the key informants review the draft case study report (Yin, 
2014). In order to increase the construct validity during the exploratory stage of this research, 
multiple sources of evidence were used (interview data, observation and document review) 
and a complete report showing the results of the benchmarking process was reviewed with 
interviewees. During the validation stage, interview data and documents were also used, and 
the researcher was also able to present to interviewees the impact of their data on the 
proposed approach.  
Internal validity is the extent of a research design and data to enable the researcher to draw 
accurate conclusions about cause and effect and other relationships within the data (Neuman, 
2006). Internal validity is used as a test for explanatory studies only (Yin, 2014). The 
validation stage of this research fell into this category, therefore internal validity was 
considered during the research design. In order to increase the internal validity, each case was 
analysed individually and compared with the other cases to make sure that the relationships 
obtained were not due to case-specific conceptual variables. 
External validity is the ability of a researcher to generalise the findings, and is related to the 
domain-specific setting chosen for the study (Yin, 2014; Neuman, 2006). In this research, in 
order to increase the external validity, multiple cases were carried out during the validation 
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stage considering the replication logic. The number of cases necessary for generalisation was 
decided during the case study implementations.  
Reliability is the extent to which the operations of a study can be repeated with the same 
results (Yin, 2014). In this research, in order to be able to carry out the same procedure for 
each case during the validation stage, a case study protocol was developed. The overview of 
the case study project, the investigated questions and the procedures used were documented in 
this protocol. 
5.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the design of the research methodology adopted in this study. Chapter 
6 will present the findings obtained during the exploratory stage and how they led to the 
development of the conceptual approach. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE EXPLORATORY STAGE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PROPOSED APPROACH 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter three concluded with a synthesised set of critical steps to guide this research towards 
the development of an approach to propose to decision makers of Iraqi government 
organisations responsible for the delivery of infrastructure, to help them overcome their 
performance weaknesses and create an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a 
step-change fashion and to institutionalise best practices. The first step necessitates assessing 
the overall practice and performance of a given government organisation, comparing it against 
world-class standards, identifying the gap and highlighting key practice and performance 
weaknesses. This understanding will feed into satisfying the requirement of the second critical 
step which necessitates choosing a suitable organisational structure to dedicate to work with 
MNCs from those discussed in chapter 3, to act as a core component to the approach that will 
be proposed to the decision makers. Moreover, the findings from the first critical step will 
also act as a baseline for developing the remaining components of the proposed approach. In 
line with the chosen research methodology, this step is referred to as the exploratory stage, 
aiming at soliciting the data required for the development of the proposed approach, following 
a case study. The stage focusing on the development of the proposed approach is referred to 
as the development stage.  
This chapter consists of two main sections. The first discusses the exploratory stage, 
presenting the case study organisation’s background, the data collection process, and the 
outcome, findings and discussions of the exploratory stage. The second section discusses the 
development stage, focusing on putting together the various components of the proposed 
approach and explaining each of its phases.  
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6.1 EXPLORATORY STAGE: A CASE STUDY TO ASSESS THE OVERALL 
PRACTICE AND PERFORMANCE OF A GOVERNMENT ORGANISATION IN 
IRAQ 
This section explores the overall practice and performance of an Iraqi organisation which has 
direct involvement in the development of infrastructure, following a case study approach. The 
case study will emphasise those practices that have a direct impact on the organisation’s 
overall performance, especially those that determine the satisfaction level of the 
organisation’s customers (namely local and/or international companies/MNCs). The 
Directorate of Government Commerce (DGC), an organisation within a Local Government 
involved in the development of infrastructure, has been chosen as a case study to fulfil this 
aim. The case study process consists of three steps of data collection, whose outcomes will 
help in the development of the proposed approach.  
Thus, the section provides an overview of the case study organisation, explains the data 
collection steps, details the outcome of each step and eventually discusses the overall findings 
of the case study, relating them to the objectives of the research to set the scene for the 
development stage.   
6.1.1 Organisation Background  
The DGC is an organisation within a local government of one of the biggest cities in Iraq. It is 
responsible for implementing various local government-related projects, including 
infrastructure, from the planning stage, through devising project tenders and contracting 
procedures to supervision of the execution stage. DGC is one of the main subsidiaries of the 
local government under the direct authority of the Governor, and has a technical link with the 
state Ministry of Planning. It consists of five main departments: the follow-up, contracting, 
archive, finance and auditing departments, as shown in Figure 6.1.   
During the lifecycle of infrastructure development, each department has its own role that 
feeds into the process of project implementation. For instance, the key role of the follow-up 
department is to make sure that the design and tenders received from the interested parties in 
the city are reviewed and finalised before being sent to the contracting department. The 
contracting department works on advertising the projects, following a tendering process 
specified by top management in line with government regulations. 
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Figure 6.1: DGC Organisational Structure 
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During this process, certain steps require the involvement of the finance department to handle 
the financial matters during and after the tendering processes, e.g. during the process of 
selling tenders. The auditing department works on a different scale, more specifically on the 
financial aspects of the projects; and the archive department record every letter coming in or 
out of the organisation. DGC is the main interaction point between the city’s executive 
authority and the private sector: local or international contracting companies or multinational 
companies (MNCs). More details about the operation and system of the case study 
organisation are discussed later in this section.   
The case study focuses on understanding the overall system and framework of the 
organisation and its corresponding problems; what customers think about the service provided 
by the organisation; the gap between the organisation’s overall practice and performance and 
those of world-class organisations; and what members of the organisation think of their 
organisation’s performance and what needs to be done to improve it.    
6.1.2 Data Collection Process  
As explained above, the main aim of this case study is to fully understand and assess the 
quality of the practices adopted by the case study organisation, which is involved in the 
development of infrastructure in one of the biggest cities in Iraq, and their impact on its 
performance. This is to build and propose an approach to helping decision makers transform 
their organisational performance and create an organisational environment attractive to MNCs 
in a step-change fashion. To obtain the relevant information, three data collection steps were 
conducted, as illustrated in Figure 6.2.  
• The first step of this stage focused on developing a set of questions, conducting a 
series of semi-structured interviews and performing observations to understand the 
organisation’s approach in carrying out its projects and to highlight key problems. 
Data was also collected reflecting customers’ satisfaction level with some of the 
practices adopted by the organisation.   
• The second step focused on assessing the organisation’s overall practice and 
performance, comparing it to world-class standards and identifying the gap between 
them, using the PROBE practice and performance benchmarking tool.   
• The third step advised interviewees of some of the best practices currently used to help 
enhance organisational performance. Feedback from the interviewees was then 
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solicited about matters requiring immediate attention from top management to 
improve the organisation’s performance.  
The findings from these steps, together with the literature synthesis, were used as a basis for 
developing and proposing an approach to help the decision makers to create an organisational 
environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion and to institutionalise best practices.  
The procedure used to conduct this case study is as follows: 
1. A formal letter was submitted to the local government explaining the aim and 
objectives of the research and the type of information required; the letter requested 
permission to proceed with the case study organisation.  
2. Permission was granted.   
3. The researcher interviewed the head of DGC and explained the research and the aim 
of the study, requesting permission to conduct observation and a series of interviews 
with him, other members of the organisation, and representatives of the local 
contracting companies working with DGC, to elicit information about the 
organisation’s overall practice and performance relevant to the study.  
4. The head of DGC was asked to select a group of five people to participate in the 
PROBE benchmarking process, who have considerable experience in how the 
organisation works and represent different levels, functions and seniority. This team 
was called the PROBE team. The head of DGC informed the selected individuals 
about the study and the need for their cooperation.  
5. Once the team had been selected, the overall practice and performance of the 
organisation was benchmarked. The benchmarking steps were conducted as illustrated 
in figure 5.6. 
6. The head of DGC and a group of senior members of his staff were asked to participate 
in a training workshop designed to illustrate the best practices, tools and techniques 
used to address various organisational performance weaknesses; 
7. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with these trainees to solicit their feedback 
about their organisation’s overall practice and performance, and what can be done to 
improve them.  
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Figure 6.2: Overview of the Exploratory Case Study Process 
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6.1.3 Data Collection Step 1: Understanding the Overall System of the Organisation  
The first step focused on understanding the overall picture of the organisation’s system 
including its structure, the framework of operations used to carry out its projects, and what 
customers (local or international companies/MNCs) think about the overall organisational 
performance. A set of questions was developed to collect the relevant information during this 
step; see Appendix 1.  
As explained earlier, this step consisted of two main tasks (Figure 6.2 above). The first was 
conducting a series of semi-structured interviews and performing observations to understand 
the organisation’s overall practices, its structure, and the framework of operations used to 
carry out its projects and highlight key problems. The second task was conducting a series of 
semi-structured interviews to understand what customers (local and/or international 
companies/MNCs) think about a given part of the organisation’s performance that has a 
significant impact on customer satisfaction level.  
I. Task One Findings 
During this task, a series of semi-structured interviews and observations were conducted to 
understand the organisation’s system of operation and its role in the process of infrastructure 
development, and to identify key issues. The details of the people interviewed during this task 
are illustrated in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1: A Summary Profile for the People Interviewed During Task One  
Job Title Interviewee 
Code 
Organisational Role 
Director 1 D-D1 Accountable for DGC work 
Director 2 D-D2 Act as an assistant to Director 1 and also responsible on 
managing a certain group of projects 
Director 3 D-D3 Responsible for managing the processes of the tendering 
and awarding phase of the projects 
Manager 1 D-M1 Responsible for managing the process of planning and the 
activities related to the technical side of the projects such 
as checking tender and design documents 
Manager 2 D-M2 Responsible for managing the activities related to 
advertising and awarding the projects 
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Manager 3 D-M3 Responsible for managing the activities related to 
developing and signing the projects contracts  
Manager 4 D-M4 Responsible for managing the activities related to 
archiving the relevant legal documents of the projects  
Manager 5 D-M5 Responsible for managing the IT related activities 
relevant to the tendering the awarding  process 
Manager 6 D-M6 Responsible for managing the activities relevant to 
following up the procedures of the tendering and 
awarding phase 
Senior Member 
of Staff (SMS) 
1 
D-S1 Is involved in the process of advertising and awarding 
projects 
SMS 2 D-S2 Is involving in the process of planning and follow-up of 
projects 
SMS 3  D-S3 Is involved in the process of contract preparation and 
development  
SMS 4  D-S4 Is involved in the process of providing IT support  
SMS 5 D-S5 Is involved in the process of advertising and awarding 
projects 
SMS 6 D-S6 Is involved in the process of contract preparation and 
development 
Most of the people listed in this table were interviewed several times during the exploratory 
case study. The outcome of this task is discussed below:  
Organisational System 
Task one focused initially on understanding the overall organisational system of the case 
study through designed interviews and observations in order to identify the scope of its work 
throughout the lifecycle of infrastructure development. In particular, an understanding about 
the aspects of the organisation’s work that have a strong impact on customer satisfaction 
during project implementation was sought. This sub-section first describes the overall 
organisational system based on the information volunteered by the interviewees and on 
observation; it then lists the interviewees’ views about the main aspects of their system.  
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In brief, DGC perform the following during the lifecycle of infrastructure projects 
implementation in the city. First, during the planning stage, DGC asks the main directorates 
(the beneficiaries such as the directorate generals of education, roads and bridges, health, etc.) 
about their needs (projects such as schools, roads, bridges, health centres, etc.). After 
receiving this information, supported by completed tender documents where applicable, the 
technical and planning section within DGC (Figure 6.1) studies the directorates’ various 
needs as well as incorporating local government requirements for the city, and produces the 
city’s annual development plan. This plan should be approved by the head of DGC, the 
governor, the local city council and then by the Ministry of Planning, before DGC can 
proceed with implementation. After obtaining the approval, DGC starts the procurement stage 
through its contracting department (CD). CD consist of five sections: advertising and 
awarding, contracts signing, procedures follow-up, computing, and legal archives sections, as 
shown Figure 6.1. 
CD’s advertising and awarding section advertises the approved projects on a group basis for 
tenders; after receiving priced tenders for a group of projects, two independent committees are 
formed to open and analyse the contractors’ priced tenders: the Open Tender Committee and 
the Evaluation and Selection Committee. These committees are under the direct authority of 
the governor. They produce a recommendation letter listing the names of the successful 
bidders chosen to undertake the implementation of the advertised projects. This letter is then 
sent to the governor for approval. As soon as the governor approves this letter, it is sent back 
to DGC which in turn carries out the contracts awarding process via CD’s advertising and 
awarding and contracts signing sections, and requires the successful bidders to start working 
on their projects as soon as possible. The follow-up department (see Figure 6.1) then manages 
the implementation of the projects and monitors their progress. Figure 6.3 summaries the 
overall picture of infrastructure project development and the interrelationships between the 
various parties involved.  
The follow-up department manages the implementation of projects on a portfolio/programme 
basis. This department has five sections named after the key portfolios/programmes of 
infrastructure projects managed: the general building, municipal and sewage, roads, electricity 
and water projects sections. The general building projects section is responsible for managing 
various types of project including schools, health centres and other general projects. 
Municipal and sewage is responsible for managing projects such as city sewage networks and 
sewage plants, and water for managing projects related to city water networks.  
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Figure 6.3: The Process of Infrastructure Project Development 
The roads section is responsible for managing projects such as roads, bridges and other related 
projects within the city, while management of the city’s power plants and electricity networks 
is the responsibility of the electricity projects section. These sections report the status of their 
projects to their head of department who in turn reports to the head of DGC, who in turn 
reports to the governor who will report to the local council. CD is also kept informed, and in 
the case of any breach of the contracts by the successful bidders, it will proceed with a 
suitable legal action.  
Base on the collected data, it is clear that DGC is mainly involved with three main phases 
during the lifecycle of infrastructure projects implementation; the planning, procurement and 
construction phases. The outcome of data collection related to these three phases is discussed 
below. 
a) Planning  
This phase refers to procedures that identify and prioritise construction projects for the next 
financial year. The more accurate these procedures are, the better and easier it is to execute 
the projects in the following financial year, with clear budget distribution. However, the 
majority of interviewees indicated that there are no clear procedures to prioritise projects 
before the beginning of the financial year. They mentioned that some projects are prioritised 
at the beginning of the fiscal year following a process, which takes several months, or 
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sometimes decisions are made quickly based on the available information. Some interviewees 
responded that there are no procedures to prioritise at all. According to D-D2 “projects 
normally implemented without a clear prioritisation process that looks at the projects that 
will provide great impact on citizens”. D-D3 stressed that “because there is no formal process 
that looks at citizens’ needs and sets plans to address these needs, you can see that plenty of 
necessary projects are not being given high priority whereas other less important projects are 
being implemented first. 
Additionally, interviewees mentioned that the design and tender development of projects is 
not part of the annual planning cycle, and warned that the cost of the design and tender 
development is not considered part of the annual budget. According to D-D3, “beneficial 
parties as well as the local government rely heavily on old design sketches and bills of 
quantities for their required projects and because of that a number of changes occur during 
the implementation process as these designs are missing many important details”. D-D1 
added that “despite the fact that the usual type of contract used by the local government is the 
traditional type, where the local government is the one responsible for the design of the 
projects, the local government does not allocate funding to renew the existing old project 
designs to match the city’s current needs”.  
Interviewees also commented that existing regulations and bylaws create an obstacle to 
prevent the planning process. To clarify this, D-D1 said that “there are number of 
contradictions between the instruction provided by the central government’s Council of 
Ministers and those of the Ministry of Finance and sometimes instructions contradict 
themselves”. D-M6 agreed with this and added that “the people appointed for budget 
allocation have no knowledge or understanding about construction/engineering projects”. D-
M6 also said, “some of the political decisions which are made to satisfy some regions in the 
city significantly affect project implementation”. D-D3 responded, “some financial and 
administrative procedures cause significant delays and sometimes the Ministry of Finance 
estimates project budgets following its own procedures, not according to the local government 
supplied plan”.  
Interviewees agreed that there is a lack of sound strategic planning in the organisation and 
in Iraq in general. For example, D-D1 said, “the problem has been always with the planning 
phase. There is no primary plan for infrastructure projects implementation and this is 
because of the absence of a strategic vision and plan for the city”. D-D3 added that “There is 
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real chaos at the level of planning. The construction of roads, bridges and water and sewage 
networks and other projects does not follow a sound strategic plan, but rather an arbitrary 
one. For instance, most of the construction projects such as bridges, sewage systems and 
other things were not implemented following an effective plan. The city does not have a 
strategic plan that shows how the future of residential, industrial, commercial and other 
important areas will be developed and how they will be implemented”.  
The majority of interviewees responded that there is no clear communication between the 
parties involved during the lifecycle of infrastructure projects implementation (i.e. 
between case study organisation and other directorates/line ministerial offices in the city). D-
M6 said, “One of the key problems affecting the projects implementation plan within the city 
is the lack of clear communication between the organisation and the various parties in the 
city. For example, the local government will award a contractor to pave the streets of a 
certain area; however, when the contractor goes to carry out the work, he discovers that 
there is no sanitation or sewage system. Thus, we're back at square one, awaiting the 
completion of a new design and a plan for the sewage system. Sometimes the contractor paves 
the road anyway to finish his job and when the directorate general of water and sewage 
realises that this area lacks sanitation or a sewage system it asks the local government to fund 
another project that is scoped to demolish the pavement, instal the sanitation or sewer system 
and pave the road again”.  
Another issue that has also been mentioned by interviewees is the lack of a complete design. 
This causes a number of problems during the construction phase, leading to projects being 
delayed and exceeding their planned budget. More about these consequences are presented in 
the construction phase section. Figure 6.4 summarises the key issues related to planning. 
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Figure 6.4: Problems Associated with the Case Study Planning Phase 
This indicates that a number of factors hinder the case study organisation from carrying out 
the planning phase effectively. The organisation has no sound strategic planning, which 
seriously affects its judgment on prioritising projects to address customer needs. Regulations 
and old procedures affect both the organisation’s ability to plan effectively, improve 
communication channels with other stakeholders and enhance project designs, reflecting the 
weakness of the organisation’s practices and performance during the planning phase.    
b) Procurement  
This phase refers to all processes from receiving a list of projects to be tendered until the 
successful bidders are announced. This is a very important phase to attract qualified 
contractors/consultants/MNCs, requiring efficient handling of communications with a large 
number of companies during the enquiry and submission stages. 
The data obtained through the interviews and observations show that the procurement phase is 
mainly conducted by CD and consists of three main stages; see Figure 6.5.   
• Preparation, Advertisement and Selling Tender Stage 
This starts from receiving projects for tender through to submitting the contractors’ priced 
tenders to the Open Tenders Committee, and is totally within the control of CD and DGC. 
• Selection of the Contractor Stage 
This is from opening the tenders to selecting the winner and sending the final 
recommendation letter. It is totally outside the control of CD and DGC. 
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• Awarding Stage  
This covers receiving the official letter of the winners to receiving the official letter to start 
the contract. It is totally within the control of CD and DGC. 
 
Figure 6.5:  The Three Main Stages of Procurement  
A detailed process model for the procurement phase has been developed by the researcher to 
understand the complexity of the processes and procedures during this phase. It was 
developed from the data gathered during this step via interviews with staff members and by 
making observations of the organisation’s day-to-day work during this phase. The data was 
then analysed and represented as a process model for presentation to heads of department 
within the organisation, to confirm the completeness and validity of this process model. The 
process mode is depicted in Figure 6.6 – Appendix 1. 
The detailed model shows that the five sections of the CD appear to be engaged with 54 
business processes, i.e. the normal operation of the department. The operation is triggered by 
receiving a number of tenders to be processed, from receive project documents through the 
technical and planning section (see Figure 6.6 in Appendix 1) to signing the contract with the 
winning contractor. 
After analysing the process model and discussing its details with the interviewees it was 
found that, only five of these 54 processes are core processes (namely: alignment of 
information; advertise and sell tenders; inform the winner; create and sign the contract) while 
the rest are non-value added processes. Interviewees agreed that more than 90% of the effort 
could be devoted to a more productive task, and that the all but the five core processes within 
the department are of a bureaucratic/administrative nature.   
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The data also showed that a further core process in this phase, namely the selection of the 
winning contractor however, it is outside the responsibility of CD and DGC. Furthermore, the 
roles and responsibilities of the directors and managers during this and other phases are of an 
authoritative rather than a strategic nature. In addition, because they are engaged in non-
value added tasks, they have less free time to monitor the overall performance of their 
organisations/departments/sections. This management style is clearly affecting the 
organisation’s ability to detect practice and performance problems and thereby blocking 
decision makers from seeing the need for organisational practice and performance 
improvements. 
The members of the organisation interviewed agreed that the processes of the procurement 
phase significantly delay the implementation of infrastructure projects, thereby delaying 
the execution of the budget allocated to the local government by the central government. D-
D3 explained that “each annual city development plan contains hundreds of projects and each 
individual project should go through these three phases in order to get awarded. For 
example, a group of 10 projects is advertised and receives about 150 bids. It requires about 
1.5 to 2 months for these projects to pass through the selection of contractor and the 
awarding phases to eventually to be awarded to the successful bidders. This approach is 
exhausting our department’s capacity and makes it difficult for the local government to 
complete their annual plan on time. Thus, those remaining projects that have not been 
awarded during this fiscal year will have to wait until the city’s next fiscal year budget is 
approved, thereby delaying the entire development of the city”. This shows that the processes 
and procedures adopted during this phase is highly bureaucratic and unfit to achieve a speedy 
award of contracts. 
Further, the data has revealed other key issues surrounding the procurement phase. 
Interviewees agreed that there is no clear and transparent method for evaluating 
contractors/consultants/MNCs. For example, D-D2 said that “some contractors are 
classified as first-class yet they have no financial capabilities or previous experience that 
enable them to implement the awarded projects. Some contractors are unqualified yet they 
have been given high scores during the evaluation process since contractors are not always 
assessed based on their successful delivery of projects”. D-M1 added that “some projects are 
awarded directly to companies that have financial and political power without being 
evaluated based on their technical competence or their records of successful projects 
delivery”, while D-M2 stressed that, “there is no such thing as evaluation; the contractors’ 
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classification is just a routine process which only takes the financial capability of the 
contractors as a prime factor, and even if there is a standard method for evaluation, it is not 
being taken into consideration when recommending the winner bidders”. This clearly reflects 
that the procurement phase is non-transparent and not fair for all the prospective bidders, local 
and international.  
Furthermore, interviewees agreed that there is no complete set of design drawings and 
tender documents before advertising the tender. D-D3 explained that “this is because 
project design and drawings are often incomplete; only some strategic projects have complete 
tenders before advertising the tender. There is no standard design/tender check-up process or 
enough follow-up (QA/QC) before advertising the tenders and the lack of time is normally an 
excuse to advertise incomplete tenders”. D-S1 added that the “performance of those 
responsible for tender development is not measured and they are not being punished for their 
negligence and poor work. Numbers of tenders were advertised yet their design and other 
technical specification are still incomplete. This can show you that there is a serious problem 
in the preparation of tender documents because the ones who do that are inefficient and 
unqualified; besides, there is a lack for designers or those who are capable on checking the 
designs”. 
Observation, document review and interview data clearly show that the organisation mainly 
relies on the traditional procurement system, where the design is the responsibility of the 
organisation and the responsibility for execution is transferred to private sector contractors via 
the procurement phase. This reflect a clear lack of strategic procurement.  
Interviewees also claimed that the Open Tender Committee and Evaluation and Selection 
Committee do not make the right decisions. D-D1 said that “a number of incorrect 
decisions were made because of the committees’ inefficiency … they lack the necessary 
experience and competence. The decision is mainly biased to the lowest priced tenders while 
the capability, efficiency and effectiveness of the contractors are not being taken into 
consideration most of the time”.  D-S2 stressed that “sometimes decisions for awarding some 
strategic projects are made even when the minimum amount of the submitted bids has not 
been reached. Also, in some cases, some people with high political/executive power influence 
the decision taken by these committees especially when the decision is related to a mega-
project”. 
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D-D3 added that “an international company once came to bid for one of the strategic projects 
we were advertising. They asked to know the mechanism of the tendering process and the 
basis on which bidders would be evaluated and awarded the projects. After they understood 
the mechanism they refused to bid, claiming that the system has too much ambiguity and is 
not transparent or fair enough for them to apply”. Figure 6.7 summarises the key issues 
identified with regards to the procurement phase. 
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Figure 6.7: Problems Associated with the Case Study Procurement Phase 
This reveals that there are many weaknesses associated with the overall practice and 
performance of the case study organisation during the procurement phase. It is reflected via 
many issues including the highly bureaucratic processes and procedures, unclear methods of 
evaluating priced tenders, heavy reliance on traditional procurement systems and the 
significant amount of non-value added activities.   
c) Construction 
This phase refers to all the procedures and communications with the selected bidders, from 
receiving the construction site to handing over the project to the DGC. It is yet another critical 
phase that can halt projects if it is not carried out effectively.  
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The data revealed that a significant number of projects are considered to have failed if we 
look at them from a project management point of view. These failed projects have either 
exceeded their planned time and budget or the delivered quality was poor. Sometimes, 
projects fail to address all three important aspects of a successful project: time, cost and 
quality. These range from schools and health centres to roads, bridges, water and waste 
networks and power plants. The projects status records to which the researcher was able to 
have access revealed that more than 65% of the infrastructure projects that have been or are 
being delivered between 2010 and 2014 are considered to be failed projects, having missed 
one or more of the triple constraints (time, cost, quality). The majority of these projects 
exceeded their planned completion period. Others were stopped for a number reasons 
including conflict with other primary projects, the contractors having no cash flow to continue 
the work because of the delay in monthly payments, or amendments to project design after 
awarding of the project; these eventually extended the planned time and budget, in addition to 
the time required to get the change approved by the relevant officials.  
The findings revealed a number of key reasons for this, presented below.   
Interviewees agreed that the supervision process is inadequate and not clear to all parties 
involved in project implementation. They added that there is no effective measurement 
procedure in place to measure the monthly performance of contactors, and a lack of 
competent personnel able to use sound project management tools and techniques to help 
manage projects effectively. For instance, D-S2 said that “some of the supervision teams are 
incompetent and lack the necessary project management skills; and sometimes the number of 
projects assigned to them to supervise exceeds their capacity. Besides, the local government 
are not paying them adequate salaries which makes them prone to some dishonest acts such 
as taking bribes from contractors and in return they give a blind eye to their poor 
performance on the field”. D-S4 added that “the supervision processes are reasonably good 
but not clear to all parties involved, not to mention the poor project management skills, the 
lack of authority delegated to the follow-up teams, and other factors which all contribute to 
the poor delivery of projects. In addition, sometimes some high-level officials interfere with 
the decisions made by these supervision teams especially when the successful bidder 
contractor has some political support from certain officials in the organisation”. D-S6 also 
mentioned that, “there is a lack of competent engineers and effective measurement 
procedures…normally there is no programme of work [project schedule] for the projects 
which they can track and is not being requested from contractors during the tendering 
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process… and even if there is one it is not being updated to reflect the actual work and this 
makes it difficult to measure the contractors’ performance. Also, in addition to their lack of 
authority, these supervision teams are not able to follow up all the projects assigned because 
it exceeds their capacity”. 
Another reason highlighted by interviewees for why projects fail to adhere to their planned 
time, budget and/or specification is that most projects have incomplete design. D-D2 
clarified this: “some projects exceed their contractual time and cost because the tender 
documents were not accurate enough to cover all aspects of the projects. For example, some 
tenders have been advertised and awarded while missing important parts of the projects such 
as the outer fence, finishings, roads leading to the building, etc. This is because these tenders 
were developed based on incomplete project designs by the beneficial party thus were 
overlooked by those responsible to prepare the tenders of those projects. So to solve this 
issue, DGC will have to prepare new tenders for these missing parts for each of these 
projects. Also, because most contractors will have no interest in bidding for such low-value 
tenders, this will force DGC to award them to the same winning bidders of those projects and 
accept whatever bids they offer, of course, after a long negotiation. In this case, these projects 
were originally awarded assuming their designs were complete, so, these added costs of the 
missing parts and the time needed to construct them will lead to the projects exceeding their 
originally estimated time and budget, thereby delaying the entire annual plan”. Interviewees 
also agreed that modification to the design or specification often happens and it takes 1-3 
months for such changes to be approved. SMS1 explained that the reason behind this delay “is 
because of the complex procedures that have to be followed to approve the change or the 
added parts to the projects not to mention that the governor’s approval has to be gained. 
Until obtaining the approval to proceed, the work will usually be stopped and thereby the 
project duration will be extended along with its cost”. Figure 6.8 summarises the key issues 
identified with regard to the construction phase.  
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Figure 6.8: Problems Associated with the Case Study Construction Phase 
This means that the case study organisation fellow a weak project management practices 
during the construction phase, making the organisation to have poor overall performance 
during this phase.  
II. Task Two Findings 
This task focuses on understanding how satisfied the organisation’s customers (contractors, 
consultants or MNCs) are with the performance of the case study organisation, and the impact 
of the organisation’s key practices from the customers’ perspective. This task focuses on 
assessing customers’ satisfaction with the organisation’s performance during the procurement 
phase, given the significant impact this phase has on attracting qualified contractors, 
consultants or MNCs. A set of questions were designed based on the three operational phases 
of Procurement: the advertising, selling tender and awarding phases. The questions were 
designed as follows:  
The advertising phase was covered by four questions: ease of access to advert, time given for 
contractors to respond to the advert, ease of access to project information, and level of 
satisfaction with the information covered in the advert. 
The selling tender phase had seven questions: ease of purchasing tender, time taken to 
purchase tender, clarity of requirements, Completeness of documents when purchasing tender, 
responsiveness to request for information (RFI), treatment by the department’s employees, 
and level of Satisfaction. 
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The awarding phase was covered by two sections. The first concerned the submission of 
tenders and the second awarding and signing the final contract. The former was covered by 
four questions: clarity of tender documents, time taken to officially submit a tender, treatment 
by the department’s employees, and level of satisfaction. The awarding section had six  
questions covering invitation of contractors to opening of tenders, time taken to open and 
evaluate tenders, transparency in informing the selected contractor, completeness of contract 
documents, treatment of employees, and level of satisfaction. 
Representatives of 12 local contracting companies with long experience with DGC were 
interviewed. The interviewees profiles are given in Table 6.2. 
 
 
Table 6.2: A Summary Profile for the People Interviewed During Task Two  
Company Job Title Interviewee 
Code 
General Contracting Company 
(GCC) 
Chief Executive Officer  G-C1 
GCC Chief Executive Officer  G-C2 
GCC Deputy Chief Executive Officer G-D1 
GCC Chief Executive Officer  G-C3 
GCC Chief Executive Officer G-C4 
GCC Chief Executive Officer 
representative  
G-R1 
GCC Deputy Chief Executive Officer G-D2 
GCC Chief Executive Officer G-C5 
GCC Chief Executive Officer G-C6 
GCC Chief Executive Officer 
representative  
G-R2 
GCC Chief Executive Officer  G-C7 
GCC Deputy Chief Executive Officer G-D3 
The outcome of the customer satisfaction survey showed that: 
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a) In terms of the advertisement phase, only 4 out of the 12 interviewees were satisfied 
with the ease of accessing information about new projects and 10 were not satisfied 
with the advert information.  
b) 8 out of 12 were not satisfied with the process of purchasing the tenders. 
c) Only one contractor was satisfied with the processes in the awarding phase of the 
project procurement operated by the case study organisation.  
The interviewees provided feedback on a number of critical issues surrounding the 
procurement phase. For example, G-C1 spoke about a corruption incident that occurred 
when he submitted a bid to implement a project for DGC: “once I was approached by some 
members of the evaluation and selection committee who asked me to write them a cheque for 
8% of the project value if I wanted the project to be awarded to me”.  
G-R1 spoke about another type of non-transparency in which he and a number of 
contractors were disqualified for unclear reasons. “A number of times, we found ourselves 
disqualified because some required documents went missing from our submitted bids… and 
these documents had not been forgotten, I always check my files before submitting any bid 
and make sure every required document is in the file, but somehow they got out of the file and 
the committee registered our bids as incomplete and thus we were disqualified… it is clear 
that they do that on purpose”. 
Other contractors mentioned bureaucratic inefficiency which they met during the selling 
tenders phase. They said CD staff did not permit bidders to review the documents of the 
advertised tenders unless they paid for them first. G-C1 said that “my specialty is the 
construction of school projects; however, I will not submit a bid if the tender contains a task 
of construction of roads along with the school. Because I am not allowed to review the tender 
documents before buying it, then the only way to know is to pay for it and check. This means 
that I and other contractors have to pay about $100 just to see if the tender matches our 
speciality or not”. In this regard, the researcher reviewed the public procurement regulations 
and bylaws to see whether there is any clause that prohibits bidders from reviewing the 
tenders before buying them. No such clause in the regulations and bylaws of Iraqi public 
procurement exists.  
All the professional contractors interviewed complained about the non-existence of a client 
single window during the selling tenders and awarding phases, making the procurement 
phase very frustrating. For example, G-C4 said that “in order to buy a tender we need to go to 
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the Contracting Department which is situated on the first floor of the building, and we need to 
see one member of staff who will give us a receipt. We then have to take this receipt to the 
Finance Department on the ground floor to pay the tender fees and receive another receipt. 
Afterwards we have to take the new receipt to the Contracting Department. to meet another 
member of staff who will provide us with a copy of the tender.”   
The interviewees agreed that there are considerable delays during this phase. For instance, 
when asked about the time needed to buy the tender documents, 10 said 1-3 hours to get a 
copy, while the rest said sometimes a day or more.  
Eight of the contractors were not satisfied and think that projects are not being advertised 
for long enough or in the right places and the information provided in the project adverts is 
poor. For instance, G-R1 said, “the time is not sufficient because every tender requires a 
considerable amount of time to be priced and contractors need to investigate the prices for 
each part of the project carefully before they submit their priced tenders … and the adverts 
are not advertised in the right places.” G-C3 added, “I think sometimes the timing of the 
projects advertisement is intended to be short so that only those who have inside contacts are 
informed in order to reduce the number of contractors who can apply for the advertised 
projects.” 
This low level of customer satisfaction reflects that the overall practice and performance of 
the case study organisation do not live up to contractors’ expectations, so improvement is 
required to regain their trust and pave the way for attracting MNCs.  
6.1.4 Data Collection Step 2: Benchmarking the Overall Practice vs Performance Using 
PROBE 
The second step focused on assessing the overall practice and performance of the case study 
organisation, comparing it to world-class standards and identifying the gap. A standard 
practice and performance-benchmarking tool, namely PROBE (see section 2.4.1), was used 
during this step to gain full understanding of all the aspects surrounding the environment of 
the case study organisation. In accordance with PROBE standards (see section 5.3.1), the 
focus group interview session using the PROBE survey questionnaire was conducted with 
five members of DGC, whose details are illustrated in Table 6.3.  
Table 6.3: Summary of the organisations members profile interviewed during step 2  
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Job Title Interviewee 
Code 
Organisational Role 
Director 1 D-D1 Accountable for DGC work 
Director 3 D-D3 Responsible for managing the processes of the tendering and 
awarding phase of the projects 
Manager 2 D-M2 Responsible for managing the activities related to advertising 
and awarding the projects 
Manager 4 D-M4 Responsible for managing the activities related to archiving 
the relevant legal documents of the projects  
Manager 5 D-M5 Responsible for managing the IT related activities relevant to 
the tendering the awarding  process 
Given the importance of the procurement phase in attracting qualified contractors, consultants 
and MNCs, the PROBE tool was used to assess DGC practice and performance during this 
phase and compare it to the PROBE world-class practice and performance model (see Figure 
2.6) and to other peer organisations within the same sector, and to identify the gap between 
them. This phase corroborates the findings of step one, to gain a full understanding of all the 
issues surrounding the quality of the practice and performance of the case study organisation 
and how it is compared to world-class organisations. The self-assessment questionnaire 
survey used during this step is presented in Appendix 1.  
In brief, this questionnaire contains 52 questions each asking for a rank of 1-5 (5 = Best 
Practice). Before conducting the focus group session, the researcher (the facilitator of the 
benchmarking process) asked each team member to spend a minute understanding the 
question and giving an answer in pencil. If, after a minute, the question did not make sense or 
did not apply, they should leave it unanswered until the facilitator workshop (the focus group 
session). On the day of the workshop, each team member was asked to bring their completed 
questionnaire and notes on why they logged certain scores on their questionnaire, and to show 
related documentation/archival records where necessary to validate their scores. The PROBE 
for Public Service facilitator led the team through the questionnaire and kept a log of the 
consensus scores achieved during this discussion. During this workshop, the facilitator 
analysed the team’s consensus scores using the PROBE tool, and provided feedback in the 
form of a presentation and discussion based on a number of graphical outputs. These show 
how their scores compare against the world-class best practice model that underpins PROBE 
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for Public Service, and how their organisation compares with others in their own sector and 
globally against a relevant subset of the 7,000+ organisations and businesses that are on the 
PROBE database.  
As discussed in chapter 2, PROBE for Public Service measures the practice and performance 
of individual service organisations in five broad themes: leadership, people, processes, 
performance management and the resulting indicators of performance outcomes, which are 
service quality, customer growth, result for stakeholders and business performance; see Figure 
6.19, (PROBE, 2016).  
 
Figure 6.9: Themes of the Overall Practice and Performance, Source: PROBE, (2009) 
The following sub-sections present the outcome of the benchmarking process relevant to the 
overall practice and performance themes:    
Note that the meaning of customer in this survey is local and/or international 
companies/MNCs. 
I. Leadership Quartile  
As discussed in chapter 2 and illustrated in Figure 6.9, the leadership theme is sub-divided 
into quality leadership and market acuity. The results of the PROBE benchmarking relative to 
the leadership indices are presented in Figure 6.10.  
These results are plotted in the form of a quartiles chart to illustrate a more detailed 
comparison between the practices of the case study relevant to this theme, and that of the 
sector average and world-class standards. This also applies to the results of the remaining 
themes of the overall practice and performance. This quartiles chart was constructed by taking 
a group of scores that relate to a particular theme/sub-theme and calculating an index for that 
theme/sub-theme. The chart shows, across the page, several indices that have been calculated 
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in this way. The range of values for each index for the entire sample is plotted from lowest to 
highest, and that range is divided into four colour-coded quartiles. For example, the first (top) 
quartile is displayed in orange; 25% of the organisations benchmarked by PROBE in the past 
are contained within it and their range of scores is indicated by the height of the orange bar. 
Superimposed over the quartile bars, the red square indicates the position of this case study 
organisation and the blue square the position of the comparison group average. In this case, 
the comparison group is all those organisations benchmarked by PROBE in the past and 
falling in the category of local authority/local authority services (in-house).  
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 identify the questions that contribute to each of the above indices (sub-
themes, namely quality leadership and market acuity) and the consensus scores that were 
assigned to them by the PROBE team during the focus group session. A score of 5 represents 
a world-class standard; thus, in this case’s analysis the questions that attracted a score of 3 or 
below are highlighted (in red) as worthy of attention by the case study top management, to 
improve the index value.  
The results showed that the overall leadership practice index of the case study organisation is 
far behind that of the sector average and the world-class standard, with scores of 
approximately 29% for quality leadership and 26% for market acuity, as illustrated in figure 
6.10.  
Note that 
• Q. No. in the tables below refers to the question number in the PROBE questionnaire; 
see Appendix 1. 
• Best practice for each of the topics below is described in the anchor statement below 
the score of 5 for the appropriate question in the PROBE questionnaire; see Appendix 
1. 
Table 6.4: Quality Leadership Result 
Question Q. No. Score 
Role of leadership in developing a service culture 1 1 
Leadership style 2 2 
Shared vision, mission and goals 3 1 
Customer orientation 4 1 
Quality values 5 2 
Problem solving  26 2 
Quality mindset 27 1 
Table 6.5: Market Acuity Result 
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Question Q. No. Score 
Measurement of employee satisfaction 11 1 
Listening to the customer 13 1 
Customer relations 18 1 
Electronic communication/commerce 21 2 
Systematic use of benchmarking  41 1 
II. People Quartile  
According to PROBE, people are central to the effective delivery of service. The people 
theme is sub-divided into the cycle of virtue, and empowerment. The results of the PROBE 
benchmarking relative to the people indices are presented in Figure 6.10. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 
identify the questions that contribute to each of these indices and the scores that were assigned 
to them by the PROBE team during the facilitated focus group session.  
The results show that the overall people practice index of the case study organisation is far 
behind that of the sector average and the world-class standard, with a score of approximately 
26% for the cycle of virtue and 30% for empowerment, as illustrated in Figure 6.10.   
Table 6.6: Cycle of virtue result 
Question Q. No. Score 
Recognition and reward 6 1 
The development of people 7 1 
Employee involvement 9 2 
Table 6.7: Empowerment result 
Question Q. No. Score 
‘Real time’ employee handling of service problems/failures 29 1 
Employee discretion 32 2 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Leadership and People Quartiles Chart 
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III. Service Processes Quartile  
PROBE’s four sub-themes of service processes management are process management, 
moments of truth, kaizen and service innovation. The results of the PROBE benchmarking are 
presented in Figure 6.13. Tables 6.8, 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11 identify the questions that contribute 
to each of the above indices and the scores that were assigned to them by the PROBE team 
during the focus group session. 
The results show that the overall practice index of the service processes sub-themes of the 
case study organisation is far behind that of the sector average and the world-class standard 
with a score of approximately 33% for process management, 32% for moments of truth, 
26% for kaizen and 40% for service innovation, as illustrated in Figure 6.11. 
Table 6.8: Process management result 
Question Q. No. Score 
Management of services and support processes 17 2 
Current use of information technology (IT) 19 2 
Supplier relationship and stability/ Strategic Procurement 22 1 
Table 6.9: Moments of truth result 
Question Q. No. Score 
Role of support functions 16 3 
Managing ‘moments of truth’ 20 2 
Problem handling strategy for service recovery 30 1 
Accessibility 36 1 
Elimination of ‘waste’ 38 1 
Table 6.10: Kaizen result 
Question Q. No. Score 
Education and training for quality 8 1 
Continuous improvement 25 1 
Quality procedures and approach  28 2 
Table 6.11: Service innovation result 
Question Q. No. Score 
Innovative environment 14 2 
New service design and development process  15 2 
IV. Performance Management Quartile 
Performance management is concerned with ensuring that the processes described above lead 
to improved performance, increasing value both for the customer and for the organisation. 
The results of the PROBE benchmarking for the performance management index are 
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presented in Figure 6.11. Table 6.12 identifies the questions that contribute to the above index 
and the scores assigned to them by the PROBE team during the focus group session. 
The results show that the overall practice index of the performance management theme of the 
case study organisation is far behind that of the sector average and the world-class standard, 
with a score of approximately 23%, as illustrated in Figure 6.12.  
Table 6.12: Performance measurement and standards result 
Question Q. No. Score 
Support for employees 10 1 
Use of customer complaint data 31 1 
Visibility and communication of service standards 39 1 
Challenging standards 40 2 
Performance measurement and reporting 42 1 
Customer satisfaction measurement 43 1 
 
Figure 6.11: Service Processes and Performance Management Quartiles Chart 
V. Overall Performance Results Quartiles  
According to PROBE, good service management will lead to improved performance on a 
number of dimensions: service quality, customer growth, results for stakeholders, and 
business performance. The results of the PROBE benchmarking relative to the overall 
performance indices of the case study organisation are presented in Figure 6.12. Tables 6.13, 
6.14, 6.15 and 6.16 identify the questions that contribute to each of the above indices and the 
scores that were assigned to them by the PROBE team during the focus group session. 
The results show that the overall performance indices of the case study organisation are far 
behind those of the sector average and the world-class performance standard, with scores of 
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approximately 30% for service quality, 30% for customer growth, 20% for results for 
stakeholders and 56% for business performance, as illustrated in Figure 6.12. 
Table 6.13: Service quality  
Question Q. No. Score 
Service meeting customer needs 24 1 
Reliability 33 1 
Quality performance, relative to your sector 34 3 
Staff responsiveness  35 2 
Level of customer satisfaction 44 1 
Value (quality/price) 45 1 
Table 6.14: Customer growth 
Question Q. No. Score 
Innovativeness 23 2 
Customer retention 46 1 
Table 6.15: Results for stakeholders 
Question Q. No. Score 
Level of employee satisfaction 12 1 
Impact on society 37 1 
Table 6.16: Business performance 
Question Q. No. Score 
Margins, relative to sector 47 3 
Market share 48 3 
Cash flow 49 3 
Overall productivity trend within organisation 50 2 
Operating costs 51 3 
Prices 52 3 
 
Figure 6.12: Overall Performance Results Quartiles Chart 
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VI. Step 2 Key Findings 
a) The Case Study Overall Practice vs Performance against the Sector Average 
and World-Class Standards 
The case study overall practice vs performance result was constructed by taking the consensus 
scores for all of the practice questions and assigning an index of overall practice for the 
organisation and an index of overall performance. These indices are plotted on the scatter 
diagram, with practice on the horizontal scale and performance on the vertical scale. The 
resulting position in isolation says much about the case study organisation:  
On the scatter diagram shown in Figure 6.13, the red square shows the position of the case 
study organisation and the green triangle the position of the overall sample average, i.e. the 
average of all the green crosses which represent all the organisations that have been 
benchmarketed by PROBE in the past. The yellow squares identify the organisations that 
work in a similar sector to the case study organisation and are called the comparison group. In 
this case, the comparison group is local authority/local authority services (in-house). The blue 
triangle represents the position of the comparison group average, the average of all the 
yellow squares.   
The analysis results position the case study organisation in the could-do-better zone of the 
world-class model, with a practice index of 29% and a performance index of 37%. When 
compared with the average scores for the sector, the case study is 30 points behind in practice 
and 24 points behind in performance. However, when compared with world-class standards, 
DGC is 71 points behind in practice and 63 points behind in performance. This result shows 
that there is a significant gap between the overall practice and performance of the case study 
and that of the world-class standards as well as that of the sector average, as depicted in 
Figure 6.13.  
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Figure 6.13: Overall Practice vs Performance Scatter Diagram 
The overall practice and performance of the case study have also been plotted in the form of a 
quartiles chart to give a more detailed comparison between the practice and performance of 
the case study against those of the sector average and world-class standards. 
As discussed above, the overall practice and performance chart breaks the scores into five 
themes (see Figure 6.9): leadership, people, service processes and performance management 
being practice themes and the fifth, overall performance, being a performance theme. Figure 
6.14 shows the overall practice and performance results of this case study.  The overall 
practice and performance indices of the case study organisation are far behind those of the 
sector average and world-class performance standard, with scores of approximately 26% for 
leadership, 28% for people, 32% for service processes, 23% for performance management and 
38% for overall performance, as illustrated in Figure 6.14. 
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Figure 6.14: Overall Practices and Performance Quartiles Chart 
Study of the chart reveals broad strengths and weaknesses compared to the comparison group 
and the entire sample. These are presented in the next sub-section.  
b) Weakest and Strongest Elements  
The final two charts are created by comparing the scores given to individual PROBE 
questions with the average of the scores given to the same questions by other organisations in 
local authority and local authority services (in-house). These charts are shown in Figures 6.15 
and 6.16 
• Normally the ten strongest elements are plotted on the right-hand side of each chart, 
representing the (up to) ten practice aspects (Figure 6.15) and the ten performance aspects 
(Figure 6.16) for which the organisation’s score is furthest ahead of the average. 
• In contrast, the left-hand side of each chart shows (up to) ten weakest elements, the 
practices or performance aspects for which the organisation’s score is below average, or in 
some cases is only slightly ahead of average.  
The bars on these two charts are colour-coded, linking the individual questions to the themes 
of leadership, people, service processes, performance management and overall performance 
results. The scale refers to the amount by which the organisation’s score is above or below the 
average. For this case study, there were no strongest elements for either practice or 
performance results.   
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The objective of these two charts is to help prioritise the topics that require immediate 
attention from top management and to use them, along with the weaknesses identified in the 
previous step, as a base line for the development of the proposed approach:  
• The highlighted performance weaknesses should be reviewed and consideration given to 
their relevance and importance to the organisation. Which are the highest priorities for 
improvement? With reference to this research study, the highest priority is to improve the 
level of customer (MNC) satisfaction with the performance of government organisations in 
Iraq in handling the delivery of infrastructure projects, beginning from the planning stage, 
devising of projects tenders and contracting procedure through to supervision of the 
execution stage.   
• Perhaps the greatest emphasis should be placed on the practice weakest elements, since 
according to the literature and as indicated by PROBE it will generally follow that 
improved performance can only be achieved through improved practices.  
• Practice Strengths and Weaknesses  
 
 
Figure 6.15: Practice Weakest and Strongest Elements  
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• Performance Strengths and Weaknesses  
 
Figure 6.16: Performance Weakest and Strongest Elements  
6.1.5 Data Collection Step 3: Training and Staff Feedback about the Need for Change 
The third step focuses first on providing six training workshops covering a range of topics: 
business process improvement, management of change, strategic planning and IT, project 
management, people and performance measurement and teamwork practices, and knowledge 
management. The aim is to provide awareness about the key concepts and best practices that 
can be used to improve the overall performance of the organisation. Assessment based on a 
post-training survey is calculated. The questionnaire was designed to assess the impact of the 
training programme on the trainees’ understanding of the delivered materials, and to solicit 
their views about those key work practices and performance weaknesses identified in steps 
one and two, and how urgent they think is the need for change. Twelve people (all trainees) 
were interviewed. A summary of the interviewees’ profiles is given in Table 6.17. The 
questions were distributed to all interviewees and explained to ensure consistence in 
completing the forms. A copy of the interview guide for this step is given in Appendix 1. 
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Table 6.17: Summary of the organisations members profile interviewed during step 3  
Job Title Interviewee 
Code 
Organisational Role 
Director 1 D-D1 Accountable for DGC work 
Director 2 D-D2 Act as an assistant to Director 1 and also responsible on 
managing a certain group of projects 
Director 3 D-D3 Responsible for managing the processes of the tendering 
and awarding phase of the projects 
Manager 1 D-M1 Responsible for managing the process of planning and the 
activities related to the technical side of the projects such 
as checking tender and design documents 
Manager 2 D-M2 Responsible for managing the activities related to 
advertising and awarding the projects 
Manager 3 D-M3 Responsible for managing the activities related to 
developing and signing the projects contracts  
Manager 4 D-M4 Responsible for managing the activities related to 
archiving the relevant legal documents of the projects  
Manager 5 D-M5 Responsible for managing the IT related activities 
relevant to the tendering the awarding  process 
Senior Member 
of Staff (SMS) 
1 
D-S1 Is involved in the process of advertising and awarding 
projects 
SMS 2 D-S2 Is involving in the process of planning and follow-up of 
projects 
SMS 3  D-S3 Is involved in the process of contract preparation and 
development  
SMS 4  D-S4 Is involved in the process of providing IT support  
The outcome of this phase is described in the following sub-sections: 
I. Focused Training Workshops  
After completion of the PROBE benchmarking process and the delivery of the report to the 
PROBE team and top management of the case study organisation, five training workshops 
were conducted for senior members of DGC covering a range of topics: 
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1) Business process improvement 
2) Management of change 
3) Strategic planning and IT 
4) Project management  
5) People and leadership. 
The aim of this phase was to make sure that members of the organisation are aware of some 
of the key concepts and best practices that can be used to improve the overall practice and 
performance of government organisations in Iraq, so they can emulate those best in class. The 
sessions also enabled the researcher to obtained informative feedback from the trainees about 
the level of change required in their organisation and the practices that urgently require 
improvement if their organisation is to deliver better performance during the lifecycle of 
infrastructure projects implementation. In order to make the training more relevant and 
exciting, the process model of the procurement phase (Figure 6.6) and PROBE benchmarking 
results were used as a real case for discussion (local scenario). This approach proved to be 
very successful as it contributed to the training in two ways: 
1) Helping trainees to understand the need for change by examining the strengths and 
weakness of their own practices  
2) Engaging trainees in the discussion of possible and potential solutions to streamline 
their practices, business processes and thus improve their performance. Particular 
emphasis was placed on the interaction with customers and how employees can 
provide better services and achieve high customer satisfaction.  
The training programme was successfully delivered; a brief profile of each member of the 
organisation attending the training workshops is given in Table 6.17. 
II. Assessment of Training Outcome 
An assessment method was produced based on post-training interviews. A set of questions 
(Appendix 1) was designed to assess the impact of the training programme on the trainees’ 
understanding of the materials delivered, and their views about the key aspects that require 
immediate improvement. The focus was on work practices, performance and need for change. 
Twelve members of DGC (all trainees) were interviewed. A summary of the interviewees’ 
profiles is given in Table 6.17.  
The outcome of the assessment is that:   
a) All interviewees now realise that the performance of their organisation can be 
significantly improved and that their current practices are slow and hinder progress. 
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b) Eleven out of the twelve understand that strategic planning principles/best practices 
are not being used by top management; one is not sure. 
c) All interviewees believe that their organisation lacks using project management’s best 
practices, tools and techniques.    
d) All interviewees realise that effective use of strategic planning and project 
management best practices can significantly help increase the rate of budget execution 
and reduce the high rate of failed projects. 
e) Eleven out of the twelve believe that they should have a clear job description to allow 
them to identify their roles and responsibilities, which will in turn help them to 
measure and improve their performance.  
f) All interviewees agree that the role of the heads of the departments should move away 
from the current control style to a more visionary one, to help rather than monitor 
employees. 
g) All interviewees agree that current regulations are hindering their progress. They now 
realise that many of these regulations do not add value and could be removed. 
h) Eleven out of the twelve agree that they need to be given responsibility for what they 
do so that they can take quick decisions (empowerment).  
i) All interviewees agree that many of their work practices do not add value and can be 
eliminated to ensure that better customer services are delivered. 
j) It became clear that employees do not believe that they are working individually 
without support from the team. Six out of the twelve disagree, with six not sure, that 
their work is based on individual performance. 
k) All interviewees realise that customer services needs to be improved.  
l) All interviewees agree that the current organisational structure of the organisation is 
inefficient, making it difficult to improve contact with customers. 
m) Ten out of the twelve agree that there should be quality assurance procedures to ensure 
that customers receive the best possible service.  
When asked about the immediate needs for improving the performance of the organisation: 
a) All interviewees responded that immediate change is required to improve service to 
customers. 
b) All interviewees saw that process improvement should take place immediately. 
c) All interviewees agreed that strategic planning and project management for best 
practice is urgently needed and should be adopted by the organisation.  
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d) All interviewees agreed that developing a client single window is a very important 
step towards achieving customer satisfaction. 
e) All interviewees saw that further training and capacity building is essential and should 
be integrated into their work. 
f) All interviewees agreed that IT should be used effectively to help them smooth out 
their business processes and to enable them to give better service to customers. 
g) All interviewees responded that a common vision must be developed, enabling all 
employees to work towards achieving it. 
h) All interviewees saw that their job description should be aligned with the objectives of 
the organisation so that they understand how their job can add value to the 
organisation. 
i) All interviewees expressed that employees need to be empowered and to be 
accountable for their own jobs.  
6.1.6 Findings and Discussion of the Exploratory Case Study 
Reflecting on the aim and objectives of the research, this study aims to develop a strategic 
approach that can guide decision makers in Iraq to overcome government organisations’ 
performance weaknesses and create an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a 
step-change fashion. In order to achieve this aim, the first objective research was to review the 
literature, seeking approaches to help step-change improvement of government organisations’ 
performance. The literature synthesis identified a number of steps towards achieving this aim, 
thereby potentially leading to creating an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a 
step-change fashion. The core message from these steps was advising decision makers to 
dedicate an organisational structure/body, established in accordance with best practices, to 
work with MNCs during the lifecycle of infrastructure development. Depending on how 
mature and effective is the current overall practice and performance of the government 
organisation, this organisational structure/body can either work from within the existing 
organisations (in-house) or operate as a separate spinout organisation dedicated exclusively to 
working with MNCs. Synthesis of the literature concluded that if the current organisational 
practices are weak and their quality is far behind those of world-class standards, then it is 
better to dedicate a separate spinout organisations unless an in-house organisational 
body/structure would be more appropriate. Thus, in order to propose the right approach, the 
second key objective of this research focused on understanding the overall practice and 
performance of an Iraqi organisation, involved in the implementation of infrastructure 
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projects and in direct contact with local/international companies, assess its quality and 
identify key weaknesses and strengths. This objective has been fulfilled in this case study.  
Reflecting on the overall findings of this case study (Table 6.18), it is clear that the case study 
organisation has direct contact with local contracting companies and therefore its overall 
performance has a direct and significant impact on the overall satisfaction of companies 
working or intending to work in Iraq, such as MNCs. This is because, as discussed in chapter 
2, it is the collective performance of the concerned government organisations in Iraq, such as 
this case study, that shape the organisational environment, which has been identified as a 
significant factor for attracting MNCs to foster FDI inflows.  
The overall findings have identified numerous weaknesses associated with the organisation’s 
performance during the planning, procurement and construction phases of infrastructure 
projects implementation, indicating a significant weakness in the overall performance of the 
case study organisation. This is particularly clear from the results obtained from the PROBE 
benchmarking which have illustrated how the overall performance of the organisation, during 
the procurement phase, falls far behind that of world-class organisations. This has also been 
corroborated by the consensus gained from interviewees who have agreed with the PROBE 
results and emphasised that organisational practice and performance improvement is required.  
Table 6.18: Case Study Overall Findings  
The Organisation Role During Infrastructure Development 
The Case study organisation is involved in the: 
❖ Planning Phase 
❖ Procurement Phase  
❖ Construction Phase 
The Impact of the Organisation Performance on Customers Satisfaction 
❖ The organisation has a direct contact with customers (Local and/or 
International companies/MNCs) and its performance has a direct and 
significant impact on customer level of satisfaction with the organisational 
environment in Iraq  
The Overall Assessment for the Organisation Practices and Performance Based 
on the Outcome from the Semi-Structured Interviews, Observation and 
Document Review 
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❖ The Findings have highlighted number of issues and weaknesses related to the 
organisations practices and performance during the planning, procurement and 
construction phases. These findings clearly reflect that the case study 
organisation has a weak overall practices and performance.  
The Overall Assessment for the Organisation Practices and Performance Based 
on the Outcome from PROBE Benchmarking 
❖ the benchmarking process has positioned the organisation in the could do 
better category of PROBE world-class grid  
❖ This means that the organisation overall practice and performance is very 
weak compared to that of world-class standards as well as the average 
comparison group.    
Key Factors/Practices Affecting the Performance of the Organisation 
❖ Poor planning 
❖ Lack of strategic planning,  
❖ Weak procurement system,  
❖ Contradicting regulations  
❖ Lack of effective project management,  
❖ Poor performance management,  
❖ Lack of effective communication among key project stakeholders during the 
lifecycle of infrastructure projects,  
❖ Ineffective use of IT  
❖ Lack of skilled personnel and professional development programmes,  
❖ Poor customer orientation 
Key Actions Required Immediately to Achieve Performance Improvement 
❖ Start organisational change  
❖ Conduct process improvement 
❖ Adopt strategic planning and project management best practices 
❖ Better use of IT to better deliver the services to customers 
❖  Effective professional development programmes 
❖ Create organisational vision and align employees job description with the 
organisation’s strategic objectives  
The overall practice and performance obtained from the PROBE benchmarking process has 
positioned the case study organisation in the could-do-better category of the world-class grid 
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and shown a significant gap between best practices and those of the case study organisation. 
Key organisational practice weaknesses were illustrated in Figure 6.15 above. The 
consequences of the practice weaknesses identified by PROBE have also revealed a number 
of key organisational performance weaknesses, depicted in Figure 6.16. 
It is obvious that the weaknesses identified during the first and second steps of the exploratory 
stage confirm that the case study organisation’s very weak overall practices significantly 
affect its performance during its delivery of infrastructure projects.  
By looking at the PROBE benchmarking results, it is clear that infrastructure projects are 
being delivered by following extremely weak practices that are far behind the sector average 
and best practices. Specifically, the organisation is weak in terms of its leadership, people, 
processes and performance management. Even more seriously, the PROBE model (Figure 
2.6) clearly indicates that the organisational culture is weak in terms of its management style, 
service culture and employee management. The organisation’s service concept and processes 
are weak in terms of understanding its customers, service design and development, delivery 
system and processes, use of IT and electronic communication, and ways of working with 
suppliers, i.e. weak strategic procurement. The organisation’s service delivery is weak in 
terms of its management for improvement, service recovery and responsiveness to clients, 
Finally, the organisation’s service value and measurement is weak in terms of its management 
of cost and value, service standards and performance measurement.  
These weaknesses have significantly affected the overall performance of the organisation and 
have led to weakening its performance in various aspects including service quality, customer 
growth, results for stakeholders, and business performance. More specifically, these weak 
practices have led the organisation to have poor internal service quality, poor service 
effectiveness, poor service quality and poor value, unsatisfied customers in both citizens and 
suppliers. Thus, the performance weaknesses are the tip of the iceberg, resulting from the 
volume of ice below the water, representing the practices’ weaknesses. 
When reflecting upon the Iraqi organisational environment, discussed in chapter 4, the case 
study findings have shown some of the key factors that can answer the question of why Iraq is 
considered, internationally, as hard to do business with. It is also clear that Iraqi government 
organisations have a low budget execution rate as well as poor planning, poor project 
management and poor procurement processes of infrastructure projects, which all result in 
more than 60% of Iraqi citizens lacking access to the most essential services, including water 
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and electricity. For example, the poor supplier relationship weakness related to service 
processes, identified by PROBE, is one of the factors that contributed to government 
organisations being hard to do business with. This is because, as the findings have shown, 
corporate procurement is neither being undertaken as a strategic business process, because the 
organisation’s procurement processes are not mature, nor benchmarked against world-class 
best practice. Despite this, according to PROBE there is overwhelming evidence that world-
class organisations benefit greatly from engaging in strategic procurement in which experts in 
the field can bring their skills to enable the organisation to reduce costs, for example via a 
centralised procurement system. Improving services and increasing overall satisfaction with 
the public service offerings by providing fast and easy to use contact points for the users of the 
service, i.e. better use of IT to give wider and faster access to public services, is also required. 
Many organisations seek to outsource services to improve the end-user experience and reduce 
costs (PROBE, 2016). However, the findings have shown that the concept of strategic 
procurement seems to be new to the case study organisation.   
The findings from PROBE also show that the case study service design and development 
process is ad hoc, i.e. service processes are not being designed and developed based on 
customer needs. This is because the organisation lacks for effective processes that can capture 
customer needs and design services to meet them. This organisational culture is reflected in a 
number of issues including no elimination of waste, i.e. identification of non-value adding 
activities is absent; this is also reflected in the process map of the procurement phase, 
obtained during step one of the first data collection phase. It explains why there is no 
continuous improvement process, poor management of customer interfaces, poor management 
of services and support processes and no education or training for quality. It can also explain 
why the customers interviewed demonstrated a low level of satisfaction with the way the 
organisation delivers its services during the lifecycle of infrastructure projects 
implementation. In addition, it provide an answer to the issue raised in chapter 4 of why the 
majority of government organisations in Iraq have a consistently low budget execution rate 
and projects are mostly considered to have failed. This is because the case study findings 
reflect that the organisation neither identifies those processes and activities that contribute to 
the delay of budget execution nor does it employ effective tools to help staff execute the 
investment budget effectively, such as utilising project management and IT solutions.       
This is not surprising, given the weaknesses related to organisational leadership. The PROBE 
findings have shown that the organisation’s leadership team seems not to have a strong role in 
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developing a customer-oriented service culture; nor does it listen or develop a relationship 
with them. This can be seen in some of the leadership practice weaknesses identified by 
PROBE, including the weak quality mindset, no quality values and the weak investment in IT 
to improve the customer experience. Moreover, the findings show that the leadership seem to 
have no shared plan or vision that identifies customers’ needs and translates them into 
practical operational goals for departments and individuals to address. This is supported by 
interviewees’ feedback, which shows that managers lack a strategic vision, and that their job 
description is not aligned with their organisation’s strategy. This reflects a clear lack of 
effective strategic management, which explains why, despite the huge investment in 
infrastructure since 2003, key infrastructure areas in Iraq are still underdeveloped. Moreover, 
the leadership team does not appear to encourage a culture that would employ a systematic 
use of benchmarking or assessment for the overall service operations to identify points for 
improvement. Another issue of great concern for the leadership team is that the it seems to be 
unaware of the links between employee satisfaction, absenteeism, workforce performance and 
customer satisfaction. This is clear, given that the leadership team has no formal process to 
measure employee satisfaction or data relating this to customer satisfaction. It should be noted 
that research into the PROBE world-class model of service provision suggests that there is a 
chain of cause-and-effect between internal service quality and the bottom-line performance of 
the business. This means that if the organisation looks after its staff, making them feel valued 
and happy in their work and well supported in terms of the systems, processes and resources, 
this will drive the organisation to enhance the value of its services, with satisfied customers 
and eventually improvement in business performance.  
This is obvious when looking at the PROBE findings related to the people practice 
weaknesses. The organisation seems to provide no feedback or recognition of service 
performance at employee level. The development of people’s skills is ad hoc and is limited in 
range, content and effectiveness. This was also noticed in the interviewees’ feedback, in 
response to the lack of effective training and empowerment. Moreover, involvement in the 
operation of the service and decision-making process is blocked by attitudes of both 
management and employees. PROBE findings show that staff are actively discouraged from 
challenging procedures; they are neither empowered to deal with problems/failures to take 
immediate decisions to resolve problems without recourse to supervisors, nor is the team 
trained in this regard. This issue was also raised by interviewees during the third data 
collection phase of the exploratory stage. It is clear when looking at the performance 
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management weaknesses that there is little support for employees, and poor performance 
measurement and reporting. 
This reflects the need for a radical improvement in the organisation’s overall practice and 
performance if it is to emulate world-class standards, as confirmed by the views of the 
organisation’s employees presented in the outcome of step three of the exploratory stage.  
The overall findings of the exploratory stage have set the scene for the development of the 
research approach which is to be proposed for Iraqi decision makers to help guide them on 
how to overcome their weaknesses and create an organisational environment attractive to 
MNCs in a step-change fashion, and institutionalise best practices. This is discussed in the 
following section. 
6.2 DEVELOPMENT STAGE: THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
6.2.1 Introduction  
This section discusses the development of the approach to be proposed to meet the aim of the 
research. The approach will be developed based on the critical steps identified in chapter 3 
(Figure 3.10), and the collective findings obtained during the exploratory stage.  
6.2.2 The Proposed Approach  
By looking at the findings of the exploratory stage through the lens of the critical steps 
identified in chapter 3 (Figure 3.10), the key components of the proposed approach have been 
identified and are discussed in the following sub-sections: 
I. The Proposed Organisational Structure to be Dedicated to Work with MNCs  
The general outcome of the exploratory stage has clearly shown that there is a significant gap 
between the overall practice and performance of the case study government organisation and 
that of world-class organisations. The PROBE benchmarking results positioned the case study 
organisation in the could-do-better category of the world-class grid. As discussed in chapter 3, 
organisations that fall in this category normally requires 5 to 10 years to be able to emulate 
those best in class. In addition, when looking at these findings from the viewpoint of the 
innovation models of Christensen and Overdorf (2000) and Davila et al. (2006, 2012), it is 
clear that the organisation requires a significant change to its existing business model and 
technological use/processes to be able to deliver world-class performance during the lifecycle 
of infrastructure projects implementation. This means that improvement of this kind will be 
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radical and disruptive to the existing organisational system of the case study organisation, and 
thus will face considerable resistance, hence the length of time suggested by Prabhu et al. 
(2001). According to the critical steps identified in chapter 3, and assuming that the majority 
of government organisations responsible for the delivery of infrastructure in Iraq fall in the 
could-do-better category, Iraqi decision makers must avoid such resistance and create an 
organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion. This study proposes 
that initially, and for the sake of attracting MNCs to foster FDI inflows, decision makers of 
government organisations should establish a separate spinout organisation and dedicate it 
exclusively to work with MNCs during the lifecycle of those infrastructure projects that the 
decision makers are willing to award only to MNCs.  
The exploratory study’s findings highlighted a number of important practice and performance 
weaknesses that the decision makers must overcome to ensure effective delivery of 
infrastructure projects. Accordingly, the proposed approach emphasises that they should 
ensure that a separate spinout organisation is established in line with best practices, operated 
by qualified personnel, in order to overcome these weaknesses. Therefore, the proposed 
approach aims at guiding them in creating an organisational environment attractive to MNCs 
in a step-change fashion, and institutionalising best practices. The approach consists of four 
main phases, in line with the critical steps identified in chapter 3. These phases are illustrated 
in Figure 6.17 and each phase will be discussed in detail in the following sub-sections. 
II. Phase I: Ensure the Need and Top Management Support 
According to the critical steps identified in chapter 3, as part of effective organisational 
change management, the first and most important step that change champions (an individual 
or groups of enthusiastic decision makers of government organisations in Iraq) need to do is 
to ensure that key decision makers understand the need for change and work effectively with 
full support and commitment to the necessary change.  
The exploratory stage findings have clearly shown that the case study government 
organisation lacks effective professional development programmes, so change champions 
should expect that key stakeholders will be less aware of how best practices can help their 
organisation deliver better performance. This lack of awareness was clearly observed during 
step one of the third data collection step in the exploratory stage. As discussed in chapter 3, 
this phase is the foundation for the successful delivery of the remaining phases proposed by 
the approach. A first objective for this phase is for change champions to make sure that key 
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decision makers agree on a vision for organisational practice and performance improvement. 
In order to achieve this, they can utilise various tools, such as conducting training 
workshops to ensure that key decision makers are aware of the details of the proposed change 
and its associated risk, mitigation plans and a proposed implementation plan.  
As discussed earlier, the exploratory stage findings have clearly shown significant weaknesses 
in relation to the practices adopted by the organisation’s leadership and thus it should be 
expected that it is not an easy task to ensure that key government stakeholders understand the 
need for change and provide their full support and commitment for all or some of the phases 
proposed by the approach. Thus, change champions should focus their efforts on obtaining 
formal approval from key government stakeholders before commencing on the establishment 
of the separate spinout organisation to ensure their firm commitment to change.  
III. Phase II:  Establishment of the Separate Spinout Organisation (SSO) 
According to the discussion in section 3.7, this phase of the approach should start as soon as a 
green light to establish the separate spinout organisation (SSO) has been given. Based on the 
findings of the exploratory stage, along with the literature identified in sections 3.6 and 3.7, 
there are number of aspects that change champions in Iraq need to address during this phase. 
The exploratory stage findings have stressed that the government organisation has overall 
weak strategic planning, inadequate project management and poor use of information 
technology/information systems (IT/IS) throughout the three major phases of infrastructure 
development programmes, namely planning, procurement and construction. Moreover, the 
findings have clearly shown how complex, bureaucratic and non-customer oriented are the 
processes and procedures that are currently used to facilitate the progression of the planned 
infrastructure projects throughout the three phases. Therefore, for the proposed separate 
spinout organisation to be successful it has to address all these key weaknesses.  
Accordingly, the approach proposes a strategic planning office (SPO) and project 
management office (PMO) as the core components of the separate spinout organisation. This 
ensures that an effective strategic plan is developed that satisfies the government 
organisations’ various customer needs and develops a list of prioritised strategic projects as 
well as highlighting those projects that need to be addressed by MNCs. Moreover, by taking 
into account MNCs’ needs, these offices can develop the processes and procedures required 
for effective and efficient project implementation from the planning stage, devising of 
projects tenders and contracting procedures through to supervision of the execution stage, 
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making sure they show integrity, transparency simplicity and overall meets MNCs’ needs. In 
addition, as the findings have highlighted that the case study organisation is completely non-
customer oriented, customer orientation should be a core value of the SSO. The SSO should 
ensure that all the processes and procedures designed for the various stages of projects 
implementation are effective and satisfy customers’ needs. Additionally, an effective 
integrated IT solution should be implemented as a core component of the SSO to facilitate the 
implementation and management of projects and to ensure that an effective client single 
window is implemented.  
In addition, the findings extracted from the exploratory stage have shown that the gap 
between best practices and the government organisation’s practices is significant, with the 
lack of awareness of best practice obvious. Thus, it can be argued that Iraqi government 
organisations do not have the expertise required to build the SSO in line with best practice. 
Therefore, change champions are advised to consider hiring an external consultant to 
commence selecting and training a heavyweight team to operate the SSO, establish the SPO 
and PMO, develop terms of reference, define roles and responsibilities, processes, 
procurement strategies, manage the performance of the organisation and provide ongoing 
training and support. This approach also suggests that change champions should continually 
communicate the SSO’s progress of implementation with key government stakeholders and 
market its achievement. This is to ensure that continuing support and commitment from these 
key government stakeholders is sustained. 
IV. Phase III: Carry out Projects and Produce “Quick Wins”  
According to the critical steps identified in chapter 3, at this phase the establishment of the 
SSO should have been completed and the SSO should be ready to operate; all the required 
permissions should have been granted by key government officials to those individuals who 
have been trained by the external consultant to operate the SSO. Indeed, these permissions 
should have been included in discussion with key decision makers and agreed upon during 
phase I of this approach. When everything is in place, the SSO can start its operation under 
the ongoing training and support of the hired external consultant. As discussed earlier, the 
approach proposes that SSOs are to be dedicated to working with MNCs and thus, at the point 
when the SSO has finished the development of the strategic plan and prioritised the 
infrastructure projects required, decision makers should know the type and number of projects 
that need to be implemented by MNCs. Hence, the approach suggests that SSOs should 
effectively communicate with those qualified MNCs and market their existence and their new 
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way of working by utilising various communication and marketing techniques to restore 
MNCs’ confidence in how Iraqi government organisations work. By attracting MNCs’ initial 
interest and then experience of the differences in performance, more MNCs should be 
expected to accept work with the SSO to implement various infrastructure projects.  
Restoring MNCs’ trust in Iraq’s public sector system can be considered a major “quick win” 
for the SSO as this will contribute to increasing the number of MNCs agreeing to work with 
Iraqi government organisations, thereby increasing the flow of FDI. Furthermore, restoring 
MNCs’ confidence in the system means that SSOs have developed effective strategic plans, 
processes and procedures for effective project implementation, and this by itself can be 
considered a major “quick win”. 
Depending on the level of success achieved by the SSO, change champions may start 
planning how to transform their old organisational systems to operate in a similar fashion to 
the SSOs, thus ensuring that all infrastructure projects under the responsibility of Iraqi 
government organisations are implemented following the same system of SSOs. This is called 
institutionalisation, as discussed in chapter 3.  
V. Phase IV: Institutionalise best practices - Gradually Expand the Separate 
Organisation via Sub-PMOs 
As discussed earlier, the aim of establishing SSOs is to attract MNCs to work with them to 
implement those highly strategic infrastructure projects that government organisations cannot 
immediately finance. However, Iraqi government organisations will still have a considerable 
amount of public funding dedicated to infrastructure development, but executed under their 
old organisational system, as described in section 6.1. The exploratory stage findings have 
shown that a significant amount of projects executed under the old system are considered to 
have failed for many reasons, including poor planning, poor project management and complex 
procurement processes. Accordingly, and in line with the literature reviewed in chapter 3, the 
proposed approach suggests that after the successful operation of the SSOs, champions of 
change should consider institutionalising and expanding the use of the SSOs’ system to cover 
the implementation of all types of projects under the jurisdiction of their organisations.        
In accordance with the discussion in section 3.6, this phase proposes that champions of 
change are required to effectively market and communicate the achievement of their SSOs; 
they may need to think of using their political advantages and power to gain higher and 
expanded support from key decision makers for the institutionalisation process. If they get the 
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green light, then and only then can they take the following steps to institutionalise the SSOs 
system to the rest of the government organisations. These steps are designed based on the 
findings from the literature and the exploratory stage: 
The strategic plan is developed by SSOs, during phase 2, to address the government 
organisation customers’ needs; in the context of the case study organisation the strategic plan 
for infrastructure development should address citizens’ needs such as schools, health centres, 
roads, bridges, etc. Also, only a group of these projects will be implemented by SSOs while 
the rest remain the responsibility of the parent government organisation; the findings of the 
exploratory stage have shown that the case study government organisation will manage the 
implementation of the infrastructure projects on a portfolio/programme basis. Accordingly, 
this phase of the proposed approach suggests that, in order to ensure gradual transformation of 
the parent government organisation system and that all the remaining projects are executed 
following the SSO system, champions of change should do the following:        
The first step is to relieve, gradually, the parent government organisations’ responsibility 
from executing the remaining portfolios of projects (on a portfolio/programme after portfolio/ 
programme basis) that are not being handled by the SSO. Consequently, every time the 
responsibility to execute a certain portfolio/programme is being taken from the parent 
organisation a group of redundant personnel will be created. Thus,  
The second step is for change champions to establish a new sub-PMO (say sub-PMO X) 
under the responsibility of the SSO, designing it in a similar fashion to the SSO in terms of its 
terms of reference, processes, procedures and IT systems, with the help of the expert 
consultant, if still required. Then:  
The third step is to train those redundant personnel to form a heavyweight team to handle the 
operation of this new sub-PMO X that will be assigned the responsibility of executing that 
portfolio of projects that has been relieved from the parent organisation. This sub-PMO X is 
to be monitored, controlled and assigned responsibilities by the SSO. Then,  
The fourth step, as soon as the sub-PMO X has proven successful, for the change champions 
to start relieving the parent organisation of the responsibility of executing a second portfolio, 
following a similar approach by establishing a second sub-PMO (say sub-PMO XX) under the 
SSO to take over this responsibility. This process continues until all portfolios have been 
transferred to the new sub-PMOs. This approach will provide a minimum disruption to 
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government organisations’ on-going work and ensure transparent gradual transformation of 
their overall practice and performance into one that can emulate world-class standards and 
satisfy all customers, including citizens, local and international companies.  
Nevertheless, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, change or improvement in organisational 
performance is not an easy task, and number of aspects should be taken into consideration to 
ensure successful implementation of organisational change, such as reducing organisational 
resistance to change. Thus, the approach proposes this phase for Iraqi decision makers as a 
long-term organisational performance improvement approach to gradually transform their 
government organisations into ones that emulate world-class organisations. Figure 6.17 
illustrates the proposed approach.      
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Figure 6.17: Proposed Approach 
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6.3 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has discussed the exploratory and development stages of this research. The 
exploratory stage focused on assessing the overall practice and performance of a government 
organisation in Iraq.  
The exploratory stage consisted of three main phases. The first focused on presenting the 
outcome of the interviews and observations with the aim of understanding the organisational 
system used by the case study in carrying out its infrastructure projects. This phase 
highlighted the key problems associated with the system during the lifecycle of infrastructure 
projects implementation, namely during the planning, procurement and construction phases, 
and presented customers’ (local contracting companies) perceptions of the system. The 
second phase of the exploratory stage focused on benchmarking the case study’s overall 
practice and performance against world-class standards and identifying the gap and key 
practice and performance weaknesses using the standard practice and performance 
benchmarking tool PROBE (discussed in sections 2.4.1 and 5.2.1d). The third phase focused 
on presenting staff opinions about key problems associated with the system and what needs to 
be done to help improve the overall practice and performance of their organisations as well as 
increasing the level of satisfaction of their customers. The overall findings obtained from the 
exploratory stage have highlighted numerous weaknesses associated with the case study’s 
overall practices and performance, from the planning stage, through devising projects tenders 
and contracting procedures, to supervision of the construction stage. The overall findings 
emphasised the significant gap between the case study’s overall practices and performance 
and that of world-class organisations; it was also far behind the average score of those peer 
organisations working in the same field.  
Accordingly, based on these findings and those synthesised from the literature, it is concluded 
that one of the key steps of the approach that can help Iraqi decision makers overcome their 
performance weaknesses and create an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a 
step-change fashion is the establishment of a SSOs dedicated exclusively to work with MNCs 
during the lifecycle of groups of infrastructure projects that the decision makers are willing to 
award to MNCs. These SSOs are to be built in line with world-class standards and work under 
the direct authority of government organisations’ CEOs, with complete responsibility for the 
success of the projects, and working in parallel with, not in conjunction with, the existing 
parent organisations. 
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In this regard, the development stage has focused on putting together the various components 
of the proposed approach in accordance with the critical steps synthesised in chapter 3 and the 
findings of the exploratory stage. The proposed approach consists of four main phases. The 
first emphasises the need for change champions (individuals or groups of enthusiastic 
decision makers from Iraqi government organisations) to ensure top management support and 
commitment to the proposed change. The second phase advises the champions of change to 
establish SSOs in line with best practices and dedicate them to working exclusively with 
MNCs during the lifecycle of those infrastructure projects that decision makers are willing to 
offer to MNCs. The third phase advises the champions of change to ensure that the SSOs 
effectively operate, carry out projects, and produce “quick wins” under ongoing training and 
support from an external consultant. The phase emphasises the need for these champions to 
communicate and market the successes of their SSOs with a wider array of government 
stakeholders, to ensure continuing support for the SSOs. In addition, change champions are 
advised to communicate and market the existence of the SSOs and their achievements to 
regain the trust of MNCs in the Iraqi public sector system. When an SSO achieves its 
objectives, the fourth phase of the proposed approach is for change champions to 
institutionalise and expand it gradually to cover the implementation of all infrastructure 
projects still under the responsibility of the government organisations.       
The next stage of this research (the validation stage) presents the proposed approach to key 
decision makers in three government organisations in Iraq. The aim is to solicit their 
professional opinions about the feasibility and effectiveness of using the proposed approach 
within their organisational context, and the factors that need to be taken into account to 
achieve its successful implementation. This will be discussed in the following chapter.   
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CHAPTER 7 VALIDATION STAGE: VALIDATION OF THE PROPOSED 
APPROACH  
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter 6 proposed a step-change organisational performance improvement approach, (Figure 
6.17) for Iraqi decision makers to help them overcome their performance weaknesses and 
create an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion. The 
approach consists of four main phases. It advises change champions how to achieve an 
organisational environment attractive to MNCs. They first need to convince decision makers 
about the need for change and strive to attain their commitment and support for the proposed 
change. Secondly, they need to establish a SSO, in line with best practices, and dedicate it 
exclusively to work with MNCs during the lifecycle of those infrastructure projects that 
decision makers are willing to assign to MNCs. Thirdly, they must run the SSO and 
communicate and market its successes with key decision makers to sustain their continuing 
support and commitment to change and pave the way for a holistic organisational 
performance improvement. The fourth phase asks change champions to work actively on 
achieving key decision makers’ approval to institutionalise best practices in the rest of their 
parent government organisations.  
The aim of this chapter is to validate and evaluate the applicability, feasibility and 
effectiveness of this proposed approach to organisational performance improvement (Figure 
6.17) through three case studies. The chapter also validates two key aspects of this research 
which have led to the development of the proposed approach, namely the need to attract 
MNCs and organisational performance improvement. In each case study, the researcher 
explains the proposed approach to key government officials (potential change champions) 
within the case study organisation: its aim, objectives and aspects that led to its development. 
The researcher then seeks their professional opinion on the applicability, suitability and 
effectiveness of the proposed approach and the factors that might hinder its successful 
implementation within the context of Iraqi government organisations. Interviewees’ opinions 
about key organisational aspects that support the overall validation process of the proposed 
approach, such as the need to attract MNCs, and issues surrounding their organisation’s 
overall practice and performance and their impact on attracting FDI, are solicited. The chapter 
consists of six main sections. The first, after this introduction, summarises the case study 
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process; three sections follow presenting the respective findings of the three case studies. The 
fourth section presents a cross-case discussion highlighting the contrasting opinions from the 
three case studies about the key themes, followed by a validation of the elements of the 
proposed approach. The final strategic approach is presented in the seventh section.  
7.2 THE PROCESS OF DATA COLLECTION AND STRATEGIC APPROACH 
DEVELOPMENT 
This section explains the data collection process followed to evaluate and validate the 
approach, as proposed in chapter 6 and illustrated in Figure 6.17. Based on the earlier 
discussion, two key aspects or factors can be highlighted as the trigger for developing and 
proposing the approach in chapter 6:  
• The first is the need to attract MNCs to foster FDI inflows to address Iraqi 
infrastructure investment needs; and 
• The second is the argument that the overall practice and performance of Iraqi 
government organisations is weak and requires a long time to emulate world-class 
standards.       
Accordingly, the aim of this data collection process is to evaluate and validate the 
applicability, suitability and effectiveness of the proposed approach by: 
➢ First validating the two underlying aspects that led to the development of the proposed 
approach; and  
➢ Second, evaluating and validating the core elements of the proposed approach, i.e. the 
four phases of the approach and their underlying components; see Figure 6.17.  
In order to collect the data required to achieve this aim, three Iraqi government organisations 
were selected as suitable case study subjects, using the selection criteria described in chapter 
5. The case study organisations must first be a government organisations; second be 
responsible for infrastructure development in Iraq; and third now or in the future be in direct 
contact with MNCs during the lifecycle of the infrastructure development process. 
Accordingly, the three government organisations are: 
A. Basra Local Government (BLG) 
B. General Company for Ports of Iraq (GCPI) 
C. South Gas Company (SGC) 
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During the data collection process, semi-structured interviews are used as the primary data 
collection method, with document review as a secondary source of data to validate some of 
the outcomes of the interviews. A set of semi-structured questions, (Appendix 2), have been 
developed to gather the necessary data, as discussed above. The general themes that represent 
the umbrella for the semi-structured questions designed for this case study are therefore: 
❖ T1: The need to attract MNCs to foster FDI inflows 
❖ T2: The need for organisational performance improvement  
❖ T3: validation of the proposed approach and its underlying elements. 
As discussed in chapter 5, because of the strategic nature of the proposed approach, the 
individuals interviewed during the data collection process all hold strategic-level positions, 
are considered potential organisational change champions, and have a direct role in the 
development of infrastructure. The three case studies were conducted consecutively; on 
completion of collection of the required data from each case, a quick review of the proposed 
approach was carried out and any necessary changes were made before proceeding to the next 
case study organisation.   
After completing the data collection process, a cross-case discussion was carried out; the 
consensus views of interviewees about the aim of this data collection process are then 
presented. This paves the way towards refining the proposed approach and developing the 
final strategic approach. This process is depicted in Figure 7.1.  
Case Study A
Case Study B
Draw Cross-Case 
Discussion and 
Confirmation for the 
Elements of the 
Proposed Approach
Final 
Strategic 
Approach
Case Study C
Proposed 
Approach
Seek professionals  opinions 
about the applicability, 
suitability and effectiveness of 
the proposed approach 
 
Figure 7.1: The Data Collection Process  
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The standardised steps used to carry out the data collection process are as follows: 
a) A formal letter was submitted to each government organisation explaining the aim and 
objectives of the research and the type of information required. The letter requested 
permission to proceed with the case study.  
b) Permission was granted.  
c) Interviews were conducted with the concerned members separately and the answers 
were recorded, analysed and compared against each other. 
d) The information obtained was then cross-checked against the components of the 
proposed approach. 
e) The proposed approach was modified accordingly.  
The following three sections spell out the outcome from each case study. Each section 
presents first the background of the case study organisation, secondly brief profiles of the 
interviewees, thirdly the outcome of the case study, and finally a brief summary and 
discussion of the outcome. For confidentiality, the positions and names of the individuals 
interviewed remain anonymous.  
7.3 CASE STUDY A - ORGANISATION BACKGROUND 
BLG is an Iraqi government organisation, one of whose key responsibilities is the 
development of infrastructure within Basra City. Results of a survey of the city’s 
infrastructure needs were presented in section 4.2.  
BLG was chosen in order to evaluate the applicability, suitability and effectiveness of the 
proposed approach, which aims at helping government organisations create an organisational 
environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion. Its structure, shown in Figure 7.2, 
consists of a number of key departments headed by officials under the direct authority of the 
governor. In order to address the city’s infrastructure within its jurisdiction, BLG interacts 
with local and international corporations and assigns the construction of the necessary 
projects over to them, following the public procurement procedures set out by the 
government.  
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 Figure 7.2 Organisational Structure of BLG 
The local government is responsible for a number of city-related matters, although its role in 
the development of the city’s infrastructure is the focus here. As discussed earlier, the main 
aim of the case study is to capture the views of key government officials (potential change 
champions) about the suitability of the proposed approach by: 
• Understanding the views of interviewees about their overall organisational 
environment and the need for MNCs, and  
• Soliciting their feedback on the applicability, suitability and effectiveness of the 
proposed approach and its underlying elements.   
Table 7.1 summarises the backgrounds of the interviewees.  
Table 7.1: Summary of the Interviewees’ Profile of Case A 
Company Job Title Code Organisational Role 
Basrah Local 
Government 
(BLG) 
Director BLG-D1 Assist the governor in the matters related to 
infrastructure development   
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BLG Director BLG-D2 Responsible for directing the organisation’s 
process of pre-tendering, tendering and 
awarding phases of the projects 
BLG Director BLG-D3 Responsible for directing the organisation’s 
process of after-awards-project management 
BLG Director BLG-D4 Responsible for directing the organisation’s 
process of planning and the activities related to 
the technical side of the projects  
BLG Director BLG-D5 Responsible for directing the organisations 
process of human resource management 
The next section illustrates the outcome of the data collection process carried out in BLG. 
7.3.1 Outcome of BLG Case Study   
This section consists of three main sub-sections. The first two illustrate the outcome 
concerning the two underlying aspects that led to the development of the proposed approach, 
discussed in section 7.2. The third presents the outcome from the data collection process with 
regards to evaluating and validating the proposed approach and its core elements.  
I. Confirming the Need to Attract MNCs 
Interviewees recognised the importance of attracting MNCs to work with their organisation. 
Two key aspects emphasised as reasons for government organisations to strive to create an 
environment attractive to MNCs were identified: 
a) The need for MNCs to address the organisation’s investment needs  
There is a consensus among interviewees about the need to attract MNCs to foster FDI 
inflows to help the organisation address its infrastructure investment needs. Interviewees 
highlighted this as one of the key solutions helping the organisation complement the shortages 
of its annual investment budget, allocated from the central government, for infrastructure 
development. For example, BLG-D2, said that BLG “requires tremendous investment in the 
infrastructure and thus having international companies agree to work with us and invest in 
our projects will be help us a lot to address the city’s infrastructure”. BLG-D1 supported this 
need, emphasising the deficiency in the annual budget: “the annual investment budget 
allocated for the organisation from the central government is not sufficient to address the 
city’s infrastructure investment needs which makes help from international corporations very 
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urgent”. Therefore, it is clear that the need for investment in infrastructure and the 
insufficient funding from the central government are key reasons for government 
organisations to attract MNCs.  
b) The need for MNCs to fill the gap in expertise  
All interviewees stressed that local contracting companies lack the required capability to 
successfully implement the projects awarded to them by the organisations. For example, 
BLG-D3 emphasised the lack of local companies’ capacity to carry out projects effectively: 
“local companies do not have sufficient capacity to implement strategic infrastructure 
projects effectively”. BLG-D5 also referred to the lack of qualification of most local 
companies for carrying out infrastructure projects in the city by stressing that “most of the 
delivered projects by these companies, such as schools and health centres, have poor 
quality”. BLG-D1 supported this by saying “respected international companies can certainly 
help in delivering high-quality infrastructure projects better than local contracting 
companies”. Therefore, MNCs can play a significant role in helping the organisation to 
address its infrastructure needs, both financially and by providing the necessary expertise to 
implement the projects successfully. 
II. The Need for Organisational Performance Improvement  
The analysed data highlighted a number of practice and performance weaknesses in relation to 
the system adopted by the case study organisation to carry out its projects. These weaknesses 
confirmed the need for significant organisational performance improvement to help ensure 
successful delivery of projects and a transparent relationship with MNCs. These weaknesses 
have been categorised under five main headings: leadership, people, processes, performance 
management and how long interviewees think it will take their organisation to emulate world-
class standards. 
a) Leadership issues  
Weaknesses related to leadership are reflected in the interviewees’ comments. All agreed that 
key decision makers have little support or commitment and high resistance to organisational 
change. For example, according to BLG-D5, “last year we tried to reform the public 
procurement processes and procedures and make them more transparent, especially the 
evaluation criteria. However, we were confronted with considerable pressure from some 
members of the local council asking us to stop relying on it and return to the old procedures”. 
All interviewees were in agreement that the executive authority of the Iraqi government is 
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divided among the country’s various political parties, each with different political interests 
and agendas; the same is true of the executive authority of the various government 
organisations in Iraq, including the case study organisation. Key executive positions are given 
to individuals representing the main political parties in the city, making it difficult for the 
governor or any other top management to easily initiate a change within the organisation. 
Because of this division in the leadership team, most of previous performance improvement 
initiatives failed to achieve their objectives because there was no consensus among the 
leadership team. For example, according to BLG-D1 “the interest, visions and agendas of the 
organisation’s key decision makers are mostly different depending on which political party 
they support. Thus, you can see there are always difficulties for getting consensus to 
commence any improvement programme by a certain decision makers group that may have a 
direct effect on certain parts of the organisation’s [department/section/units] that are under 
the influence of other leadership groups within the organisation”. Thus, this resistance to 
change and political interventions are key factors that make initiating a holistic organisational 
performance improvement very difficult within the context of the case study organisation.              
b) People issues 
In terms of people, all the interviewees agreed that the findings have shown that the 
organisation seems to have poor personnel development to enable them to conduct their work 
effectively. This has considerably affected the overall performance of the organisation during 
the various stages of the project lifecycle, causing many problems that have a direct impact on 
the organisation-supplier relationship. For example, BLG-D2 has highlighted a number of 
problems or mistakes during the public procurement lifecycle “because most of the 
individuals responsible for carrying out the various activities of the public procurement lack 
the necessary training, skills and expertise to conduct them effectively”. BLG-D5 supported 
this by stressing that during the contract award phase a “number of incorrect decisions was 
made by the committees responsible because they lack the necessary experience and 
competence”. Also, according to BLG-D1, during the contract implementation phase “some 
of the supervision teams are incompetent and lack the necessary project management skills”. 
Interviewees agreed that few if any of the people development programmes provided to staff 
are linked to the organisation’s everyday work. For instance, according to BLG-D2, most of 
the training programmes are not related to the organisation’s current capabilities, policies and 
way of working and therefore, the knowledge gained cannot be applied. It is as if “they train 
you to drive a car and when you go back you only have a horse to ride so none of what you 
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have learned is applicable”. BLG-D4 also asserted that, “we do have training programmes 
for staff and sometimes we send some of them abroad but I cannot see any practical reflection 
on the operation of the organisation as most of what they learn is not applied in our 
organisation”. This indicates that the organisation does not provide the necessary support for 
its employees to enable them to carry out their jobs effectively.  
c) Service Processes Issues 
In terms of organisational processes, there was consensus among interviewees that the case 
study organisation has no standard processes and procedures for conducting its various 
project-related activities in a way that applies to all prospective private companies without 
discrimination. This has seriously affected the organisation’s performance and led to deterring 
some international corporations from working with the case study organisation. For example, 
in terms of the procurement stage of the project lifecycle, BLG-D1 said that the organisation 
“have asked a number of international companies to come and work on constructing some of 
the strategic projects in the city; however, those respected international companies have 
refused to come saying that the procurement processes and procedures are not clear and are 
ambiguous and do not follow international standards”. BLG-D4 agreed: “we have been 
working hard to convince a number of highly respected international corporations; however, 
none has yet accepted to work with us to address our key strategic projects”.  
 BLG-D2 raised another service process issue concerning bureaucracy and lack of 
transparency, stating that “the contractors’ classification is just a routine process which only 
takes the financial capability of the contracts as a prime factor. Some contractors are 
classified as first-class yet they have no financial capabilities or previous experiences that 
enable them to implement the awarded projects successfully”.BLG-D5 agreed that the 
organisation does not seem to enforce a customer-oriented culture, stating that “because of 
the bureaucracy and complex administrative routines, usually the process of awarding 
contracts and the subsequent contractors’ payments are delayed”. Therefore, it is clear from 
the interviewees’ comments that the organisation has poor service processes, not designed to 
achieve satisfied customers. 
d) Performance management issues  
The findings have also shown a number of issues related to performance management. 
Interviewees agreed that political pressure and non-transparency are two factors that 
significantly affect the performance of the organisation during the key stages of the 
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infrastructure projects lifecycle. For example, according to BLG-D4, “some projects are 
awarded directly to companies that have financial and political power without being 
evaluated based on their technical competence or their records of successful projects 
delivery”.  BLG-D2 also highlighted this issue: “in many cases, some people with a high 
political power influence the decision taken by [the contract awards] committees especially 
when the decision is related to mega-projects”. BLG-D1 emphasised that the organisation’s 
staff, especially those responsible for following up project implementation, “are not being 
paid adequate salaries which makes them prone to some dishonest acts such as taking bribes 
from contractors and in return turning a blind eye to their poor performance in the field”. 
These performance issues reflect an organisational environment deterrent to MNCs.     
e) The time required for the organisation to emulate world-class standards 
There was a general consensus among interviewees that their organisation will require some 
considerable time to compete with the best in class. For example, according to BLG-D4, “it 
will take considerable time and efforts to change the organisations’ practices and 
performance base to international standards”. BLG-D2 agreed, asserting that “based on my 
previous experience, it can be difficult to conduct an organisational change within our 
organisation; however, it is not impossible”. BLG-D3 also agreed: “given the conflict of 
interest between the political parties that share the leadership and management of the 
organisation, I cannot imagine a change to our current service delivery can take place in the 
near future”. BLG-D1 also believed that change “is not impossible; we can do it, actually we 
have to change, but it may take considerable time and effort”.      
III. Validating the Proposed Step-Change Performance Improvement Approach 
As discussed earlier, the proposed approach is a guide to help decision makers (change 
champions) of government organisations in Iraq to create an organisational environment 
attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion. The approach consists of four main phases 
which need to be followed consecutively; each contains several elements which shows the key 
steps or activities to be carried out to ensure successful implementation of each phase. This 
sub-section presents the analysis of interviewees’ views concerning the phases of the 
approach and their underlying elements. These findings are presented in a sequence similar to 
the structure of the proposed approach.   
 
 
 Page | 185  
 
a) Phase I: Ensuring the need for top management support and commitment  
All interviewees agreed that phase one of the proposed approach is an essential step to initiate 
change within their organisation. Achieving key decision makers’ understanding and support 
for change has been considered a prerequisite which, if not obtained, makes applying any 
organisational performance improvement will be difficult. For example, according to BLG-
D1 “achieving a common consensus among the organisation’s key decision makers about the 
need for change is an imperative step toward initiating organisational performance 
improvement”. BLG-D3 also maintains that “without convincing the organisation’s key 
decision makers about the reasons for the need for change and how it will benefit the 
organisation, no support and commitment can be expected to be given to any improvement 
programme within the organisation”. This reflects a clear understanding among interviewees 
about the need to obtain top management support and commitment for change before 
commencing any proposed improvement programme within a government organisation.    
The outcomes relative to the activities necessary to achieve phase one of the proposed 
approach are presented below: 
• Setting a Vision for change  
Interviewees agreed that in order to commence an organisational improvement approach, the 
organisation’s key decision makers are required to establish a vision for change and give it 
their full commitment. For example, BLG-D1 said “it is very important that the 
organisation’s key decision makers are fully aware and convinced of the need for change and 
setting a vision for the change”., BLG-D2 added that “having the organisation’s main 
decision makers set a vision for change is the key to initiating a performance improvement 
programme in our organisation”. BLG-D3 stressed that “if key decision makers do not have 
a vision to improve the organisational performance, then I don’t think an improvement 
programme like this will receive any support or commitment from top management”. Thus, 
without the organisation’s top management understanding of the need to improve 
organisational performance and set a vision to achieve that, it will be difficult to initiate an 
organisational performance improvement programme.    
• Conducting Focused Awareness Workshops for Key Decision Makers   
All interviewees found the awareness workshops to be a very important step toward achieving 
full support and commitment from top management for conducting the proposed step-change 
performance improvement approach. For example, BLG-D4 highlighted the importance of 
 Page | 186  
 
training workshops, saying “providing focused awareness workshops about the proposed 
performance improvement programme will work as a catalyst to get the green light from top 
management to initiate the implementation of the proposed improvement programme”. BLG-
D3 also emphasised the need for training workshops, stressing that “there is a lack of 
awareness among key decision makers about the latest approaches to organisational 
performance improvement and their benefits. Thus, I think conducting focused awareness 
workshops for them and others at managerial levels will be essential for facilitating any 
performance improvement programme”.     
• Defining needs, requirement and selection of resources needed to build and 
operate the separate spinout unit 
With respect to the focused awareness workshops, interviewees agreed that it is imperative to 
clearly define and present the requirements and resources required for conducting the 
proposed performance improvement approach through training workshops. For example, 
BLG-D1 said, “of course it is very important that, during the focused awareness workshops, a 
detailed description or summary of the needs and resources required to implement the 
proposed improvement programme is provided. This will help key decision makers to have 
full understanding about the proposed change and to give their decision accordingly”. In 
addition, BLG-D5 highlighted the importance of providing a detailed description about the 
proposed approach: “I think a detailed explanation about any proposed performance 
improvement is necessary; this will help us be aware of what to expect from the proposed 
change and what will it cost the organisation”. This reflects the need to include a detailed 
business case for the proposed improvement approach, to ensure that key decision makers are 
fully aware of the details of any improvement proposal in terms of the resources required and 
the consequential benefits of the change, as well as any potential risk. This will help facilitate 
the attainment of the green light to initiate the proposed approach within the government 
organisation. 
• Developing an implementation plan and confirming stakeholders’ commitment to 
the proposed change and allocation of the required resources  
All interviewees stressed the importance of developing an implementation plan for any 
proposed performance improvement approach, to facilitate tracking the implementation. For 
example, BLG-D3 asserted that “I totally agree that it is important to develop a detailed 
implementation plan for any proposed change, as this will help us to easily track its 
progress”. BLG-D2 emphasised the need for an implementation plan: “it is always necessary 
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to plan carefully to implement any project to make sure that all project aspects and issues 
have been taken into account, and this certainly also applies to performance improvement 
programmes”.  
Interviewees also supported the importance of reconfirming key decision makers’ 
commitment to the change, and that all resources necessary to carry out the proposed 
approach are allocated before implementing the change. For instance, according to BLG-D1, 
“from my experience, it is important to always confirm top management commitment for 
implementing any programme or project even after having an initial support. Circumstances 
may change and so may top management opinion, which is why it is important to keep top 
management up to date”. BLG-D4 also stressed the need to confirm top management support 
by saying that “on a number of occasions we got initial agreement from top management to 
conduct an improvement project but when it came to the actual implementation, we did not 
get the support we needed to start the project”.  
b) Phase Two: Establishing a separate spinout organisation (SSO) to work with 
MNCs 
The findings revealed general agreement among interviewees about the effectiveness and 
suitability of establishing a SSO, aligned with international standards, and to work exclusively 
with MNCs, as a mean of overcoming the organisational performance weaknesses and 
creating an organisational environment attractive to MNCs fostering FDI inflows. For 
example, BLG-D1 highlighted the effectiveness of establishing the SSO: “I think the concept 
idea of your approach to improve the organisational performance is very good and it can be a 
good way to convince international companies to agree to work with us”. BLG-D2 also 
supported this, adding that “given our current organisational environment and the difficulty in 
making changes to its current processes, procedures or structure, I think establishing a 
separate and independent unit to work only with international companies will be a good 
approach to show them a better performance without affecting the existing system”.      
The findings also show that it is highly feasible to establish a SSO to work exclusively with 
MNCs in the context of a government organisation. However, interviewees agreed that a 
number of factors need to be taken into account to successfully implement the proposed 
approach and establish a SSO. These factors include:  
• Achieving key decision makers’ understanding and support for the proposed approach. 
For example, BLG-D3 said that “I do believe that establishing an independent unit 
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under the authority of the governor and designed in line with international standards 
can certainly be a very good approach for us to deliver better performance quickly 
without the need to interfere with the existing system. However, in order to establish 
such a unit, it is imperative for decision makers, such as those members of the council, 
to have proper understanding of the aim, objectives and key characteristics of this unit 
and how it can impact our organisational performance”. 
• Highlighting any contradictions between the spinout organisation’s practices, 
processes and/or procedures and those of the Iraqi regulations and bylaws, and 
determining how such contradictions (if any) can be reconciled. For example, 
according to BLG-D1, “with the unit carrying out key procurement and contracting 
activities with MNCs, it is important to show how the unit’s activities or procedures 
for procurement or contracting differ from those already stated in the Iraqi 
regulations and bylaws. BLG-D5 added that “understanding how will the unit 
operates will help us to know if there are any contradictions between the unit’s system 
and that of the Iraqi system and how such contradictions can be addressed”. 
• Developing a detailed business case for the proposed SSO, containing key benefits, 
ROI, KPIs, success criteria, and associated risks and mitigation plan, and 
communicating it to key decision makers. For instance, according to BLG-D4, “it is 
imperative that we understand every detail of the proposed improvement programme 
and the proposed benefits and how they will be achieved”. BLG-D1 also emphasised 
the need for a detailed description of the proposed: “detailing the benefits, return on 
investment and other key aspects of the proposed unit and explaining them in simple 
terms to key decision makers during the training workshops is vital for achieving their 
understanding and eventually their support to the proposed improvement 
programme”.    
• Hiring an external expert (consultant) to establish the SSO. All interviewees agreed 
that the organisation lacks the required expertise to carry out the proposed approach. 
Moreover, the findings revealed that the organisation also lacks the resources and the 
required expertise to fill the various positions within the SSO. Therefore, all 
interviewees stressed that focus on training programmes will be necessary if the 
selected personnel are to carry out their delegated responsibilities effectively. For 
example, BLG-D4 said, “I do believe that the way in which our organisation operates 
is way behind best practice and thus bringing an expert consultant to establish the 
proposed unit and do the required training is essential”. BLG-D1 stressed that, “our 
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organisation is highly bureaucratic and thus you cannot expect our personnel to 
follow international best practices without getting proper training from an external 
expert”. 
• Providing the unit with the autonomy and authority it needs to deliver the intended 
performance. This is because all interviewees highlighted that the organisation has a 
highly centralised system with little to no empowerment for employees, and as such 
change champions should discuss this need for authority with key decision makers at 
the initial stages of implementation. For example, according to BLG-D2 “the 
executive authority resides mainly with key decision makers and every administrative 
activity requires their approval and signature no matter how small the activities are; 
therefore, I believe in order for the proposed unit to get the required authority, 
decision makers will be required to understand how such delegation of authority 
affects their sovereignty”.  
Key Elements of the Separate Spinout Organisation     
• Establishing a strategic planning office (SPO) 
The findings show general agreement among interviewees that strategic planning should be an 
integral part of the SSO. All interviewees agreed that the lack of effective organisational 
planning is a key factor behind the organisation’s weak performance in addressing its 
infrastructure needs. The findings also highlighted that this is one of the main reasons for the 
considerable number of failed projects. For example, BLG-D4 highlighted the lack of 
strategic planning by saying that “I do not deny that we have a serious lack of good strategic 
planning and project management. Actually we still don’t have a holistic strategic plan for 
the city”. BLG-D1 agreed, saying that “we do not actually have a solid strategic plan for the 
city and nor have we the capability to do so. For this reason we have hired an internationally 
recognised consultant company to help us better manage our project as well as working on 
producing a strategic plan for the city. However, because of the recent government austerity 
programme, their contract has been terminated because of the reduction of the annual 
investment budget”.         
• Defining the organisation’s customers, identifying their needs and developing 
strategic plans to address these needs 
All interviewees agreed that it is very important to have a dedicated process as part of 
strategic planning to define the organisation’s clients, identify their needs and develop 
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strategic plans to address them. For example, BLG-D4 supported the need for customer 
identification and understanding: “I do agree that if we define our clients effectively and 
understand their various needs then of course we will serve them effectively. This would 
include understanding the needs of our people and the companies that implement our 
projects”. However, all interviewees agreed that the organisation currently has no dedicated 
process to identify and understand the urgency of the various customers’ needs and develop 
prioritised plans to address them.  
All interviewees stressed that, with regard to direct customer (the citizens), the organisation’s 
plans focus on executing the allocated budget, even if the plans pay little regard to the 
customers’ urgent needs. For example, the organisation tends to implement projects such as 
bridges and roads which have less importance for customers and ignore other projects such as 
electricity, fresh water, sewer networks and housing projects that have high urgency for 
citizens. This fact was supported by BLG-D5, that “normally our annual budget execution 
plan focuses on addressing the beneficiary parties’ requirements [i.e. ministerial directorates 
in the city such as education, municipal, or electricity directorates] …and we try to make a 
balance among these requirements when we allocate the budget…however, I agree that we do 
not mainly focus on citizens’ urgent needs, rather giving more attention to the overall picture 
of the city”. All interviewees agreed that the organisation has no process to assess the level of 
satisfaction of this customer segment or consider their feedback when developing the annual 
budget execution plan.   
In terms of the indirect customers (suppliers including local contractors or MNCs), the 
interviewees established that the organisation has no process to investigate their needs, 
requirements or level of satisfaction. There is no process that captures their feedback and uses 
it as a basis to improve the organisation’s practices and accordingly their level of satisfaction. 
For example, according to BLG-D3, “we don’t have a process or a department whose job is 
to ask companies whether they are satisfied with our processes and procedures or routine or 
not… we never did that before”.   BLG-D1 agreed: “… we do receive a number of complaints 
from the contractors regarding allegations of unfair treatment, processing delays and more, 
but none of these complaints is taken into account or used as a catalyst for improvement”.     
• Establishing a project management office (PMO) 
The analysis of the collected data has shown consensus among interviewees about the 
importance of adopting project management best practices, and considering them to be part of 
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the organisation’s everyday routine. Having a PMO as part of the SSO unit was seen by all 
interviewees as a very effective step towards nurturing the concept of organisational project 
management. For example, according to BLG-D1 “I’m convinced that effective project 
management is a very important thing to have as part of our organisation’s core system, and 
of course it will be a necessary component for the proposed unit”. BLG-D2 agreed that 
“having a dedicated project management office to work on making sure that projects are 
following international standards of project management is I think a very important step 
toward improving the process of project implementation”.    
While the interviewees agreed that the case study organisation lacks effective project 
management, this lack is another important factor behind most of the unsuccessful delivery of 
projects. According to BLG-D3, “our organisation as well as the local contractors’ lacks the 
necessary project management skills and technique to manage projects effectively and this is 
one of the reasons why we have a high percentage of failed projects”.        
• Developing a list of prioritised strategic projects 
All interviewees agreed on the importance and effectiveness of prioritising projects based on 
customers’ needs, and how this could help in improving the overall level of customer 
satisfaction. Interviewees established that this process should be a key activity for the SSO. 
According to BLG-D2, “I do believe that if the organisation carefully understands citizens’ 
and companies’ needs and develops a planned list of prioritised projects to address their 
needs, this of course will have a direct impact on their satisfaction level”. BLG-D3 agreed, 
saying that “project prioritisation is a very important process, yet it requires effective 
planning and understanding of requirements; these requirements can be for citizens as well 
as for contractors. Only then can we identify the needed projects and say which needs to be 
carried out first. This of course will increase customers’ satisfaction”. 
• Developing a list of “A to Z” processes and procedures for project 
implementation  
All interviewees supported the need for effective organisational processes and procedures for 
project implementation, from the planning to supervision of the execution stages. The 
findings have shown that the current processes and procedures are not transparent; they are 
strongly bureaucratic and place a huge burden on staff. Thus, there was consensus among all 
interviewees about the effectiveness of having this activity as part of the SSO. For example, 
BLG-D2 expressed this need by stressing that “I’m convinced that our organisational 
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processes and procedures for project implementation, mainly during the planning and 
tendering and post-award stages, are old and outdated and are not coping with the high 
number of annual projects”., BLG-D2 asserted that “one of the main organisational 
weaknesses we have that is causing most of our projects related problems is the bureaucratic 
and old organisational system that is followed during the various stages of project 
implementation. I do believe that the proposed unit should have new processes and 
procedures for project implementation based on international best practices”. 
• Implementing integrated an IT solution  
The findings revealed a general consensus among all interviewees about the need for an 
effective IT solution to be integrated in the organisational system to support the organisation’s 
processes and procedures for project implementation. The findings also support the idea of 
using an effective integrated IT solution as part of the SSO. For example, according to BLG-
D3, “I completely agree that effective utilisation of IT will definitely boost the organisation’s 
performance during various stages of project implementation such as the tendering or project 
management stage. BLG-D4 agreed: “I do agree that utilising effective information 
technology systems should be an important factor to consider when implementing the 
proposed unit”. However, all interviewees emphasised that care needs to be taken when 
implementing an integrated IT solution, such as an e-procurement system, in terms of the 
availability of the necessary infrastructure, and whether there will be any interference with the 
current regulations and bylaws. This should be discussed with key decision makers during 
phase one of the proposed approach. For example, according to BLG-D5, “doing the 
procurement process online from advertising, selling tenders to submitting tenders online and 
awarding contracts would be a good way of reducing the burden of paper work; however, this 
should be discussed with officials to check if it will contradict our procurement law”.  
• Developing Client single window 
All interviewees supported the importance of having a client single window as part of the 
organisation’s system. The organisation’s current method of project implementation, during 
various stages, is putting a huge burden on staff and costing the organisation time and money. 
For instance, according to BLG-D2, “having an online single window…where bidder 
companies can buy or just download tenders, enquire and submit online will be something 
very helpful…for example, currently, advertising a group of 10 projects will normally receive 
about 150 bids so you can imagine the capacity required to produce the hard copies of the 
tenders to sell them and then to receive the bids in one day so imagine 100 contractors in the 
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building where we have to take each and every bid and register it then do the necessary 
checks before we put them in the bids box; it is an exhausting process for us and the bidders”. 
However, there was a consensus among interviewees that utilising the full potential of a single 
window requires change champions to clearly discuss its details with key decision makers 
during phase one of the proposed approach, to make sure that it receives the support it needs.   
c) Phase Three: Carrying out Projects and Achieving Pre-Defined Success 
Criteria 
All interviewees agreed that, for the SSO to prove its worth it needs to make sure that the 
purpose it was established to achieve is realised at an early stage of its operation. A major 
“quick win” highlighted by interviewees is the ability of the SSO to attract MNCs and 
encourage them to accept work with the local government. For example, according to BLG-
D1, “it will be a major outcome if this separate unit can actually convince those respected 
international companies to work with us”. All interviewees agreed that another “quick win” 
would be the SSO delivering a high-quality performance that emulates world-class 
organisations. For instance, according to BLG-D4 “it [the spinout organisation] should show 
an effective performance that is much better than our current way of doing things. Because 
those officials who facilitate the building of such a unit will need to know that it is really 
delivering what it promised to deliver, otherwise they might withdraw their support and 
assign different work to this unit so that it becomes just another name in the organisational 
structure”.   
The interviewees also agreed that communicating and marketing the successes of the SSO 
would be an effective step towards sustaining top management support and commitment to 
change, paving the way for large-scale performance improvement programmes. For instance, 
BLG-D2 said that “I agree that keeping key decision makers informed with the latest 
achievements and success stories of the new unit will of course help in ensuring a continuous 
support and commitment from them [decision makers]”. BLG-D5 emphasised that “… 
sustained communication and marketing of the new unit and its achievements will gradually 
help to make everyone aware of the latest best practices and how they can improve our 
organisational performance and satisfy our customers, thereby gradually reducing the 
resistance to change”. 
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d) Phase Four: Institutionalising Best Practice 
The findings show a general consensus among interviewees about the effectiveness of the 
fourth phase of the proposed approach, concerned with the gradual transformation of the 
overall practice and performance of the whole case study organisation towards emulating 
world-class standard. However, key decision makers’ resistance against any organisational 
change/improvement has been found as a major hurdle which needs to be overcome to 
successfully commence this phase. For example, according to BLG-D1, “in terms of this 
phase I do not think it can start directly after getting some quick outcome from the separate 
unit because you are talking about a major shuffling …this may mean that some individuals 
within the organisation who have a certain political power and support may have to lose their 
position or get training on something that they do not have the capacity or desire to work on 
and this can create problems”. BLG-D2 agreed that “some of the positions and individuals in 
the organisation are politically protected and any change that threatens these positions will 
definitely receive strong political resistance”. 
Interviewees agreed that because of the current organisational environment, institutionalising 
best practices for the entire government organisation will not be easy and may take a long 
time. It was agreed that in order to successfully commence this phase, a number of awareness 
programmes need to be delivered to key decision makers to explain the benefits of utilising 
best practices to improve organisational performance. Continuous marketing of the successes 
of SSO to key decision makers is also found to be an effective way for achieving a green light 
to start this phase. For example, according to BLG-D5, “I think the idea of using the successes 
of the new unit and using it as a tool to convince local government officials to give a green 
light to expand using best practices to the rest of our organisation is theoretically a good idea 
but I think it will take quite some time for the officials and the staff to be convinced to use 
them because it is like asking them to change their religion, to change a way of thinking and 
doing things that they have been doing for more than, say, 50 years or more”.  
• Establishing sub-PMOs to take over the responsibility of project implementation   
All interviewees supported the proposed approach of using sub-PMOs to gradually take over 
the responsibility of project implementation from all sections and departments within the 
organisation and transform the organisational structure into a set of sub-PMOs, each one 
responsible for a certain portfolio/programme of projects and all governed by the SSO. For 
example, according to BLG-D1, “restructuring the organisation into project management 
offices with each having complete responsibility for a group of projects will be a very 
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effective approach to manage our projects”. BLG-D2 agreed, saying “I think this approach is 
a safe way to convert our organisation gradually without totally disrupting our existing 
organisational system. Also, I do believe that having the separate unit to control them all will 
add extra efficiency to the process of project implementation throughout its various stages 
such as the tendering and the post-contract stage. It should prove effective when working with 
MNCs”.   
7.3.2 Case A Summary and Discussion  
The findings from this case study have confirmed the organisation’s need to attract MNCs and 
the logical sequence between the four phases of the proposed approach. The findings have 
validated that phase one, ensuring top management support and commitment, is a priority 
initial phase/step to ensure successful implementation of any proposed performance 
improvement approach within the government organisation. The case study findings also 
supported the proposed steps for achieving this phase. They have validated that setting a 
vision for change/improvement is the initial step the organisation’s key change champions 
need to take before commencing on any organisational change. This vision should be 
developed based on the organisation’s key decision makers’ understanding of the need for 
change and their willingness to seek an effective solution and give it their full commitment. 
The findings also support the need for a detailed business case for the proposed improvement 
approach, and that its contents, such as benefits, ROI and associated risks, be explained 
clearly to decision makers during a training workshop. This is to ensure that decision makers 
are fully aware of every detail of the proposed improvement approach and that their needs and 
requirements are understood and taken into account when developing the implementation 
plan. This will also ensure that any contradiction between the best practices followed by the 
SSO and government regulations are highlighted and suitable reconciliation plans put 
forward. The findings have also emphasised the need to establish a committee of key decision 
makers and senior managers to oversee the implementation process and provide it with any 
needed support whenever required. The case study findings have also emphasised that it is 
imperative that the proposed first phase be successfully completed before commencing the 
second phase, establishing the separate spinout organisation.         
In terms of the second phase of the proposed approach, the findings have validated the 
effectiveness of using the SSO as a tool to deliver effective organisational performance in a 
step-change fashion to attract MNCs. The findings have also validated the importance of 
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incorporating SPO and PMO as key components of the SSO. The findings reveal that the case 
study organisation lacks proper strategic planning and project management, and this is one of 
the main reasons behind the considerable number of failed projects. The findings have also 
revealed that the organisation has no formal process looking at the organisation’s customers’ 
various needs and their level of satisfaction with what the organisation is providing, or using 
their feedback to improve the service. The findings show that the organisation’s main 
customers, citizens and contractors, are not satisfied with the current performance but that the 
adoption of best practice, the use of integrated IT solutions and creation of a client single 
window would have a significant impact on the overall organisational performance and 
customer satisfaction level. The current organisational environment, such as the strong 
bureaucracy and political pressure that hinder improvement initiatives, means that 
organisations will require a long time to emulate world-class performance. This finding 
validates that establishing a SSO, based on best practices, to work exclusively with MNCs, is 
an effective approach to delivering improved performance in a step-change fashion, instead of 
the long-term continuous improvement approach for the entire organisation.  
With regard to the third phase of the proposed approach, the findings have validated that, after 
its successful establishment, it is imperative to give the SSO the opportunity and the required 
authority to carry out the planned projects and “quick wins”. The findings have stressed that 
the SSO should strive to achieve its plans and promise, with its performance measured against 
the pre-planned KPIs and success criteria. The findings have also validated the importance of 
communicating and marketing the successes of the SSO to the organisation’s key decision 
makers and the different managerial levels and staff, to help secure prolonged support and 
commitment from key decision makers. This will also help to gradually induce a culture of 
change within the organisation, paving the way toward a large-scale performance 
improvement for the entire organisation, as proposed in the fourth phase of the proposed 
approach. 
In terms of this fourth phase, spreading the performance improvement programme to cover 
the entire case study organisation, the findings have shown that more effort needs to be 
invested in communication and marketing for the success of the SSO and the impact of 
adopting best practice on the organisation’s performance. This is because political pressure, 
interventions and conflicts seem to hold back any changes or organisational improvement that 
may affect certain individuals within the government organisation. Thus, the findings 
emphasise the importance of effective communication and marketing for the benefits of the 
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change to key decision makers through workshops and seminars, to gradually achieve their 
acceptance, commitment and support to engage in the large-scale improvement programme.    
7.4 CASE STUDY B: ORGANISATION BACKGROUND  
The General Company for Ports of Iraq (GCPI) is a state-owned subsidiary of the Iraqi 
Ministry of Transport. The company was founded in 1919 after the First World War. It 
manages all Iraqi ports including Umm Qasr, Khor Al-Zubair, Maaqil and Abu Flous. The 
company undertakes a number of activities in managing the ports under its jurisdiction, 
including: 
• Discharge and shipping of various imports and exports. 
• Anchorage and sailing operations for ships coming into and out of Iraqi ports. 
• Marine guidance for ships in Iraq territorial waters. 
• Works of drilling, cleaning, furnishing, deepening and lightening navigational 
channels. 
• Implementing the projects necessary for the development of the ports’ infrastructure to 
improve their capacity. 
• Implementing docking facilities, and maintenance and repair for local and foreign 
ships. 
• Providing the services that ships and marine units need. 
• Rescue work and picking up from territorial waters. 
• Telecommunications and housing services with the rest of public services. 
• Regular maintenance of equipment, machinery, vehicles, water and electricity grids. 
• Training and rehabilitation of company’s cadres for all specialisations, marine 
professions, discharge and shipping. 
The infrastructure of Iraqi ports has been badly affected by the consecutive wars and conflicts 
of the last decades. After the 2003 war, the newly formed democratic GOI allocated funds to 
developing the infrastructure of the ports and improving their capacity; however, these funds 
are not sufficient as a huge amount of work is required to get the ports fully up and running 
again.  
GCPI consists of a number of departments addressing the various organisational activities and 
tasks, as depicted in Figure 7.3.  
 Page | 198  
 
 
Figure 7.3 Organisational Structure of the General Company for Ports of Iraq 
As with the BLG case study, the GCPI case study focuses on the organisation’s role in 
developing and improving the infrastructure of the ports of Iraq. Thus, the people interviewed 
all have a direct role in the planning, procurement and/or construction phases of the ports’ 
development programmes, and are potential champions to initiate an organisational 
performance improvement.   
Table 7.2 summarises the backgrounds of the interviewees.  
Table 7.2: Summary of the Interviewees’ Profiles of Case B 
Company Job Title Code Organisational Role 
General Company 
for Port of Iraq 
(GCPI) 
Director GCPI-D1 Is a senior director in GCPI and has many 
responsibilities including a serious role in the 
initiation and approval of infrastructure 
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projects   
GCPI Director GCPI-D2 Also, is a senior director in GCPI and has 
many responsibilities including a serious role 
in the initiation and approval of infrastructure 
projects   
GCPI Director GCPI-D3 Is a senior director responsible for the 
engineering and management aspects of 
projects  
GCPI Director GCPI-D4 Is a senior director and has a serious role in 
the process of projects implementation and 
responsible for many aspects including 
planning and project follow-ups  
GCPI Director GCPI-D5 Is also a senior director and has a serious role 
in the process of projects implementation and 
responsible for many aspects such as the 
tendering and contract preparation 
7.4.1 Outcome of GCPI Case Study  
I. Confirming the Need to Attract MNCs 
Interviewees have attached tremendous importance to attracting MNCs to work with their 
organisations. Two key aspects emphasised as reasons for government organisations to create 
an environment attractive to MNCs are: 
a) The need for MNCs to address the Organisation’s Investment needs  
The findings show that attracting MNCs is essential factor in addressing GCPI’s infrastructure 
investment needs. According to GCPI-D1, “given the shortages of investment fund that we 
annually receive from the central government, we mostly depend on international companies 
to rehabilitate our ports. Our joint operation contractual agreement with a number of 
international companies has helped us significantly in securing investment funds to improve 
the service operation of our ports”. GCPI-D2 added that “… these sorts of contract [the joint 
operation contracts] with respected international companies are helping us a lot in 
rehabilitating our ports without the need for central government funding…because they 
oblige the international companies to, for instance, rehabilitate certain berths in the port and 
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operate them and in return they get a predefined percentage from the berths’ revenues during 
the contractual period to get their invested money back”.  
b) The need for MNCs to fill the gap in expertise  
The organisation’s lack of expertise to effectively and efficiently rehabilitate and operate the 
ports within its jurisdiction was readily identified. Given that local companies also lack for 
the required capacity and expertise, the organisation’s key decision makers have invited 
qualified international companies to enter into joint operation contractual agreements between 
with GCPI to rehabilitate the ports. According to GCPI-D3, “most local companies do not 
have sufficient capacity or expertise to rehabilitate our ports effectively; neither do our 
internal resources. Thus, currently, we have mostly relied on the joint operation contracts 
with qualified international companies”. The findings show general agreement among 
interviewees about the vital role that MNCs can play in helping the organisation to address its 
infrastructure needs, both financially and through providing the necessary expertise to 
implement the projects successfully. According to GCPI-D1, “the international companies 
with which we have joint operation contracts have demonstrated effective and efficient 
performance during the ongoing rehabilitation and operation of our ports, not to mention the 
provision of the necessary funds to do it”.  
II. The Need for Organisational Performance Improvement  
The interviewees indicated a number of practice and performance weaknesses in relation to 
the system adopted by the case study organisation in carrying out its projects. These 
weaknesses reflect the need for organisational performance improvement to help ensure 
successful delivery of projects. They have been categorised under five mean headings: 
leadership, people, processes, performance management and the time required for the 
organisation to emulate world-class standards. 
a) Leadership issues  
The findings show a number of leadership issues that reflect poor support and commitment 
and strong resistance to change, especially during the procurement stage. According to GCPI-
D5 “… there have been many attempts to improve the organisational performance during the 
tendering and contract award stage, such as the development of a client single window to 
simplify procedures and make them more transparent…however, the proposal faced 
tremendous resistance from the main officials and was eventually rejected”.     
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As with BLG, key executive positions within the organisation are given to individuals 
representing the different political parties, making it difficult for the CEO or any other top 
management to initiate change within the organisation. Because of this division within the 
leadership team, most of the past performance improvement initiatives have failed to achieve 
their objectives because they did not receive a common consensus from all key decision 
makers. According to GCPI-D1 “the organisation is penetrated on a wide scale by the main 
political parties in the country and most key positions are held by individuals representing 
these parties…and because of this, for instance, if improvement necessitates replacing a low 
performing individual with another one or applying a change to a certain department headed 
by such individuals, such improvement or change will be impossible”.    
b) People issues 
As in the BLG case study, the findings indicate that the organisation has a poor record of staff 
development to enable them to conduct their work effectively. Beside the absence of 
internationally recognised standards for the organisation’s administrative system in general 
and for the procurement processes in specific, the organisation lacks professional staff 
development programmes. According to GCPI-D5, “as well as the lack for administrative 
system development, our organisation lacks good programmes that aim at improving 
employees’ skills and performance”. The findings explain that the organisation is responsible 
for the effective operation of ports, including services such as loading and unloading ships. 
However, decision makers have not exploited the joint operation contracts which obligate 
international companies to work alongside the internal staff in operating the berths during the 
contractual period. Instead, these companies are hiring external resources to do the job while 
the organisation’s staff remain redundant. This makes it impossible to transform the skills and 
expertise of internal staff, which will make it difficult for them to operate the berths when 
these companies leave. According to GCPI-D4 “…I do believe that the newly adopted 
contractual arrangement [the joint operation contracts] with the international companies are 
very useful for the quick development of our ports; however it is not being utilised effectively 
to transfer the skills from these companies back to our staff… actually the organisation does 
oblige these companies to use and train our staff to operate the berths they have built or 
reconstructed, and it is a clear waste of such an important opportunity to improve our staff 
performance”.     
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c) Process issues 
The findings have shown that the case study organisation lacks standard processes and 
procedures for conducting its infrastructure development programmes effectively. For 
instance, the public procurement processes and procedures are highly bureaucratic, non-
transparent and are affected by political power within the organisation. For example, GCPI-
D1 said that “standard procedures are not being followed when awarding joint operation 
contracts to bidders from the international companies. GCPI-D2 adds that “in a number of 
instances international companies have been disqualified for reasons beyond any technical or 
financial measure, such as not making a deal with certain officials within the organisation”.  
d) Performance management issues  
The findings show a number of weaknesses related to performance management. For 
example, political pressure, non-transparency and bureaucracy are of the main factors 
affecting the performance quality of the organisation. According to GCPI-D1 “we have 
certain political pressure that directly affects the organisation’s level of transparency during 
the key stage of project implementation, especially the tendering the award stage…those 
high-value contracts normally get awarded to those who have certain contacts or relationship 
with those parties governing the organisation”. The findings also showed that the outdated 
administrative system and its complex bureaucracy have a significant impact on the speed 
with which contracts are awarded to the rightful bidders. According to GCPI-D3 “…most of 
the delays during the project tendering and awarding stage occur because of the complex 
administrative routines and red tape that have no certain value in this process”.      
e) The time required for the organisation to emulate world-class standards 
The findings indicate that, given the current organisational environment, GCPI will need a 
long time to adopt best practice and emulate world-class performance. According to GCPI-
D4, “… I do think that our organisation will require a considerable time and efforts to be able 
to reach a position that enables it to change its practices and performance in line with the 
international standards”. GCPI-D1 asserted that “it is very difficult to execute a change or 
improvement to our current way of working and make it emulate best practices because the 
organisation’s leaders do not have the determination to do so”. 
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III. Validating the Proposed Step-Change Performance Improvement Approach 
a) Phase I: Ensuring the need and top management support and commitment  
The findings also supported the fact that without the organisation’s top management 
understanding of the need for change to improve overall performance, and provide the 
necessary support, no improvement initiative will achieve the desired outcome. According to 
GCPI-D1 “I’m totally convinced that if key decision makers do not arrive at a unanimous 
decision regarding the need to improve the organisational system and facilitate the provision 
of the needed recourse to conduct such improvement, it will be difficult for anyone within the 
organisation to make any organisational improvement”. Additionally, GCPI-D5 maintained 
that “I’m sure that any improvement programme, regardless of its effectiveness, will not 
receive the needed support if key decision makers do not have the commitment or the 
willingness to improve the organisational performance”.   
Necessary Elements to achieve Phase one of the proposed approach 
• Setting a Vision for change  
The findings validated that it will be difficult to initiate change within the organisation 
without key decision makers setting and being committed to a vision for change by seeking 
effective approaches to improve the organisational performance and providing their full 
support. According to GCPI-D1 “…I’m totally convinced that if the need for change has not 
been introduced from those at the top of the pyramid and if these people have no vision for 
change and still think that the organisation’s current performance is effective, then I don’t 
think your proposal for performance improvement nor any other change programme will 
receive the needed support…”. GCPI-D2 agreed that “…any organisational improvement 
programme should start with a vision and such vision should come from the organisation’s 
top decision makers; they have to commit to it, otherwise the vision will not be achieved”. 
Thus, without the organisation’s top management understanding of the need for change and a 
vision to achieve it, it will be difficult to initiate an organisational performance improvement 
programme.    
• Conducting Focused Awareness Workshops for key stakeholders   
The findings have maintained that in order to achieve top management commitment and 
support for the performance improvement programme, it is important and effective to conduct 
awareness workshops for key decision makers, highlighting the main aspects of the proposed 
change and their positive impact on the overall organisational performance in both short and 
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long term. According to GCPI-D5 “…I think that in the public sector environment, if anyone 
has a proposal like yours and wants it to take effect, it is very important that the relevant 
officials are made fully aware of its details and costs and are convinced of its benefits; only 
then may such a proposal receive the support it needs”. The findings also emphasised a lack 
of awareness at the top management level about available approaches for performance 
improvement. Finally, the political conflicts inside the organisation make certain type of 
performance improvement approaches hard to implement without unanimous understanding 
among key decision makers. Thus, providing focused training or awareness workshops for 
those individuals who influence the organisation’s decision to proceed with any change 
programme is imperative. GCPI-D3 said that “…despite the fact that you might hear some 
officials speak about the need for change or performance improvement and so forth, they are 
only good at describing the problems and no one has put forward a plan or programme or 
attempted to get rid of these problems…mostly because such improvement may affect the 
position of certain individuals who are backed by certain political party … thus a training 
workshop for those officials as well as other senior managers, describing the programme 
detail. its benefits and their role, will help them to quickly decide whether to go ahead with 
it”.   
▪ Defining needs, requirement and selection of resources to build and operate the 
separate spinout unit 
The findings confirmed that defining the requirements for establishing the proposed SSO and 
the resources needed to achieve it through awareness workshops is very important for 
achieving top management support and commitment to the proposed change. According to 
GCPI-D1 “…it is important that we understand what will be needed in order to implement 
such a proposed approach…including any costs for training, equipment, the needed staff, 
etc… so as to understand the needed budget for such a programme… such information will 
greatly facilitate the achievement of a common ground among all related officials and 
achieve common decision accordingly”. The findings also emphasise that such details should 
be in the form of a detailed business case highlighting all aspects of the proposed 
improvement programme. According to GCPI-D2 “…in order to achieve a formal approval to 
conduct any improvement programme within our organisation or any other public 
organisation, I think it is important that a formal report that includes all the details of the 
programme is submitted to us and explained during these workshops… this will help 
achieving quick decision towards supporting such a programme”.      
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• Establishing a committee to champion the implementation of the proposed 
approach  
The findings also emphasised the need for establishing a committee representative of those 
highly influential individuals or parties within the public organisation in order to facilitate the 
implementation of the proposed performance improvement approach and track its progress. 
According to GCPI-D1 “… I believe that when the proposed programme receives a green 
light from the main decision makers, I think it is imperative that a committee is formed to 
oversee the implementation of the programme and provide it with the necessary support and 
report back to us”. Such a committee will help make sure that key decision makers are up to 
date with the progress of programme implementation, and communicate and market the 
successes of the SSO to ensure continual support from top management. According to GCPI-
D2 “… I think that establishing a committee to oversee the programme implementation is as 
important as forming a committee to oversee a project …this will ensure that problems are 
quickly reported to top management to receive the necessary support… achievements are also 
quickly reported to top management to improve their confidence and commitment to the 
programme and to widen their support”.  
• Developing an implementation plan, confirming stakeholders’ commitment to the 
proposed change and allocating the required resources  
The findings stressed the need for an effective programme implementation plan in order to 
manage stakeholder expectations and make everyone aware about when any pre-defined 
deliverable or success criterion will be met, so as to ensure consistent implementation. 
According to GCPI-D4 “…having an implementation plan is of course important as is the 
case with any programme or project, because this will ensure that the programme 
implementation is consistent and easy to track”. The findings also stressed that it is important 
to confirm decision makers’ commitment to the programme, that the necessary resources and 
budget have been allocated, and that a supervision committees has been established. 
According to GCPI-D5 “… having the initial approval to implement the proposed programme 
is not enough to begin implementation, since the dedication of funding and resources to any 
programme with the public sector takes some time because of routine…and only after getting 
a formal approval can you start the programme”   
b) Phase Two: Establishing a separate spinout organisation to work with MNCs 
The case study findings showed unanimous agreement about the effectiveness of having a 
SSO that operates in line with the best practices and is dedicated exclusively to work with 
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MNCs, in an attempt to show a better picture of the organisation’s overall practice and 
performance to help attract FDI. According to GCPI-D1 “... I honestly believe that your 
proposed solution will be very effective for overcoming the weaknesses in our organisational 
system…especially as we have an increasing demand from the ministry to widen our 
relationships with international companies and increase the joint operation contracts”. 
GCPI-D2 added that “…because of the old, slow and complicated system we have, we have 
received a number of complaints from the international and local companies regarding the 
way in which we handle the work, especially during the tendering and contract award stage 
and the post-contract stage…but since it is not easy to suddenly change this routine I think 
your proposal will be an example of how best practices can help deliver a better performance 
without interrupting the current system”.      
The findings have shown that the establishment of a SSO to work with MNCs is feasible 
within the case study organisation; however, there are certain considerations to be taken into 
account when planning to implement the proposed approach, including the following: 
• It is extremely important for the proposed approach to receive unanimous support 
from all influential parties within the organisation; otherwise, its implementation will 
be difficult. According to GCPI-D3 “…it is imperative for all parties to have a mutual 
willingness to improve the organisation’s performance, otherwise it will be difficult to 
implement any improvement programme.” 
• Current regulations and bylaws need to be taken into account in the implementation 
planning process. This is to ensure that any contradiction between best practices and 
the regulations and bylaws that bind the organisation’s operations are highlighted and 
proposals to address them are produced. According to GCPI-D2 “…our current 
organisational system, especially the tendering and contract award stage, is 
underpinned by a number of government regulations and thus any change that aims to 
improve the system should take into account that such regulations need to be 
satisfied…otherwise it will be difficult to implement”.   
• GCPI will require an external consultant to establish the SSO, as the organisation 
lacks the expertise to do so. According to GCPI-D5 “…we don’t have anyone who is 
expert enough to establish a unit such as the one you’re describing and I agree that an 
external consultant will be needed to do that”. The findings also emphasised that the 
organisation’s current employees are believed not to have the required skills and 
expertise to perform the various roles that will be assigned to them within the SSO. 
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Thus, training programmes should be taken into account when developing the 
implementation plan of the proposed SSO. According to GCPI-D1, “… despite the fact 
that we send some of our staff to attend certain training programmes inside and 
outside Iraq, most of what they learn is not applicable within our organisational 
environment…thus I think focused training will be needed for those individuals who 
will be dedicated to the proposed programme”.     
• The findings also referred to the organisation’s highly centralised system and how this 
might affect the delegation of authority to the SSO. It is important that key decision 
makers are made fully aware during the awareness workshops of any delegation of 
authority needed  and how it will benefit the organisation. According to GCPI-D5 “… 
in our organisational culture, and I believe this applies to all other public 
organisations, the main authority resides with those at the top of the pyramid and 
delegation of authority to those at the lower level is kept to a minimum… thus if the 
proposed unit requires certain authority to be able to deliver the planned 
performance, I think it will be important to discuss and explain its importance with 
key decision makers at early stage of its implementation”.                
Key Elements of the SSO     
• Establishing a strategic planning office (SPO) 
The findings validated the importance of integrating strategic planning into the SSO. They 
emphasised that the organisation lacks effective strategic planning, and this is one of the main 
reasons why the organisation is still struggling to get its ports to reach optimum capacity.  The 
organisation also tends to develop plans for quick fixes, and fire fighting is the norm,  
focusing on the short term. According to GCPI-D1 “… I do believe that strategic planning is 
an imperative component for any organisation and having it as part of the proposed unit will 
be very effective”. GCPI-D2 added that “… of course, strategic planning is very important 
and it should be one of the core processes of any organisation; however, our strategic 
planning is very very poor and the type of plans that we have are contingency plans that only 
address problems after they occur, like fire fighting”. The findings also show that the lack of 
long-term strategic planning is the reason behind the under-utilisation of the ports’ capacity, 
thereby costing the country a considerable amount of money, equivalent to that from oil 
exportsGCPI-D5 emphasised that “…currently we are only utilising about 20% of the 
estimated capacity of our ports, which is considered a valuable source of funding to the 
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country after the oil…and the reason is that the organisation lacks effective long-term 
strategic plans that examine how to rehabilitate the remaining inactive berths and enable the 
ports to reach optimum capacity”.      
• Defining the organisation’s customers, identifying their needs and developing 
strategic plans to address these needs 
The findings validated the importance of having a process that investigates the organisation’s 
various customer needs and uses them as a basis from which to develop strategic plans to 
address those needs effectively to improve customer satisfaction. According to GCPI-D4 “… 
the problem is that the organisational system is not built on the basis of plans or strategies 
that the organisation puts forward to address a certain situation; a crisis develops on the 
basis of using other opinions or feedback on how best to address a situation…it is mostly 
developed and imposed from the top management and mostly it does not address the problem 
completely”. GCPI-D3 added that “… I do not recall during my period of working here that 
someone ever asked our customers what they feel regarding the services they receive …or 
asked the companies that work on developing the ports about whether they are satisfied with 
the procedures for project tendering or awarding or supervision stages”. GCPI-D5 said “… 
we do sometimes receive a number of complaints about how we handle our customers’ 
various paperwork… however, none of these have been taken into account to improve the 
organisational system”.      
The findings also emphasised that amending the current organisational system to one that 
vigorously looks at the various customers’ needs and level of satisfaction, and develops 
strategic plans to satisfy these needs, will help significantly in creating an environment 
acceptable to MNCs. According to GCPI-D1 “… I do agree that our organisational system is 
way behind that of world-class organisations… and I support integrating a best practice such 
as understanding the various companies’ needs and level of satisfaction and using this as a 
basis for improving our system; of course, this will satisfy international companies and make 
them more willing to work with us”. 
• Establishing a project management office (PMO) 
The findings show unanimous agreement regarding the need to use effective project 
management tools and techniques in order for the organisation to carry out its projects 
efficiently. They confirmed that establishing a PMO as part of the SSO would be an effective 
step towards ensuring the success of the SSO’s strategic plans. According to GCPI-D1 “…I 
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entirely believe that if our organisation follows the project management best practices during 
the various stages of project implementation, then there will be an enormous impact on the 
quality of our projects. GCPI-D3 added that “…it will be very effective to have a project 
management office as I think that this will nurture and spread the culture of managing 
projects on the basis of best practices and help train our staff…thus having it as part of your 
proposed unit will be very effective”.     
The findings also highlighted the organisation’s lack of effective project management 
practices, which has been shown as one of the main reasons behind its poor project 
implementation. According to GCPI-D5 “…our organisation is suffering from a considerable 
lack of effective planning and project management and this comes at the top of the list of the 
problems causing poor organisational performance”.  
• Developing a prioritised list of strategic projects 
The findings strongly emphasised the importance of prioritising projects in order to satisfy the 
needs of customers. The organisation is not customer oriented, and in no part of its plans are 
customer needs taken into account when prioritising projects. According to GCPI-D2 “…there 
is no doubt that if the organisation takes into account customer needs and gives priority to 
those projects that have a direct impact on addressing their needs, you would imagine an 
increased level of satisfaction by our customers and thereby increased organisational 
revenues”. GCPI-D3 added that “…we are currently in a very difficult financial situation and 
attracting international companies is a very important task for us right now…thus I believe 
that this task will be even more difficult if we do not pay more attention to how can we make 
our organisational system simpler and more transparent”.       
• Developing a list of best practices, “A to Z” processes and procedures for project 
implementation  
The findings show that adopting best practices is a very effective step towards achieving an 
organisational system capable of emulating world-class performance. They have also revealed 
that the GCPI’s current organisational systems, including the processes and procedures, are 
outdated and that the government is continually imposing new regulations that make this 
system even more complicated. According to GCPI-D5 “… to be honest with you, our 
organisational system is very old and ineffective to cope with the current situation …there are 
good aspects of the system but they are mostly inactive and occasionally the Ministry of 
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Planning imposes new regulations that make the system even worse and far from any modern 
system that I know”.  
• Implementing an integrated IT solution  
An effective IT solution to facilitate an organisation’s various activities has been found 
valuable in achieving organisational excellence. According to GCPI-D1 “… I myself have 
attended a number of training workshops that discuss the latest technologies that can be used 
to simplify organisations’ processes and procedures…thus, I do believe that if we use such 
technologies, it will boost our organisational performance tremendously”. The findings 
highlighted that GCPI is under-utilising the latest integrated IT solutions to improve its 
performance, because little attention is paid to improving overall practice and performance. 
According to GCPI-D2 “… currently we do not use any of the latest technologies which could 
help us to effectively manage our various activities… the reason is that the top management 
do not pay attention to improvement, and even if they did, the organisational environment 
does not encourage such attempts”.    
• Developing a Client single window 
The case study findings have emphasised the effect of having a client single window and how 
it would have a significant impact on overall organisational performance and thereby on the 
customer satisfaction level. According to GCPI-D5 “…it is very effective to have a client 
single window and it has numerous advantages, such as the simplification of procedures 
during the tendering and contract awards stages and making them more transparent. GCPI-
D3 added that “…actually given the advantages of the single window, I and other managers 
have tried rigorously to get it implemented to simplify the organisational procedures and 
make them more transparent, as we know that companies find our procedures highly 
complicated and unfair…yet we have never received support from top management to 
implement it.”     
c) Phase Three: Carrying out Projects and Achieving Pre-defined Success Criteria 
The findings emphasise that the publication of “quick wins” by the SSO is very important in 
continuing to receive the necessary support and commitment from top management. 
According to GCPI-D1 “… I think it is very important for the proposed unit to quickly 
produce the tangible results that should have been discussed during the awareness 
workshops… as this will increase key decision makers’ confidence in the continuous support 
for this unit”.  The findings have revealed that Iraq’s current financial situation and corruption 
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claims against government officials are putting under the microscope more government 
officials and senior civil servants, such as the CEOs of public sector organisations.. This make 
government these officials more reluctant to invest money in certain improvement 
programmes. It is necessary to interest them in those programmes that can quickly produce 
tangible results, so as to help them defend the need for such programmes. According to GCPI-
D2 “… currently we are in a more difficult financial situation and the annual budget that we 
receive from the government is low and thus we are being more careful about where to spend 
that money to avoid being blamed by officials for wasting the funds… so when a programme 
or an approach like yours is approved this would help us avoid being blamed for it; so 
generate those promised tangible benefits in the programme report as soon as possible”.      
The findings also support the importance of communicating and marketing the successes, the 
benefits and the tangible results from the SSO to the various parties within the organisation. 
This is to ensure that the planned benefits of the proposed approach are achievable, and to 
boost top management confidence and trust in the programme to ensure their continued 
support. According to GCPI-D3 “… I do believe that an improvement programme like this 
requires continuous marketing to the various related parties in the organisation before and 
after its start, given its relatively new nature to our organisational culture. GCPI-D5 said that 
“…I think communicating and marketing the proposed unit, or actually the entire approach 
objectives, and the success they achieve during implementation, is very important as this will 
help in persuading more people, which will help to reduce the intensity of the opposition from 
those who are not in favour of such a change just because it may eventually conflict with their 
interests”. 
d) Phase Four: Institutionalising Best Practices 
The case study findings confirm that the successes achieved by the SSO should lead top 
management to focus on institutionalising those successes to the rest of the organisation. They 
also confirm the effect of the fourth phase of the proposed holistic approach, in applying a 
successful change in a certain part of the organisation to the rest of the organisation. 
According to GCPI-D1 “… I am totally convinced that this phase is exactly where it needs to 
be and I think this is what needs to happen after a certain programme or system has achieved 
its objectives in a certain part of the organisation”. However, the findings show that starting 
such a phase is not easy and is highly dependent on top management and other influential 
parties understanding, committing to and supporting the process of institutionalising the 
change throughout the rest of the organisation. According to GCPI-D5 “… as I mentioned 
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before, the problem in Iraq is that currently public sector organisations like ours are 
distributed among the political parties that have won in the national election and these 
parties assume responsibility for the public organisation and influence any decision that 
might come from the organisation’s manager exactly as if they own the organisation. This 
situation restrains managers from doing what they think is best for the organisation without 
needing agreement from those political parties, despite the fact that those parties may not 
have the expertise to decide what is best for the organisation”. GCPI-D3 added that “… I do 
believe that spreading the best practices of the proposed unit after they achieve their 
objectives is very important; however, it requires a common consensus among the 
organisation’s decision makers…otherwise it will be difficult to start such a process”.         
• Establishing sub-PMOs to take over the responsibility of project implementation 
The findings also support the concept of the approach that seeks the gradual transformation of 
the overall practice and performance of the case study organisation to one emulating that of 
the SSO, through the establishment of sub-PMOs. According to GCPI-D1 “… I think this 
approach will be effective as it will not disturb the entire organisational system at once, 
thereby creating huge resistance… instead it is upgrading the organisation bit by bit which I 
think is the only thing that we can do right now”.     
7.4.2 Case B Summary and Discussion  
The GCPI case study findings have confirmed the need to attract MNCs, and the 
interrelationship among the four phases of the proposed approach that aim at a step-change 
improvement in the organisation’s overall practice and performance. The findings emphasise 
the importance of achieving key decision makers’ understanding of the need for the proposed 
improvement programme, and making sure that it receives their commitment and support 
before starting on the implementation of the SSO. The organisation should start with phase 
one of the proposed approach, ensuring the need for top management support, before starting 
the second phase, focusing on the direct implementation of the SSO. The findings also 
support the importance of the third phase, which focuses on ensuring that the SSO works 
rigorously towards achieving the objectives it planned during the first phase. The SSO’s 
achievement of “quick wins” is very important in ensuring continued support and 
commitment from top management. The findings have also validated that communicating and 
marketing the successes of the SSO throughout the organisation, and especially to key 
decision makers, will help in gaining sustained support from top management and pave the 
 Page | 213  
 
way for the implementation of the fourth phase. In order to achieve approval from top 
management to commence the fourth phase, it is imperative that the SSO achieve all or most 
of its predefined objectives and that tangible benefits are clearly reflected on the ground. 
Another important factor in ensuring top management’s continuing support and the start of 
the institutionalisation process in phase four is the on-going communication and marketing of 
the SSO’s benefits and tangible achievements to all concerned parties within and outside the 
organisation. 
In terms of the first phase of the approach, the findings have validated the importance of top 
management setting a vision for organisational performance improvement. It has been 
concluded that without clear willingness from top management toward improving the 
organisational overall practice and performance it will be difficult to continue with the 
remaining phases of the proposed approach. The findings have also emphasised the 
importance of awareness workshops for top management to clarify and educate key decision 
makers about the advantages to be gained by adopting best practices. In addition, the 
development of a clear and detailed business case for the proposed improvement approach, 
where benefits, costs, required resources and risks are explained along with a clear 
implementation plan, is very important to facilitate the decision-making process for top 
management in supporting the proposed approach. The findings have also emphasised the 
need to establish a committee to champion the implementation of the proposed step-change 
improvement approach, to ensure that top management are continually engaged and kept up-
to-date with the progress of implementation.   
In terms of the second phase of the approach, the findings have confirmed the importance of 
having a SPO and PMO as part of SSO. The organisation lacks effective strategic planning 
and project management, two of the main reasons for weak overall performance. The SSO 
needs to develop new processes and procedures in line with best practices for the various 
stages of project implementation. The findings have also confirmed that the organisation is 
not customer oriented, so a process is needed to identify and evaluate customers’ needs and 
include them in the organisation’s strategic plans and project prioritisation. Finally, the 
findings have validated the need for an effective integrated IT solution and the development 
of a client single window to ensure simple and transparent procedures throughout the various 
stages of project implementation.  
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In terms of the third phase of the proposed approach, it has been found that it is crucial for the 
SSO to achieve what it promised to achieve, and more importantly to communicate and 
market these achievements to all key decision makers. The findings have confirmed that the 
key activities to be undertaken during this phase are key ingredients in paving the way 
towards a large-scale performance improvement programme.  
Finally, with regards to the fourth phase of the proposed approach, the findings have 
confirmed the importance for change champions not to only be satisfied with the SSO’s 
expected achievement, but also to rigorously fight for expanding the performance 
improvement initiative to cover the rest of the organisation. However, the findings have also 
highlighted that the organisational environment is strongly influenced by the national political 
environment and by the political parties’ interference with and pressure on the decision-
making processes within the organisation. Thus, initiating the fourth phase may take a long 
time. However, the findings have highlighted the importance of communicating and 
marketing the successes of the previous phases of the approach as a means to facilitating the 
initiation of this phase.                              
7.5 CASE STUDY C: ORGANISATION BACKGROUND 
The South Gas Company (SGC) was founded in 1979 to treat the natural associated gas 
extracted from the fields of the southern region of Iraq, such as Rumaila, Zubair, Qurna and 
Ben Omar, for the purpose of producing dry and liquefied gas and natural gasoline for both 
export and domestic consumption. In the critical periods of the Iran-Iraq war and the first and 
second Gulf wars, the company did not run at full capacity to meet local and export needs, 
and thus the main objective for which the company was founded has yet to be achieved. The 
structure of the organisation, as shown in Figure 7.3, consists of number of key departments 
headed by local government officials.  
The company has three main production units, with sub-units: the natural gas liquid (NGL) 
recovery unit for separating liquids; the liquified petroleum gas (LPG) production unit; and 
the gas treatment plants. These are gas compressor stations which receive gas from the 
degassing stations and pass it to gas dehydration units to reduce its moisture level before it is 
sent to the appropriate NGL units. In terms of storage and export, the company has two main 
complexes. The first storage complex was built by a Japanese firm in the 1980s, located in 
Umm Qasr with the aim of storing three main products (propane, butane and natural gas) in 
concrete tanks at low temperatures, ready for shipping by tankers. 
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Figure 7.4 Organisational Structure of the SGC 
 Page | 216  
 
However, this is currently being used by the company as an additional storage capacity for 
liquified gas which is then pumped across Iraq using reverse pumps and a network of 
pipelines towards the centre and north of the country. The second complex is a loading port 
located at Umm Qasr, built in the 1980s by the Italian firm Saipem, with a capacity of 
4,800m3/h. However, this is currently being used for receiving imported LPG and imported 
gasoline to meet local demand.  
The case study organisation is planning to increase its annual production of commercial gas 
from the less than 500 mmscfd reported in 2012 to almost 2,000 mmscfd by 2018. In order to 
do this, the company needs to set up new gas processing plants to separate the NGL and for 
LPG production, as well as establishing new plants for gas liquefaction (LNG) in addition to 
those required in terms of rehabilitation to the gas compressor stations, laying out pipelines, 
rehabilitating or building new storage facilities, and providing sufficient energy to operate 
these facilities without affecting the current capacity. 
To achieve this goal and because of the recent financial crisis resulting from the fall in oil 
prices in mid-2014, it is necessary for the SGC to attract MNCs if it is to reach its main goals. 
This is the only way for SGC to address the infrastructure investment necessary to achieve the 
organisation’s aim of producing 2,000 mmscfd of sales gas.  
As with the previous case studies, the SGC case study focuses on the organisation’s role in 
developing/improving the infrastructure required to improve its production. Thus, the 
interviewees have a direct role in the planning, procurement and/or construction phases of the 
SGC’s production improvement programmes.   
Table 7.3 summarises the backgrounds of the interviewees.  
Table 7.3: Summary of the Interviewees’ Profiles of Case C 
Company Job Title Code Organisational Role 
South Gas 
Company (SGC) 
Director SGC -D1 Is a senior director in SGC and has a very 
important role during the various phases of 
infrastructure development     
SGC Director SGC -D2 Is a senior director in SGC and has a direct 
role in the process of infrastructure 
development 
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SGC Director SGC -D3 Is a senior director in SGC and also has a 
direct role in the process of infrastructure 
development including projects follow-ups 
SGC Director SGC -D4 Is a director and a senior chief engineer in 
SGC 
SGC Director SGC -D5 Is a senior director in SGC and has a serious 
role in the development of infrastructure 
including projects planning and surveying 
7.5.1 Outcome of the SGC Case Study 
I. Confirming the Need to Attract MNCs 
Interviewees stressed the importance of attracting MNCs to work with the organisation. Two 
key reasons were emphasised:  
a) The need for MNCs to address the organisation’s investment requirements 
The findings emphasise the importance of attracting MNCs to work with SGC. The 
organisation has already invited a number of MNCs to work with it, in the form of a joint 
venture to achieve the targeted annual production of 2,000 mmscfd commercial gas by 2018. 
According to SGC-D1 “… at the moment attracting international companies is very important 
as the organisation currently lacks the ability to fund the rehabilitation projects needed to 
improve its capacity of gas production and reach the planned production rate of gas”. SGC-
D2 added that of those MNCs invited to form a joint venture only two have accepted: “…we 
have invited a number of international companies to come and work with us and form a joint 
venture with the aim of improving the organisation’s capacity of gas production to reach the 
planned production rate and start exporting; however, only two companies agreed to come”.    
b) The need for MNCs to fill the gap in expertise  
The findings have revealed that the current organisational environment and the lack of 
effective continuous performance improvement programmes have led SGC’s system to 
become outdated, bureaucratic and non-transparent, lacking the capacity and the expertise to 
effectively address the required rehabilitation projects and improve the gas production rate. 
This situation encouraged SGC to invite MNCs to fill the gap not only in finance but also in 
expertise, in order to achieve its targeted gas production rate. According to SGC-D3 “… our 
organisational system has become very complex over the years … also there is a lack of 
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effective capacity building programmes for the concerned staff, making it very difficult to 
implement the required rehabilitation projects with the speed and quality required”. SGC-D4 
added that “… our current joint venture with the two international companies is helping the 
company to override most of the complex administrative routines that are usually required 
when initiating any project, as well as making sure that the rehabilitation projects are being 
implemented by highly qualified individuals”.            
II. The Need for Organisational Performance Improvement  
The interviewee findings indicate a number of practice and performance weaknesses in the 
system adopted by organisation to carry out its projects, reflecting the need for organisational 
performance improvement to ensure successful delivery of projects. These weaknesses fall 
into five groups: leadership, people, processes, performance management and the time 
required for the organisation to emulate world-class standards 
a) Leadership issues  
Clear leadership issues which have been highlighted. As with the previous case studies, the 
organisational system is strongly influenced by the national political parties. Thus, any 
decision for improving organisational performance that is of no interest to those parties will 
face huge resistance. This environment restricts the ability of the organisation’s top 
management to do what is necessary to improve overall practice and performance. According 
to SGC-D1 “… in our organisation, it is very difficult to initiate any improvement projects, 
even those that are necessary for sustaining the organisation’s gas production rate…despite 
that our organisation is the one responsible for making sure that gas production is sustained 
and improved. However, the ministry does not provide us with the necessary authority to help 
us approve and implement the required rehabilitation projects swiftly and on time”. SGC-D5 
added that “…the problem is that our organisational system is built on the basis that all 
authority necessary to facilitate the organisational production rate lies at the ministerial 
level; we, as a company responsible for sustaining and improving the production rate, have 
not been given the required authority and are always having to seek approval for each and 
every contract from the ministry…making the rehabilitation of the production system very 
slow… Any attempt to improve this situation faces huge resistance”. According to SGC-D2 
“…our main problem is our lack of authority to conduct the tendering and contract awarding 
phase without recourse to Baghdad [the Ministry’s headquarters]…having such authority 
would help us swiftly to conduct the necessary rehabilitation projects and increase the 
production rate accordingly…but so far we lack such authority”.   
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b) People issues 
The findings shown that the case study organisation lacks an effective professional 
development programme linked to a strategic plan. Most of the trainings programmes 
conducted over recent years were not productive and did not focus on the organisation’s real 
problem, having no major impact of employee performance. According to SGC-D3 “…to be 
honest the training programmes sometimes provided to our staff do not have a major impact 
on their performance…this is because most of what they get trained for is not applicable to 
our organisational environment”.  
c) Process issues 
The case study findings show that the organisation’s processes and procedures for project 
implementation, especially the procurement stage, are very complex; there has been no 
attempt to improve and standardise these processes and procedures in line with international 
standards. According to SGC-D4 “… the organisational procedures that we need to follow in 
order to get the necessary rehabilitation projects approved and implemented are very 
complicated…any project requires at least six months to go through the tendering and 
awarding stage…even those important projects that if not implemented on time would stop the 
gas production process.” SGC-D5 said that “...top management do not seem to be seriously 
interested in improving the organisation’s production system, otherwise they should have first 
focused on improving our administrative system…this is because our system is very complex 
and non-transparent …and it should be top management’s main priority to improve it.       
d) Performance management issues  
The organisation lacks an effective system that continually assesses its overall performance 
and develops the necessary programmes to sustain and improve the overall organisational 
performance. According to SGC-D2, “… to be honest if we need to improve the 
organisation’s performance then a number of individuals will need to be replaced with others 
who are more effective, and some departments that are not adding value will also need to be 
closed…This is in addition to replacing our old organisational system… However, with the 
current political influence on decisions like this and the fact that some of the individuals or 
departments that need replacing are backed by political parties… proposing an improvement 
like this will not be supported”.    
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e) The time required for the organisation to emulate world-class standards 
The findings have revealed that SGC will require a very long time to reach the point where it 
can rethink its overall practices in line with best practices, as long as political parties are still 
interfering with every decision that leads to improvement. According to SGC-D1 “… I do 
believe that given the current organisational environment and the lack of authority and 
political pressure we will not be able to emulate world-class standards even after twenty-five 
years”.  SGC-D3 added that “…top management does not seem to be willing to initiate any 
organisational performance improvement and without such willingness it will be very difficult 
to make any improvement in the near future”.  
III. Validating the Proposed Step-Change Performance Improvement Approach 
a) Phase I: Ensuring the need and top management support and commitment  
The findings have validated the importance of top management support in initiating the 
proposed performance improvement approach as well as any improvement programme within 
the organisation. According to SGC-D1, “…there is no doubt that in the public sector without 
key decision makers’ support, an improvement programme will not be implemented”. The 
findings have also confirmed that it is very important that key decision makers are aware of 
the need for change and that they have the desire and commitment. According to SGC-D2 “… 
I do agree that key decision makers should understand the need for change to achieve a better 
performance…however, understanding is not enough. They must have the desire to improve 
and to support improvement programmes such as yours if there is a real commitment to 
improve the organisational performance”.   
Necessary activities to achieve Phase one of the proposed approach 
• Setting a Vision for change  
The findings have emphasised that it is imperative for the organisation’s top management to 
have a vision to improve the overall organisational practice and performance in line with the 
international best practice. The lack of such vision means that the organisation’s key decision 
makers are not willing to support or commit themselves to any programme that seeks 
organisational performance improvement. According to SGC-D3 “…I completely agree that if 
key decision makers have no vision or are not willing to change the organisational system 
with a better one then you do not expect any support to be given to your programme or any 
other programme”. SGC-D4 added that “…do not think that top management and government 
officials are not aware that our organisational system is a failed system and ineffective. 
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However, we don’t see any enthusiasm from their side for improvement…thus, yes I do agree 
that if they don’t have a vision for change then don’t expect any support. Thus, the findings 
validate that top management’s understanding of the need for change and their willingness to 
address the organisational performance weaknesses is very important if an improvement 
programme is to be initiated.    
• Conducting Focused Awareness Workshops for key stakeholders 
The findings show that conducting awareness workshops for decision makers and other key 
stakeholders is very important in paving the way to achieving top management support and 
commitment to organisational performance improvement. According to SGC-D5 “…I think 
that not all officials are aware of the latest practices and technologies and how they can 
improve our organisation’s performance…as most senior decision makers still believe that in 
having a working system slow is better than trying a new one”. Moreover, SGC-D2 said that 
“…of course providing effective training workshops for key decision makers is very useful and 
they will lead them to greater understanding of the best practices and their impact on the 
organisation’s performance”.    
▪ Defining needs, requirements and selections of resources to build and operate the 
separate spinout unit 
The findings also support the need for a detailed business case for the proposed improvement 
programme, to be clarified in detail during the focused training workshops. This is to make 
sure that decision makers are aware of the important details related to the proposed 
programme, such as its benefits, required budget, associated risks and implementation plans. 
According to SGC-D1, “… I believe it is important to have a detailed report that discusses 
the proposed programme and how it will help in improving the organisation, … and in turn 
the organisation’s obligations for the programme to achieve its objectives…and it is better to 
explain that report during the proposed workshops”.  
• Establishing a committee to champion the implementation of the proposed 
approach  
As in the other case studies, these findings support the need to establish a committee 
representing the organisation’s key decision makers, to champion the implementation of the 
proposed improvement programme. This is to ensure that key stakeholders are continually 
engaged with the programme and are always kept up to date with the progress of its 
implementation. According to SGC-D2, “…of course, key decision makers will work on 
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establishing a committee to supervise the implementation of the proposed programme as soon 
as it is approved … this is to ensure that they are aware of its progress”. SGC-D3 said that 
“… having a committee responsible for supervising and tracking the implementation of the 
programme is very important, as this will ensure that the programme receives the necessary 
support as soon as any problems arise that may impede the programme implementation”.  
• Developing an implementation plan, confirming stakeholders’ commitment to the 
proposed change and allocating the required resources  
The development of an effective implementation plan was strongly emphasised in the case 
study findings. This is to ensure that key decision makers are aware of the milestones in the 
programme’s development, and when they should expect the achievement of the programme’s 
objectives. According to SGC-D4 “…it is very important that a detailed implementation plan 
is provided for top management and discussed with them during the proposed training 
workshop”. SGC-D5 also emphasised that “… I do believe that implementation of such a 
programme will also be a very good opportunity to show top management how we can 
effectively implement any programme on time…thus I believe the proposed programme 
should have a good implementation plan. More importantly is to successfully implement the 
programme exactly according to the plan”. 
The findings also emphasise that, given the nature of the public sector environment and the 
bureaucratic routines, it is important to always confirm top management support for the 
proposed improvement programme and allocation of the required resources even after 
receiving initial approval. According to SGC-D1 “… I think improving the organisational 
performance does not currently have a priority compared to other activities… because you 
can see that you are coming to us to propose an improvement programme while we are the 
ones that should be seeking such programmes if there is really a serious intent for 
improvement…thus getting an initial agreement from top management to start such a 
programme is not enough, they should corroborate it with other necessary approval such as 
budget allocation and staff allocation, etc.”         
b) Phase Two: Establishing a separate spinout organisation to work with MNCs 
The proposal to establish a SSO, in line with best practices, as a means to deliver effective 
performance in a step-change fashion, received unanimous agreement among interviewees for 
its potential effectiveness in confronting the organisation’s practice and performance 
weaknesses. According to SGC-D1 “… I think, given the current organisational environment 
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and the difficulty in attempting a holistic change to the entire organisational system, that 
establishing your proposed unit to carry out certain important activities in an effective 
manner and market these new practices and performance to the Ministry office, will have a 
major impact on convincing them to expand it to the rest of the organisation”.SGC-D2 added 
that “… I think your improvement approach will be very effective and suits the organisational 
environment of the public sector in Iraq, as currently it is not possible to suddenly attempt to 
change the entire organisational system as there will be huge resistance… there needs to be 
some preparation and to gradually inject these new practices into the organisation…and I 
think your proposed programme has the potential to do that”.   
However, the interviewees again emphasised that the SSO should operate based on and in line 
with Iraqi regulations and bylaws, working within the umbrella Iraqi public sector 
environment. Thus, certain considerations need to be taken into account during the 
implementation of the proposed approach:  
• Successful implementation of the proposed approach is entirely dependent on 
achieving the key decision makers’ support and commitment to the proposed step-
change improvement programme. According to SGC-D5 “…there is no doubt that it is 
impossible to start any improvement programme in our organisation without have full 
support from the top management”. 
• Current Iraqi regulations and bylaws must be considered when developing the 
business case for the proposed improvement programme. Careful discussion of the 
business case with key stakeholders, to identify any conflict with the regulations is 
essential, as is seeking their professional opinion over any possible reconciliation and 
amending the business case accordingly. According to SGC-D4 “…currently  I think 
we are in need of such development programmes to improve the organisation’s 
performance but given that most of what we do is based on regulations and 
procedures from the Ministry… I think that the details of how the proposed unit will 
be carry out its activities should be discussed with the top management to see if any of 
its activities will contradict with ministerial regulations and whether it is possible to 
seek approval from the Ministry to override them”.         
• An external consultant is needed to establish and monitor the activities of the proposed 
SSO.  The findings also suggest that the staff delegated to the SSO may not have the 
required expertise for the job assigned to them. Training is therefore necessary. 
According to SGC-D3, “… I don’t believe that we have the necessary expertise to 
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establish the proposed unit in line with best practices, simply because the organisation 
currently does not follow international best practices…and even though from time to 
time the staff receive some training it is not specific to what we do; focused training 
should be considered to enable them to do their job effectively in the proposed unit”.  
• Given SGC’s organisational environment, acquiring the required authority to enable 
the SSO to carry out its work effectively may not be an easy task. The findings clearly 
emphasised the important role of the first phase of the proposed approach in achieving 
key decision makers’ approval to delegate the required authority. According to SGC-
D1 “…our organisational system is very rigid and highly centralised and authority is 
mostly confined to the ministerial office; even I have very limited authority…thus if the 
proposed unit will require certain authority, this should be clearly discussed with all 
key decision makers during the proposed workshop in a way that can convince them 
about the consequential benefits”.  
Key Elements of the separate spinout organisation     
• Establishing a strategic planning office (SPO) 
The interviewees laid great emphasis on the need for effective utilisation of strategic planning 
to improve the organisation’s overall practice and performance. In general, the findings have 
highlighted the organisation’s lack of effective planning in general and of strategic planning 
in particular. According to SGC-D2, “… of course, strategic planning should be a key part of 
any organisational system and thus I do agree that establishing this important office as part 
of the proposed unit will be very effective…generally our organisational system lacks effective 
planning and even when there are plans they are mostly ignored, which is why the 
organisation isn’t able to performance effectively”.  
• Defining the organisation’s customers, identifying their needs and developing 
strategic plans to address their needs 
The findings highlight the organisation’s lack of a formal process that actively defines the 
organisation’s customers, understands their needs and takes them into account during the 
planning process. According to SGC-D1, “…to be honest the organisation’s main focus is on 
how to sustain the production process; none of what we do to achieve this takes into account 
the needs of our customers…the procurement process is very complex and old and frustrating 
to the bidders, but decision makers are not paying attention to what the bidders think of the 
system…even the needs of the citizens’ who buy our products are not being taken into 
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account…actually our organisational environment is far from the concept of customer 
satisfaction…”. The findings also show that achieving customer satisfaction would have a 
significant impact on how the organisation is seen by its different customers, especially the 
bidder companies. According to SGC-D2, “… there is no doubt that if the organisational 
system is transformed to one that takes into account increasing the level of satisfaction of the 
people who interact with the system, and the consumers, them of course, we will see an 
increased number of international companies wanting to apply for one of our contracts”. 
• Establishing a project management office (PMO) 
The importance of adopting project management best practices and integrating them into the 
SSO is strongly supported by the findings. The interviewees confirmed the organisation lacks 
effective project management tools and techniques for the various stages of project 
implementation. According to SGC-D3, “…I totally agree that following effective project 
management best practices will serve in the achievement of successful and effective project 
implementation…there is no doubt that our organisational system uses outdated project 
management techniques and of course it’s one of the main reasons behind the declining 
performance of project implementation”.  
• Developing a prioritised list of strategic projects 
The collected data have highlighted the importance of ensuring that project prioritisation takes 
into account the various needs of the organisation’s customers. According to SGC-D4, “… I 
do believe that the Iraqi public sector in general lacks the notion of seeking customer 
satisfaction or taking account of customers’ requirements or complaints, such as those of 
private companies, or using them to improve the organisational system accordingly…thus if 
we need to start improving then this is one of the main things that we should start with as I 
think it will be the key to other organisational developments”.   
• Developing a list of best practices, “A to Z” processes and procedures for project 
implementation  
The data collected have highlighted that the organisation’s current processes and procedures 
do not qualify the organisation to emulate world-class performance. The findings support the 
need to develop a new list of processes and procedures for the various stages of project 
implementation, in line with international standards. According to SGC-D5, “… I do believe 
that the performance of our organisational system is far behind that of world-class 
organisations and similar companies in the region… companies in the region have improved 
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their production rates tremendously in the last years; however, it’s been more than 12 years 
since the fall of the regime and the company production rate is still very low compared to its 
design capacity…and the main reason behind this is the weak organisational system that 
we’ve been following since the establishment of the company in 1979”. SGC-D1 emphasised 
that “…I do agree that developing new processes and procedures for the proposed unit is very 
important because our current processes and procedures are very weak”.    
• Implementing an integrated IT solution  
The findings stress the need for integrating an effective IT solution to improve the overall 
practice and performance of the organisation. The evidence highlights SGC’s failure to use 
available IT solutions to simplify the organisation’s core processes and procedures during the 
various stages of project implementation. According to SGC-D2, “… I totally agree that one 
of the main tools that the organisation can use to improve the organisational system is the use 
of the latest technologies as we currently do not have any of these, such as e-tendering and e-
mailing systems, etc.”    
• Developing a client single window 
The findings have validated the importance of developing a client single window as a means 
of delivering a transparent and simple service to customers, and thereby increasing the 
customer satisfaction level. According to SGC-D3, “…of course using the single window 
system will be very effective and will help in simplifying procedures and satisfying bidder 
companies as well as reducing the burdens on staff that accumulate during the various 
organisational activities”. 
c) Phase Three: Carrying out Projects and Achieving Pre-defined Success 
Criteria 
The collected data have validated the importance of the third phase of the proposed approach 
and the importance of communicating and marketing the SSO’s achievement to ensure 
continuing top management support and commitment. The findings stress the need for the 
SSO to successfully achieve its objectives and deliver the predefined success criteria so that it 
can pave the way for the holistic performance improvement programme. According to SGC-
D4, “…it is without doubt that the important phase of your proposed approach will show the 
ability of the proposed unit to deliver all the benefits discussed in the workshops during the 
first phase. SGC-D5 added that, “…I do think that it is very important for the proposed unit to 
successfully carry out its projects and market its achievement with key decision makers and 
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other concerned parties as this will be the key if we need to expand this exercise and begin a 
holistic reform to our organisational system”.     
d) Phase Four: Institutionalising Best Practices 
The collected data have validated the importance of the fourth phase of the proposed 
approach. The findings stress that it is important to effectively market and communicate the 
achievements of the SSO and the effectiveness of its system. Key decision makers should 
always be kept informed of its latest developments and achievements to ensure their eventual 
approval to commence the fourth phase of the proposed approach. The findings also 
emphasise that initiating this phase may take a long time, and it is highly dependent on 
achieving unanimous agreement among all key decision makers. According to SGC-D1 “…of 
course it will be very important to expand the use of the best practices adopted by the 
proposed unit to the rest of the organisation; however, with the current organisational 
environment and the political pressure and financial shortages it will take a long time to 
conduct such a big step”.     
• Establishing sub-PMOs to take over the responsibility for project 
implementation 
The data support the proposed approach of a gradual transformation of the organisation’s 
overall practice and performance using sub-PMOs managed by the main SSO and designed to 
take over responsibility from the parent public organisation. According to SGC-D2, “… if a 
green light is given to start a holistic change programme for the organisational system then I 
think that this is an effective approach to follow as this will ensure that the organisation will 
continue to work while the improvement process is ongoing”.      
7.5.2 Case C Summary and Discussion  
In general, these case study findings have validated the need for government organisations to 
attract MNCs, and the comprehensiveness, effectiveness and suitability of the proposed 
approach for the Iraqi public sector environment, with the potential to help the organisation 
deliver better performance in a step-change fashion. The findings validate the 
interrelationship between the four phases of the proposed approach and their proposed 
sequence. The data highlight the organisation’s need to improve its overall practice and 
performance and adopt internationally recognised best practice in order to deliver world-class 
performance. The findings validate that in order to start an organisational performance 
improvement programme it is of the utmost importance to first achieve key decision makers’ 
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support and commitment. This finding validates the need for the first phase which focuses on 
the attainment of top management support and commitment to change before the 
establishment of the SSO. The findings support the methodology proposed by the first phase 
for acquiring top management support through setting a vision, focus training workshops for 
key stakeholders, and the development of an implementation plan. They also highlight the 
need to establish a committee that represents the organisation’s key stakeholders to champion 
the implementation of the proposed step-change improvement approach. Without achieving 
the objectives of the first phase, the second phase cannot start.  
The findings support the aim and objectives of the second phase of the proposed approach, 
which focuses on the establishment of a SSO dedicated exclusively to work with MNCs. The 
findings highlight the organisation’s lack of effective strategic planning and project 
management, its poor customer focus and under-utilisation of integrated IT solutions. These 
findings validate the core component and activities of the SSO suggested by the second phase 
of the proposed approach. They support the effectiveness of establishing a SPO to identify 
and understand the organisation’s customer needs and develop strategic plans to address them. 
They also highlight the importance of a PMO to work along with the SPO in prioritising 
strategic projects in accordance with customers’ requirements, and develop new processes and 
procedures for project implementation in line with best practices. The use of an effective IT 
solution to facilitate the project implementation process throughout its various stages, and the 
development of a client single window are also supported by the case study findings. Finally, 
the findings emphasise the importance of continually communicating and marketing the 
results from the SSO to ensure that its concept, benefits and the culture of change are 
disseminated throughout the organisation.    
The aim of the third phase of the proposed approach has also been confirmed by the case 
study findings. In order to achieve total support from the organisation’s key decision makers 
for holistic reform of the entire organisational system, it is imperative that the SSO achieve its 
objectives and the predefined success criteria. The findings also validate the  importance of 
effectively marketing and communicating the SSO’s successes and achievements to key 
stakeholders. This will first ensure their continuing support and commitment to the 
improvement approach, and second pave the way to achieving approval and support for 
institutionalising the SSO’s achievements in the rest of the government organisation.                
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Finally, the case study findings validate the importance of the fourth phase and the 
effectiveness of gradual transformation of the organisation’s overall practice and performance 
through the use of sub-PMOs. The findings emphasise that, after the successful operation of 
the SSO, it will be logical to institutionalise and expand this exercise to cover the rest of the 
organisation. However, the findings suggest that, given the issues associated with the current 
organisational environment such as political pressure, conflict and interventions and the 
highly centralised and bureaucratic system, it will not be easy to gain speedy approval to start 
this phase.  
7.6 SUMMARY 
The aim of this chapter was to assess the applicability, suitability and effectiveness of the 
approach proposed in chapter 6 via three case studies. The findings have validated the 
approach’s effectiveness and suitability for the context of Iraqi government organisations, and 
have shown that it is an appropriate tool to create an organisational environment attractive to 
MNCs in a step-change fashion. The findings obtained has not affected the  structure of the 
proposed approach, however, the findings have highlighted a number of key factors that 
change champions need to take into consideration to achieve successful implementation of the 
proposed approach. The next chapter will discuss all these finding in more details.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION  
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter 7 has presented the detailed outcome of the three case studies that were carried out 
during the validation stage of this research. The aim is to validate the approach proposed in 
chapter 6 by presenting and discussing its details with key Iraqi decision makers in three 
government organisations and solicit their feedback on its applicability, suitability and 
effectiveness. The findings have validated the key aspects of the proposed approach along 
with number of other important themes of this research such as the need for FDI and for 
organisational performance. Despite that the findings have not suggested any changes to the 
structure and contents of the proposed approach, however, it has highlighted number of 
factors that change champions need to take into account to achieve a successful 
implementation for the proposed approach.  
This chapter discussed these findings in more details highlighting the contrasted views of the 
interviewees about the key aspects of the research and the proposed approach, followed by a 
validation for the proposed approach and its underlying elements and finally presenting, in 
details, the final strategic approach.  
8.2 CROSS-CASE DISCUSSION: KEY FINDINGS  
This section compiles an overall picture from the three case studies, validating the main 
themes of the research. 
8.2.1 The Importance of Attracting MNCs in Iraq 
Iraq has a considerable lack of infrastructure on various levels, and government of Iraq (GOI) 
is struggling to address this problem. The validation stage confirmed that lack of finance and 
poor performance in both government and private organisations were the main contributors to 
GOI’s inability to address the problem. The overall research outcome has highlighted the need 
to attract MNCs to foster FDI inflows to address Iraq’s infrastructure investment needs and to 
fill the gap in expertise. This finding was confirmed by the views solicited from government 
organisations’ professionals, who agreed that the available financial resources are insufficient 
to meet the infrastructure investments needs within their jurisdictions. They emphasised that 
local contracting companies do not have sufficient capacity or expertise to carry out most of 
the strategic projects required.  
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For example, interviewees from BLG agreed that  , given the current financial crisis and 
government austerity programme, attracting MNCs is a viable approach for local government 
to address the city’s considerable lack of infrastructure. This supports the literature discussion 
in sections 2.2. and 2.3, showing that FDI can play a significant role in helping governments 
in the developing world to address their infrastructure investment needs. However, and 
despite determined efforts to attract MNCs, BLG has still not succeeded in attracting MNCs 
to carry out the necessary infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, the local government 
interviewees fully believe in the need to attract MNCs and gain associated advantages, 
especially filling the gap in expertise and encouraging private sector development.  
A similar view was captured in the other two case studies. GCPI highlights the importance for 
attracting MNCs by showing how the recently introduced type of contractual arrangements 
with MNCs (joint operation contracts) has helped the company address some of its 
infrastructure investment needs as well as acquiring the necessary skills to carry out such 
strategic projects. However, despite the company’s belief that addressing its lack of 
infrastructure is in the best interests of the country, and despite all its efforts to attract a large 
number of MNCs, few companies agreed to work with GCPI. A similar scenario was found 
with SGC, where significant infrastructure development is required to improve the company’s 
production of ready-to-export natural gas and to reduce waste. As with the rest of Iraqi 
government organisations, the recent financial crisis and government austerity have 
significantly affected SGC’s ability to address its infrastructure needs, not to mention the lack 
of expertise in this field, making attracting MNCs the only viable solution to this dilemma. 
This situation has forced the company to open the door for MNCs to participate in the 
development process, but despite all its efforts only two companies have agreed to work with 
SGC. 
This indicates that the lack of necessary financial resources and expertise is a common 
problem among Iraqi government organisations and a key factor in requiring them to attract 
MNCs to foster FDI inflows to address the lack of infrastructure in the country. This is also in 
line with the literature findings discussed in section 4.4.  
8.2.2 The Overall Organisational Environment in Iraq  
The findings have clearly shown that government organisations responsible for the delivery of 
infrastructure in Iraq have poor planning at both the strategic and project levels. This was 
indicated during both the exploratory and validation stages of the study, which confirmed the 
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absence of clear procedures to prioritise projects, the lack of clear communication among key 
stakeholders, and the absence of strategic planning, which were highlighted as weaknesses 
during the data analysis. This adds to the sparse literature, discussed in section 4.4.3, on the 
lack of proper planning among government organisations in Iraq. It also supports the 
discussion of the literature in section 3.5, that good planning can significantly contribute to 
achieving effective and efficient organisational performance during the lifecycle of 
infrastructure development programmes.  
The procurement system adopted by government organisations is weak, bureaucratic and non-
transparent. This was evident from the findings obtained in both the exploratory and 
validation stages of this research. It was clear that service processes adopted in the 
procurement phase are bureaucratic and non-transparent, that staff do not follow standard 
procedures, and that no use was made of available tools and techniques, such as e-
procurement and client single window, to facilitate the execution of this stage. This finding 
supports the literature discussed in sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.4.  
The overall project management practices of the government organisations are poor, as clearly 
highlighted during the exploratory and the validation stages, where many examples were 
given: the increased number of failed projects, failure to use effective project management 
tools and techniques, lack of competent project managers, poor project supervision and 
performance measurement. This finding adds to the limited literature discussed in section 
4.4.3. The findings also agreed with the literature highlighted in section 3.5, which underlined 
the effectiveness of using project management best practices and the establishment of PMOs.  
Numerous weaknesses relating to leadership, people management, service processes and 
performance management practices adopted by Iraqi government organisations were 
identified. A significant gap was found between the practices in these areas and those of 
world-class organisations. Issues of leadership included their inadequate in developing a 
service culture, the absence of an organisational vision, mission and goals, leaders not being 
customer oriented, resistance to change among key decision makers, and serious intervention 
from influential members of political parties. Personnel issues included lack of effective 
professional development programmes, lack of expertise and poor real-time handling of 
service problems/failure. Service process issues included poor strategic procurement, poor use 
of IT, complex and highly bureaucratic processes and procedures, an increased number of 
non-value adding activities, absence of continuous improvement practices and poor quality 
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procedures. Performance management issues included lack of support for staff, no use of 
customer complaint data to improve practices, discrimination against customers 
(local/international companies) and no measurement of customer satisfaction. These findings 
adds to the scarce literature on the organisational environment in Iraq. 
Regulations and the intervention of political parties in internal organisational policies are 
badly affecting the performance of Iraqi government organisations and their ability to initiate 
organisational performance improvement programmes. Several of the Iraqi government 
professionals interviewed stressed that government regulations, bylaws and procedures 
hindered organisational improvement. Political parties interfered with the internal decisions 
made by government organisations’ CEOs and managers, and with other key organisational 
activities. Identification of this problem adds to the few studies discussing the factors 
affecting the performance of government organisations in Iraq.  
8.2.3 Organisational Practices and Performance vs FDI Inflows 
The overall findings from the case studies reflect a general picture of weak organisational 
practices and performance, which will without a doubt deter MNCs from working with Iraqi 
government organisations. The findings showed that the existing organisational environment 
in Iraq has resulted in few international corporations agreeing to work and invest in the 
country. This view was supported by the professionals interviewed, who confirmed that a 
number of organisational practice weaknesses had caused both international and local 
companies to refuse to, or complain about, working with these government organisations. For 
example, the complex and non-transparent organisational processes and procedures followed 
during the procurement stage, which were identified during the exploratory and the validation 
stages, have triggered many complaints and explained why so few international corporation 
were willing to work in Iraq. The case was similar in the construction stage, where complex 
procedures caused unnecessary delays.  
A common aspect among these cases is that each has either interacted with MNCs or actually 
worked with them. This indicates that their views come from real-life experience, not from a 
vacuum, reflecting that the overall practice and performance of Iraqi government 
organisations does have a negative impact on attracting MNCs and reducing the flow of FDI. 
This supports the literature findings discussed in section 2.3.4, which underlined the impact of 
the performance of government organisations in the host country on attracting MNCs and 
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fostering FDI inflows. This also added to the literature discussion in section 4.4.2, that Iraqi 
government organisations are seriously corrupt and hard to do business with.  
8.2.4 Continuous Improvement vs Step-Change Improvement in Iraq  
All interviewees agreed that the overall practice and performance of their organisation is far 
behind that of world-class organisations. For a number of reasons, including political and 
government intervention, they felt that their organisations will require a long time to fully 
absorb best practice and emulate world-class performance. This arose from their genuine 
belief that following a holistic organisational performance improvement approach would face 
considerable resistance from key decision makers and influential political parties within the 
country. It supports the literature discussed in section 2.3.3, which underlined a number of 
barriers to holistic organisational performance improvement within the context of the public 
sector. As a result, a continuous performance improvement approach such as EFQM’s will 
not help decision makers of weak performing organisations to achieve the rapid improvement 
needed to attract MNCs in the shortest possible time. This supports the argument raised in 
section 2.5, which stressed that public sector organisations can only benefit from existing 
performance improvement methodologies in the long term. Therefore, the interviewees’ 
reflection on the need for an alternative approach, able to step change the performance of 
government organisations in Iraq, is in line with the argument laid out in section 2.5. 
8.2.5 Establishing a separate spinout organisation (SSO) 
The data obtained from the three case studies show that establishing a SSO parallel to the 
parent government organisation is a better alternative for decision makers to create an 
organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion, without disrupting 
their organisation’s existing system. This was also supported by the interviewees’ optimistic 
feedback, that this approach would actually help them to overcome their organisational 
practice and performance weaknesses and deliver effective performance in a step-change 
fashion. This approach was greatly welcomed by the case study interviewees as an alternative 
approach to creating an attractive organisational environment for MNCs. These Iraqi 
professionals believed that resistance to innovation normally accompanies attempts to 
introduce changes to the existing organisational system, structure and way of working. 
However, the SSO is new, independent and under the direct authority of the change 
champions such as CEOs, governors; it works in parallel with the parent government 
organisation, making it less prone to resistance.  
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This finding supports the argument made in section 3.4, which emphasised that establishing 
and dedicating a SSO is the best approach for weakly performing government organisations to 
deliver an attractive performance for MNCs in a short period of time. It also adds to the base 
of knowledge about new concepts for organisational performance improvement within the 
public sector. 
However, in order for this approach to succeed, the findings drew attention to certain factors 
that must be taken into account:  
➢ Regulations and bylaws, and political intervention  
➢ Achieving the support and commitment of key decision makers and government 
officials  
➢ Hiring external consultants 
➢ Effective communication and marketing of the proposed change. 
Added to the factors discussed in section 3.6, they underline the key factors that need to be 
taken into account when applying change within public sector organisations.  
8.2.5 Validating the Elements of the Proposed Approach   
There was consensus among all interviewees about the feasibility and effectiveness of the 
proposed approach in helping decision makers overcome their performance weaknesses and 
creating an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion. The 
findings extracted from the case studies validate the argument made in sections 3.4 and 6.2.2, 
that the proposed approach can help decision makers in Iraq deliver better performance in the 
short term without disrupting their existing organisational system, thereby reducing resistance 
to change. During the case studies, interviewees provided feedback on all aspects related to 
the proposed approach. The following sub-sections show interviewees’ contrasting views 
about the various elements of the proposed approach and what needs to be taken into account 
to effectively implement it:      
IV. Top Management Support  
The case study findings clearly emphasise the importance of achieving top management 
support and commitment to the proposed performance improvement initiative, or to any other 
change initiative, before it begins. This was clearly evident during the exploratory and 
validation stages if this research. For instance, the findings have clearly shown that the 
organisation’s leadership team seems not to have a strong role in developing a customer-
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oriented service culture; nor does it listen or develop a relationship with them. This can be 
seen in some of the leadership practice weaknesses identified, including the weak quality 
mindset, no quality values and the weak investment in IT to improve the customer experience. 
Moreover, the leadership team does not appear to encourage a culture that would employ a 
systematic use of benchmarking or assessment for the overall service operations to identify 
points for improvement. This means that striving for achieving top management support to 
carry out organisational improvement within the context of Iraq public sector is a vital step for 
change champions to do for such initiative to succeed.  This supports the findings from the 
literature discussed in sections 3.6.1 and 3.7, that achieving top management support is a 
prerequisite to starting any organisational change initiative within the public sector. The 
findings also agree with the literature that in order for the champions of change to gain top 
management support, they need to make sure that the need for change is clearly recognised by 
key decision makers within the organisation. This finding validates phase one of the proposed 
approach, that if change is to happen within Iraqi government organisations in Iraq, gaining 
top management support is the first thing to accomplish. To achieve this step, the interviewees 
agreed with the activities proposed in phase one of the approach, and detailed a number of 
factors that need to be taken into account during this phase, as follows:  
a) Developing a Vision. The case study findings clearly show that an important step for 
decision makers to show commitment to change is by first developing an overall 
vision for change. This will reflect their understanding of the need for change and their 
willingness to engage their organisation in a performance improvement initiative. This 
is because the findings highlighted number of occasions were lack of awareness to the 
need for change among key Iraqi decision makers caused change initiatives to 
languish. Therefore, even though the proposed approach is designed to avoid 
disrupting the government organisations existing system and framework, yet working 
towards having decision makers recognise the need for the proposed change and set a 
vision towards achieving its objectives is an imperative step for the successful 
implementation of the proposed approach. This is in line with the literature findings 
discussed in section 3.6.1, which highlighted the importance of top management’s 
vision for change being established before engaging with the change.   
b) Conducting Awareness Training Programmes. The second important step for 
change champions is to ensure that decision makers agree with the proposed 
performance improvement approach, by conducting awareness-training programmes 
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explaining the proposed approach. This was agreed by all the interviewees, and is also 
supported by the findings from the exploratory stage that training helps staff to 
understand the need for change and suggest possible solutions to improve their own 
performance. The literature findings in section 3.6.1 similarly stressed the benefit of 
awareness training for managers, staff and key stakeholders in supporting any 
proposed change initiative.      
c) Highlighting Conflicts with Regulations and Bylaws. Change champions should 
study relevant government regulations and bylaws, highlighting any possible conflict 
with the proposed approach, and including this as part of the training workshops. This 
is to ensure that decision makers are aware of every aspect of the approach, and to 
engage them in continuing the performance improvement initiative. This finding adds 
to the literature of change management as a factor worthy of attention for change 
champions in developing countries. This is in line with the literature discussion in 
section 2.2, which underlined that one of the causes hindering economic growth is 
unsuitable laws and regulations. 
d) Developing a Detailed Business Case. All interviewees emphasised that change 
champions must prepare a detailed business case for the proposed performance 
improvement approach, to be presented to key decision makers. The business case 
should provide details of every aspect related to the implementation of the proposed 
approach, including risk assessment, resources required and an implementation plan. 
The business case should also detail the authority required by the SSO if it is to 
conduct its work in line with world-class standards. This agrees with the literature 
discussed in section 3.6.1. 
e) Hiring External Consultant. There was consensus among interviewees that, given 
the nature of the proposed change and the organisations’ lack of experts, change 
champions need approval to collaborate with specialist consultants during phase one, 
two and three of the proposed approach. Yet, the case studies findings also 
emphasised the importance of effectively utilising the skills and expertise of external 
consultants and working towards effectively transferring these skills to the Iraqi 
workforce on the various levels. 
This activity adds to the literature of change management as a factor worthy of attention to 
change champions.     
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V. The Separate Spinout Organisation (SSO) 
There was consensus among interviewees that, given the current organisational environment 
in Iraq, establishing a SSO, in line with best practice, dedicated to working exclusively with 
MNCs, is an effective approach to creating an organisational environment attractive to MNCs 
in the shortest possible period of time. This finding supports the argument proposed in 
sections 3.4 and 3.7.  
Key Factors Supporting the Need for SSOs 
The findings highlight a number factors that justify the use of SSOs as an alternative approach 
for Iraqi decision makers to overcome their existing practice weaknesses and improve their 
performance in a step-change fashion. These are discussed below: 
a) Political Interventions. The case studies findings highlight a serious problem 
affecting CEOs and top management teams from effectively managing their 
organisations, hindering most change/reform initiatives in Iraqi government 
organisations. The problem concerns the intervention of political parties in the 
decision making of top management. These interventions affect the performance of 
government organisations to the point that CEOs/top management are not able to 
replace line managers, change their roles or even choose who should succeed a certain 
departmental manager. This makes it more difficult for management to conduct any 
reform that might affect the position of individuals supported by the dominant political 
parties in the area where the organisation is located. Interviewees agreed that this is 
one of the key problems hindering organisational performance improvement 
initiatives, thereby affecting the quality of infrastructure development. Similarly, the 
literature discussion in section 2.2 highlighted one of the barriers to economic growth 
as excessive government intervention. 
On the other hand, the interviewees agreed that establishing a SSO might overcome 
this problem because there would be no need to disrupt the existing organisational 
system, thereby avoiding direct confrontation with political parties. This supports the 
literature review findings discussed in sections 3.4 and 3.7.   
b) Weak Overall Organisational Practice and Performance. The collective findings 
from the case studies show that government organisations lack effective practices, 
especially at the planning, project management and IT levels, that would contribute to 
delivering efficient performance during the lifecycle of infrastructure project 
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implementation. This adds to the list of weaknesses of Iraqi government organisations 
discussed in section 4.4. There was consensus among the interviewees that, given their 
current organisational environment and the weak overall practices and performance, 
their organisations require a long time to emulate world-class organisations. This 
bolstered their support for SSOs as an effective way for top management to deliver 
better performance in the short term, and as a tool to convince key decision makers to 
initiate an organisational performance improvement programme. The literature review 
findings agree; see sections 3.4 and 3.7.     
Key Components and Activities of the Proposed Separate Spinout Organisations  
a) Strategic Planning Office. The findings clearly show that government organisations 
lack effective planning, and indeed the absence of strategic planning was obvious. 
Interviewees agreed that poor planning in general is one of the key factors affecting 
the successful delivery of infrastructure projects in Iraq, validating the literature 
discussed in section 4.4.3. The findings provided no evidence of a strategic planning 
process being conducted within the government organisations in question. 
Accordingly, the interviewees agreed that strategic planning should be a key 
component of the proposed SSOs, in line with the literature discussion in section 
3.5.1.  The findings also supported the prioritisation of activities, suggested in the 
proposed approach, to be conducted by the strategic planning office within the SSO. 
The following points will elaborate:    
• Understanding Customer Needs. The interviewees indicated that identifying and 
understanding customers’ needs is not something that their organisations normally do. 
They had no evidence that their organisations used customer complaints to improve 
their system to increase the level of satisfaction. This supports the findings obtained 
during the exploratory stage, discussed in chapter 6. Thus, because a key objective of 
the proposed approach is to help create an organisational environment attractive to 
MNCs, the interviewees agreed that this should be one of the key activities of the 
proposed SPO. This is in line with the best practices discussed in section 2.4, as well 
as innovation discussed in section 3.2.  
• Develop Strategic Plans to Address Customers’ Needs. Along with developing a 
long-term comprehensive strategic plan for their organisations, the interviewees 
emphasised the need for plans to take into account customers’ requirements and make 
sure that the organisational system is designed in a way that would address these 
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requirements. They agreed that this would help the SSO to achieve better customer 
satisfaction and thereby improve the chances of attracting more MNCs. This is also at 
the heart of the best practices of the organisational performance improvement 
methodologies, discussed in section 2.4, and innovation, discussed in section 3.2.  
b) Project Management Office. The interviewees agreed that their organisations lack 
effective project management tools and techniques, considering this as one of the key 
factors affecting the successful delivery of infrastructure projects. This is in line with 
the discussion in section 4.4.3, which underlined the lack of project management as 
contributing to the underdevelopment of infrastructure in Iraq. The findings support 
the importance of the PMO as one of the key components of the SSO. This is in line 
with the literature discussion, section 3.5.2, which highlighted PMOs as a key 
contributor to effective and efficient organisational performance. The findings also 
supported the activities suggested for the PMO, as follows.  
• Developing a Prioritised List of Strategic Projects. The project prioritisation 
process is strongly supported by the case study findings. Interviewees stressed that, as 
with strategic planning, the prioritisation process should consider customers’ needs as 
well as making sure that important strategic projects emphasised by customers were 
given the utmost priority. The findings support the notion that after developing an 
organisational strategic plan, the SSO should prioritise the projects and select a group 
of strategic projects of high importance to the organisation and having a great impact 
on customers’ experience. This agrees with the literature discussion in section 3.3, 
which underlined the importance of organisations understanding their customers’ 
needs and developing the right products or services to satisfy these needs in an 
affordable and simple way.   
• Developing the Processes and Procedures for Effective Projects Implementation. 
The interviewees agreed that their overall practices are weak, resulting in a weak 
overall performance, and they therefore agreed that new processes and procedures for 
project implementation should be developed in line with world-class standards. They 
should cover the entire lifecycle of project implementation, from the planning stage, 
through devising project tenders and contracting procedures, to supervision of the 
execution stage. This is in line with the literature findings discussed in section 3.4, 
which emphasised that when managers are confronted with the need for disruptive 
change that would entail significant change to their business model and technology , 
they should ensure that new processes are developed to meet the new performance 
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requirements. Thus, the findings support that the belief that SSOs need to design new 
processes and procedures for effective project implementation. 
• Implementing Integrated IT Solutions. The findings show a consensus among 
interviewees about the absence of effective IT solutions during the lifecycle of 
infrastructure projects implementation, supporting the findings obtained during the 
exploratory stage and adding to the organisational weaknesses discussed in section 
4.4. The interviewees agreed that the proposed SSOs need to effectively utilise 
available IT solutions, such as e-procurement, and integrate them into the operational 
system, to improve organisational performance. This supports the literature discussion 
in section 3.5.3.  
• Developing a Client Single Window. Developing a client single window is one of the 
key factors interviewees felt would help in the development of an organisational 
environment attractive to customers, including MNCs. The findings show that 
customers normally struggle through the existing routine of government organisations 
when having to process any type of project related to paper work. Creating a client 
single window is an effective step towards achieving a better organisational 
environment for MNCs. This is agrees with the literature discussed in section 3.5.3, 
which highlighted the benefit of a client single window in achieving transparency and 
reducing bureaucracy and corruption at key stages, such as procurement.    
• Communication and Marketing. Interviewees confirmed that it is very important for 
change champions to effectively communicate and market the SSOs’ achievements 
during and after their establishment. They agreed that keeping key decision makers up 
to date with the progress of SSOs is important in ensuring their continuing acceptance 
of the new system, and marketing the successes of SSOs will further ensure the 
commitment and support from key decision makers. This is in line with the literature 
discussion in section 3.6.  
• Performance Management. Interviewees also recognised effective performance 
management of the SSOs as a key to the successful implementation of the proposed 
approach. They emphasised that without proper performance management by a 
specialised consultant, SSO establishment and/or operation might not conform with 
the world-class standards they are expected to emulate. Therefore, it is a key 
component of the proposed approach. This is also at the heart of the best practices of 
the organisational performance improvement methodologies, discussed in section 2.4. 
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VI. Carrying out Projects and Producing and Marketing “Quick Wins”  
The findings have strongly emphasise the importance of SSOs effectively carrying out a 
selected group of projects that are strategically planned to be delivered by MNCs. Change 
champions should ensure that ongoing training and support are provided for the staff of SSOs 
by the external consultant, to ensure their delivery of world-class performance during the 
lifecycle of project implementation, at the contact points with MNCs. This will make sure a 
smooth transfer of knowledge and expertise from the consultant to the SSO staff to help them 
emulate world-class standards in reasonable period of time. The interviewees agreed that this 
would help in regaining the trust of international corporations, and this in itself is a significant 
achievement for SSOs. The interviewees also saw marketing the successes of SSOs with key 
decision makers as a significant factor not just for securing the decision makers’ support and 
commitment but also for paving the way for more comprehensive organisational reform 
within the Iraqi public sector. This supports the literature findings discussed in sections 3.6.2. 
and 3.7. Thus, this phase is where the CEOs of government organisations in Iraq can regain 
the trust of MNCs, using them as a tool to convince key decision makers to approve a gradual 
transformation of government organisations’ overall practices and performance.         
VII. Institutionalising Change  
The case study findings validate that institutionalisation of best practices throughout 
government organisations should follow the successful operation of the SSOs, confirming the 
literature discussed in section 3.6.3. Interviewees agreed that following the gradual 
transformation of government organisations through sub-PMOs, as suggested by the proposed 
approach, should lead to a smooth and straightforward change with the least possible 
disruption to government organisations’ work. However, the interviewees stressed that in 
order to get approval actually to start this phase, certain factors need to be considered by the 
change champions.  
The interviewees stressed that the existing organisational culture is one of the key factors 
impeding holistic organisational change. Political interference in the decisions made by top 
management of government organisations is a significant factor that can hamper initiatives 
from the start. Regulations and bylaws that govern most of the procedures associated with the 
key project implementation phases, such as planning, procurement and construction, must 
also be taken into consideration. Lack of awareness among most public sector personnel about 
the benefit and effectiveness of best practices, and how they positively impact the 
performance of government organisations, is a further factor to consider. The findings 
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emphasise that lack of knowledge among staff is a trigger for resistance to change. Thus, the 
interviewees agreed that unless these challenges are overcome, this phase will take a long 
time to implement, supporting the literature discussed in section 3.6.3.     
Accordingly, the findings emphasise that in order to overcome such challenges and increase 
the chance of gaining approval to start this phase, change champions need to communicate 
and broadcast the benefits of best practices and the successes that have been achieved by the 
SSOs in following world-class standards. Such communication and marketing should reach a 
wide array of decision makers, including political parties, for example by conducting 
awareness workshops explaining what needs to be done for such benefits to be achieved. This 
supports the literature discussed in section 3.6.3.  
8.3 THE STRATEGIC APPROACH  
The strategic approach to achieving the aim of this research is the product of multiple data 
collection stages. The development process started with the literature review stage, where a 
number of underpinning factors were identified, guiding the research towards developing the 
strategic approach. These underpinning factors emphasised the need to carry out an 
exploratory stage to understand the overall practice and performance of government 
organisations in Iraq, identify the level of organisational weaknesses and staff opinion about 
what needs to done to improve organisational performance. The findings from the exploratory 
stage, along with those obtained from the literature review, guided the development of the 
proposed approach during the development stage. The proposed approach was then presented 
to decision makers in Iraqi government organisations to validate its applicability and 
effectiveness, using a case study approach. The findings obtained from the case studies were 
listed, discussed and compared with each other in the earlier sections; the final approach will 
be discussed in this section.  
Note that change champions, in the Iraqi public sector context, are those individuals who 
firmly believe in the need for improvement in organisational performance; they may be the 
CEOs of government organisations, alone or with other key strategic-level managers such as 
deputies, assistants and other senior managers. Key government stakeholders and decision 
makers, in the context of the Iraqi public sector, may be the heads of city councils, with other 
members of the council in the case of local government; or ministers with their senior 
managers in the case of other government organisations, representative of a given government 
ministry; or influential members of political parties.  
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The strategic approach emphasises that in order for decision makers to overcome their 
organisations’ performance weaknesses, create an organisational environment attractive to 
MNCs in a step-change fashion, and institutionalise best practices, they need to follow the 
following four phases.  
8.3.1 Phase One: Ensuring Top Management Support for the Change 
In order to achieve the aim of this phase, change champions responsible for the delivery of 
infrastructure need to: 
• First, set a vision for change and believe in the need for organisational performance 
improvement.   
• Second, ensure that the concerned decision makers understand the organisation’s 
overall practice and performance weaknesses and the urgent need for organisational 
performance improvement. They should also make sure that decision makers 
understand the details of the proposed step-change organisational performance 
improvement and its implementation plan, and discuss the aspects of implementation 
that requires the decision makers’ approval, or help in facilitating approval from 
higher government officials.  
Change champions can achieve this by conducting awareness training workshops. 
these awareness training workshops should be effectively utilised to achieve key 
decision makers’ acceptance of change and an understanding of the benefits of such 
change to the government organisation in general, to creating an organisational 
environment attractive to MNCs and to the development of infrastructure in Iraq as a 
whole. Change champions should ensure that decision makers are aware of the 
resources required for establishing the SSO, and the aspects of government regulations 
and bylaws that can hinder the implementation of an improvement programme. 
8.3.2 Phase Two:  Establishing a Separate Spinout Organisation (SSO) 
Change champions cannot start this phase unless key decision makers’ support and 
commitment for the proposed change has been gained. During this phase, the change 
champions establish a SSO in line with best practices, by hiring a consultant who is expert in 
this field, and selecting a group of elite employees or hiring newly qualified ones, from Iraq, 
to operate the unit. The aim of establishing this SSO is to dedicate it to work exclusively with 
MNCs during the lifecycle of those infrastructure projects which decision makers are willing 
to award to MNCs. Change champions work to regain the trust of MNCs by letting them 
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experience a world-class performance, previously not delivered because of the weak overall 
practices of their government organisation. Another important benefit of the SSO is helping 
change champions to adopt best practices and deliver world-class performance without the 
need to disrupt the existing system of the parent organisation. This has been shown to avoid 
resistance to change from government organisation staff. It is also agreed to be an effective 
approach for initiating an organisational performance improvement process within by 
providing a realistic example of the benefits government organisations can achieve by 
adopting best practices.  
The structure, key components and priority activities of the SSO are explained below: 
I. The Location and Responsibility of the Separate Spinout Organisation (SSO) 
Change champions should ensure that the SSO is located in the organisational line of 
responsibility and reporting system directly underneath the governor, in the case of local 
government, or the director general in the case of other government organisations. The SSO 
should work parallel and not in conjunction with the parent organisation, as depicted in Figure 
7.5.  
 
Governor/
CEO
 
 
SSO
 
 
Parent 
Organisation
 
 
Figure 7.5: The Position of the Separate Spinout Organisation 
This is because the SSO should be designed to follow world-class best practices while the 
parent organisation is still operating the weak practices that are far behind those of the SSO. 
Therefore, making the SSO work in conjunction with the parent organisation would affect its 
overall performance and make it just another line of bureaucracy with the same poor practices 
being followed by the parent organisation. Moreover, change champions should ensure that 
the SSO is delegated all the authority it needs for effective execution of its job, and is fully 
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accountable for the successful delivery of the assigned projects and for ensuring that MNCs 
are highly satisfied with its performance.  
II. Key Components, Structure and Priority Activities of SSOs 
The three key components of SSOs are strategic planning, project management and IT. Given 
that government organisations’ poor use of all three is one of the key weaknesses identified in 
this research, the approach requires creating an SPO and a PMO directly underneath the CEO 
of the SSO. This is to be followed by a number of supporting departments to carry out the 
projects, from the planning stage, through devising projects tenders and contracting 
procedures, to supervision of the execution stage. The size of the staff that will operate the 
SSO depends on the size and number of projects assigned to it. Thus, it is expected to be 
small initially, with only a few projects, but as its benefits, effectiveness and achievement 
become apparent, more strategic projects will be assigned, necessitating staff expansion. To 
achieve greater customer satisfaction, both for external customers such as MNCs and citizens, 
and for internal customers such as any concerned government organisation or official body, 
the entire SSO is represented to customers, both onsite and online, by a client single window; 
see Figure 7.6. 
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Figure 7.6: Overall Organisational Structure of SSO 
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In addition, through its strategic planning and project management offices, the SSO should 
ensure that the following activities are addressed, maintained and continuously improved, as 
they represent high-priority activities for overcoming key organisational performance 
weaknesses and regaining the trust of customers, especially MNCs and citizens: 
a) Identifying internal and external customers and their needs 
The SSO should ensure that internal and external customers of the government organisation it 
is representing and who are affected by its performance, are identified and that their needs are 
prioritised in accordance with the customers’ wishes rather than those of the SSO or any other 
decision makers. For example, in terms of local government, internal customers can be 
governmental agencies that are affected, positively or negatively, by the infrastructure 
projects being implemented by the local government. They may also be political parties 
governing the city with majority of seats. External customers may be MNCs or any respected 
international corporations wishing to work with the local government, or which the local 
government wishes to attract to address its infrastructure needs. External customers, in the 
case of local government, are also the citizens who are the direct recipients of the service and 
who are affected by the lack of infrastructure within their cities.                                                                               
b) Developing a strategic plan to address customers’ needs 
The SSO’s next significant job is to analyse the various customers’ needs and develop 
effective strategic plans to address them. Plans that may satisfy internal customers can include 
process improvement, better communication and regular tracking of their needs. Plans that 
may satisfy external customers, such as MNCs, can include developing better business 
processes, communication techniques, and effectively utilising IT throughout the lifecycle of 
infrastructure projects implementation. Citizens expect plans to provide them with the 
services they require every day, such as electricity, drinking water, effective sanitation, clean 
and effective roads and bridges and better health services.  
c) Developing a prioritised list of strategic projects 
According to the level of priority given to each customer need, the SSO should develop a 
prioritised list of projects that will have a direct and significant impact on the customers’ 
satisfaction levels with SSO performance. Of course, not all the projects will be carried out by 
the SSO, as initially the parent organisation will retain the bulk of infrastructure projects; 
however, the champions’ aim is for the SSO to handle the group of projects that have a high 
impact on customers. This is because successful delivery of these projects will help the SSO 
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achieve a good reputation among key decision makers and customers and will help pave the 
way for change champions to achieve support for institutionalising best practices throughout 
their parent organisation.      
d) Developing a list of A to Z processes and procedures for project implementation 
As the aim of establishing the SSO is to create an organisational environment that emulates 
world-class standards, the SSO should ensure that the processes and procedures required 
throughout to implement projects conform to best practices.  
e) Implementing integrated IT solutions  
Government organisations in Iraq make poor use of IT for facilitating project implementation. 
Therefore, the SSO should be key in the effective use of IT during the lifecycle of 
infrastructure projects implementation, making sure that the IT solution is utilised effectively, 
simplifying processes and procedures and eliminating wasteful activities that could better be 
achieved using IT solutions. 
f) Developing a client single window 
Developing a client single window is considered one of the key “quick wins” of SSOs, as it 
will have a significant impact on the level of customer satisfaction, ensuring better 
accessibility to the SSO and increasing the level of transparency and integrity throughout the 
lifecycle of project implementation. 
g) Communication and marketing  
The aim of this activity during this phase is to ensure that key decision makers are kept 
informed of the progress of SSO implementation and achievement, and that the aim and 
benefits of this improvement are broadcast to all stakeholders, including decision makers and 
international corporations.   
h) Performance management  
Performance management ensures that SSOs conform to the standards, success criteria and 
KPI that were agreed during phase one of this approach.   
8.3.3 Phase Three: Carrying out Projects and Producing “Quick Wins”  
During this phase, change champions, with the help of external consultants, should ensure that 
the SSO is ready to carry out the assigned group of projects following world-class standards. 
It is the result of this stage that will determine whether the SSO delivers the benefits it was 
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established to achieve, and be the example that change champions can use to convince key 
decision makers to introduce total organisational reform.  
8.3.4 Phase Four: Institutionalising best practices - Gradually Expanding the Separate 
Organisations through Sub-PMOs 
As discussed earlier, the aim of phases two and three of this approach is to is help change 
champions deliver better performance in a step-change fashion during the lifecycle of the 
group of infrastructure projects assigned to MNCs, without disrupting the existing parent 
organisational system. The phase also aim at communicating and marketing the success of the 
new organisational structure to a wide range of decision makers so that they can observe the 
real benefits achievable from the adoption of best practices, and their impact on the overall 
performance of their organisation. Another objective of broadcasting the successes of the SSO 
is to ensure continuing commitment for change and support for the SSO and to seek decision 
makers’ approval and support for institutionalising the successful SSO throughout the 
government organisation. Even with the existence of a SSO, the parent organisations with all 
its poor overall practices and performance, remains responsible for carrying out a significant 
share of the projects represented in the organisational strategic plan. Therefore, continuous 
communication and marketing of the SSO successes and comparison of its performance with 
that of the parent organisation through a series of awareness workshops for decision makers 
and other government officials, has been found to help achieving approval to commence total 
organisational reform.  
In addition to broadcasting the achievements of the SSO, champions of change may need to 
think about using their political advantages and power to gain higher and expanded support 
for this institutionalisation process among key decision makers. If they get approval for such 
an initiative, then and only then can they follow the steps to institutionalise the SSO’s system 
throughout the rest of the organisation. These steps are based on the findings from the 
literature and the exploratory stage: 
Since the strategic plan was been developed by SSOs during phase 2 to address the 
customers’ needs, only a small group of projects will be implemented by SSOs, the rest 
remaining the responsibility of the parent organisation. Because the findings have shown that 
government organisations manage the implementation of infrastructure projects on a 
programme basis, this phase proposes that, in order to ensure gradual transformation of the 
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parent organisation’s system, all the remaining projects should be executed following the SSO 
pattern., Champions of change should follow these steps:        
I. The first step is to relieve, gradually, the parent government organisation’s 
responsibility for executing the remaining portfolios of projects (on a 
portfolio/programme after portfolio/ programme basis) not already being handled by 
the SSO. Consequently, every time the responsibility to execute a certain 
portfolio/programme is taken from the parent organisation, a group of redundant 
personnel will be created. Thus,  
II. The second step is for change champions to establish a new sub-PMO (say sub-PMO 
X) under the responsibility of the SSO and design it in a similar fashion to the SSO in 
its terms of reference, processes, procedures and IT systems, with the help of the 
expert consultant (if required). Then,  
III. The third step is to train these redundant personnel to form a heavyweight team to 
handle the operation of this new sub-PMO X, that will be assigned the responsibility 
of executing the portfolio of projects taken from the parent organisation. This sub-
PMO X is monitored, controlled and assigned responsibilities by SSO. Then,  
IV. The fourth step, taken as soon as sub-PMO X has proven successful, is to start 
relieving the parent organisation from the responsibility of executing a second 
portfolio, following a similar approach to establish a second sub-PMO (say sub-PMO 
XX) under the SSO, to take over this responsibility. This process continues until all 
portfolios/programmes have been transferred to the new sub-PMOs. This approach 
will incur minimum disruption to government organisations’ ongoing work and ensure 
transparent, gradual transformation of their overall practice and performance into one 
that can emulate world-class standards and satisfy all customers.  
Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter 2 and 3 and supported by the data collection findings, 
change/organisational performance improvement is not an easy task and there are a number of 
aspects to consider to ensure successful implementation of organisational change, such as 
organisational resistance to change. Thus, the approach proposes this phase for Iraqi decision 
makers as a long-term organisational performance improvement approach to gradually 
transform their government organisations into ones that emulate world-class organisations. 
Figure 7.7 illustrates the strategic approach.    
 Page | 251  
 
Establish Strategic Planning 
Office (SPO)
Develop a list of 
“Prioritised” 
Strategic Projects
Develop the list of “A to 
Z” processes for projects 
implementation 
Develop a  
Strategic Plan to 
meet clients needs
Develop the 
procedures for 
each process
Implement 
integrated IT 
solution
Develop Clients Single 
Window
External 
Consultant 
Phase Four
Gradually Expand the Separate Organisation via Sub-PMOs (Institutionalise Change)
Carry out 
Projects
Phase Three
Carry out Projects & Produce Quick Wins
Achieving key decision 
makers support for 
carrying out a holistic 
organisational change
Establish Sub-PMOs to address 
clients needs Type “X”
Develop a list of 
Portfolios and 
programmes 
Follow the standardised list of 
processes for project, programme, 
portfolio implementation of the 
SSO
Understand the strategic 
plan set to address the 
clients need(s) Type X 
Follow the 
procedures for 
each process
Implement integrated IT 
solution and link it with 
the SSO system
Develop Clients Single 
Window and Merge it with 
that of the SSO
External 
Consultant
(if necessary) 
Com
m
unication and M
arketing
Perform
ance M
anagem
ent 
Phase One
Ensure the Need and Key Decision Makers Support via
SSO to give 
permission for the 
sub-PMO x to Carry 
out Projects
Achieve Pre-
defined success 
Criteria
Identify the organisation’s 
“Internal and External” client(s) 
and identify their needs
Establish  Project Management 
Office (PMO)
Separate Spinout Organisation
Consultant
On going 
Training 
and Support
Consultant
On going 
Training 
and Support
  On going 
Training
    as needed
On going 
Training
as needed
Seting Vision
Conduct an awareness 
workshop  for key 
stakeholders 
Define needs, requirements 
and selections of resources 
needed to build and operate 
the “spinout organisations”
Develop implementation plan 
and confirm commitment for 
change and allocation of 
required Resources 
Phase Two
Establishment of the Separate Spinout Organisation
Perform
ance M
anagem
ent 
Com
m
unication and M
arketing
Consultant
On going 
Training 
and Support
Consultant
On going 
Training 
and Support
Perform
ance M
anagem
ent 
Com
m
unication and 
M
arketing
 
Figure 7.7: Proposed Approach 
 Page | 252  
 
CHAPTER NINE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
9.1 INTRODUCTION  
Iraq, like many developing countries, has a considerable shortage of infrastructure. About 
60% of Iraqi households suffer from the lack of at least one of the following: access to 
improved drinking water, access to improved sanitation facilities, a minimum of 12 hours of 
electricity a day from the public networks, or food security (JAPU, 2013). On top of this, the 
recent crisis in the price of oil and the sudden increase in the budget deficit have significantly 
affected the amount of funding available for key development sectors, making it even more 
difficult for the GOI to address the country’s urgent infrastructure needs, including an 
immediate two  million housing units (Sait and Nkuuhe, 2013) and critical services such as 
water and electricity. Infrastructure development is considered a key facilitator for achieving 
economic growth. Attracting FDI has been highlighted as an effective approach to addressing 
the significant infrastructure investment needs, although attracting it is not necessarily easy. 
The literature stresses that a key step to achieving this task requires governments to create an 
organisational environment attractive to MNCs to foster FDI inflow. Therefore, this research 
aims at helping decision makers of government organisations in Iraq to overcome their 
organisational performance weaknesses and create an organisational environment attractive to 
MNCs in a step-change fashion. This aim has been achieved through meeting several specific 
research objectives.  
This chapter summarises the research, and evaluates it against the original objectives. The key 
findings and conclusions are presented and the limitations discussed. The final section makes 
recommendations for future research. 
9.2 DISCUSSION  
The specific tasks of this research are summarised and discussed below, with respect to the 
original research objectives. 
OBJECTIVE ONE – To develop an understanding of the concept of FDI: its definition, 
contribution to economic growth and how the host country’s organisational 
environment can deter MNCs and thereby affect the flow of FDI 
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A thorough literature review was carried out to understand the various aspects of the concept 
of FDI, including its definition, general benefits and contribution to infrastructure 
development and economic growth; factors that can deter MNCs, and thereby affect the flow 
of FDI, were identified. The first half of chapter two achieved this. It stressed that FDI can 
significantly help developing countries, such as Iraq, to address their infrastructure investment 
needs, as well as through the transfer of positive spillover , such as productivity gains, 
knowledge and technology transfer and human capital development in the host country 
(BKPM, 2010; OECD, 2002; Wang et al., 2013).  
However, it was concluded that attracting MNCs is not an easy task, as governments are 
required to address a number of key factors that have a considerable impact on the country’s 
ability to do this. These are categorised as government or country-level, and organisational 
level factors. The former include political and social stability, market size and business 
conditions. These are widely discussed in the literature and there have been numerous studies 
offering recommendations for decision makers in the developing world on how best to 
address them effectively. Because of this richness in the literature, the researcher has not 
included this type of factors within the scope of this study.  
Synthesis of the literature nevertheless emphasised that addressing these country/government-
level factors alone will not suffice in creating an environment attractive to MNCs; 
governments in the developing world are also required to address their organisational level 
factors. Government organisations’ level of transparency, bureaucracy and corruption have 
been identified as representatives of organisational level factors that decision makers in the 
developing world must address to create an environment attractive to MNCs.  
It has been concluded that these organisational factors reflect the quality of government 
organisations’ performance; thus improving the overall performance of government 
organisations in the host country is the key towards creating an environment attractive to 
MNCs. As to government/country level factors, the literature did not provide an approach that 
would guide decision makers in the developing world, such as Iraq, on how to overcome their 
performance weakness and create an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-
change fashion. Accordingly, this study aimed to develop a strategic approach to help Iraqi 
decision makers to overcome their performance weaknesses and create an organisational 
environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion. The second objective follows from 
this.               
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OBJECTIVE TWO – To identify, understand and evaluate the available organisational 
performance improvement approaches and highlight the critical steps that can be 
followed to create an organisational environment attractive for MNCs in a step-change 
fashion 
To achieve this objective, a further extensive literature review was been carried out, to 
identify, understand and evaluate the available approaches, models or frameworks that can 
help decision makers in the developing world overcome their performance weaknesses. The 
second half of chapter two examined the available organisational performance improvement 
methodologies, that generally fall under the umbrella of Total Quality Management (TQM): 
EFQM, Baldrige, Lean, Six Sigma and PROBE. The literature review showed how effective 
these methodologies are in assessing organisations’ practices and performance and in 
identifying their weaknesses and strengths; it also highlighted a number of barriers that 
significantly affect their successful implementation within the context of the public sector, 
concluding that their use in achieving organisational performance improvement is a long-term 
approach, not a short-term fix. The literature synthesis showed no solutions that can bridge 
the gap between these existing performance improvement methodologies and the speed with 
which organisations must transform their performance to overcome their weaknesses and 
attract FDI. It was therefore concluded that a search for an alternative approach, to address the 
specific aim of the research, was required.  
Searching for such an alternative approach was the aim of chapter three. It concluded that 
overcoming government organisations’ performance weaknesses in a step-change fashion 
requires decision makers to innovate and consider combining multiple innovative approaches 
to achieve the desired outcome.    
Accordingly, the chapter shed light on innovation, its definition, types, links to organisational 
performance, why some innovative implementations fail, and how to successfully implement 
innovation in a step-change fashion. The chapter also examined some of the effective 
organisational tools and techniques and their role in improving organisational performance, 
including: strategic planning, project management office and integrated IT solutions. It also 
highlighted the main considerations that change champions (decision makers) need to take 
into account when implementing organisational change in the public sector. After a rigorous 
understanding and evaluation of various innovative approaches, six steps were identified to 
guide this research towards developing a strategic approach capable of helping Iraqi decision 
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makers to create an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion, 
and to institutionalise best practices. These steps are summarised below (discussed in detail in 
section 3.7). 
The first Step required understanding and assessing the overall practice and 
performance of government organisations in the host country and identifying how weak their 
practices are compared to best practices, using a standard practice and performance 
benchmarking tool called PROBE (discussed in chapter 2).  
The second Step built on the findings of step one and suggested that, if the gap 
between existing and best practices was significant, the change champions should establish a 
separate spinout organisation (SSO) in line with best practice, and dedicate it to work 
exclusively with MNCs during the lifecycle of infrastructure project implementation.  The 
SSO works parallel to, not in conjunction with, the parent government organisation, and under 
the direct authority of its own CEO or governor. The SSO allows the project to follow a new 
business model with different values and priorities from those of the parent organisation. 
According to Barahona and Elizondo (2012), the SSO is an independent organisation with 
other values and skills, not threatened by the possibility of having to do new things, and not 
seeing the potential market in the same way as the threatened entity, the parent organisation. It 
does not retain anything from the organisation it is replacing. At the highest level, it may have 
contacts that facilitate the use of some resources, but basically it “forgets” how the parent 
organisation did things and how it saw customers, such as MNCs and local contractors. A 
heavyweight team ensures that new processes can emerge. Otherwise, there is a risk that the 
SSO will remain immersed in the assumptions, values and decisions of the parent 
organisation.  
On the other hand, if the gap is small, the step suggests that decision makers establish an in-
house team (cross-functional or lightweight); it remains within the existing government 
organisation, and assigns it to work with MNCs during the lifecycle of infrastructure project 
implementation.  
After deciding on a suitable organisational structure to work with MNCs, the third step 
emphasises the importance of support and commitment from key decision makers for such an 
organisational change, before beginning the implementation of any proposed performance 
improvement approach.   
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After approval for the proposed change has been granted, the fourth Step requires the 
change champions to commence establishing a suitable organisational structure, either in-
house or as a SSO. This step also advises change champions to consider adopting some of the 
critical elements that might be missing from the parent organisation, such as strategic 
planning, project management and IT.  
The fifth step encourages the change champions to ensure that the chosen organisational 
structure (whether in-house or SSO) is given the necessary authority to carry out the assigned 
projects and to produce quick results. KPIs or predefined success criteria for the established 
organisational structure help measure its performance. Change champions must also work 
hard at broadcasting information about the successes achieved by the newly established 
organisational structure, to ensure the continuing support and commitment of key decision 
makers.  
When the predefined success criteria have been achieved, the, the sixth step advises 
change champions to seek key decision makers’ approval to gradually institutionalise the best 
practices adopted by the newly established organisational structure throughout the rest of the 
organisation.    
In following the first step, chapter four reviewed the relevant literature to understand and 
assess the overall practices of government organisations in Iraq and compare their weaknesses 
and strengths to world-class standards. The literature showed the organisational environment 
in Iraq to be seriously corrupt and non-transparent. Beneath this tip of the iceberg are 
organisational practices which need to be benchmarked against world-class standards to 
identify the weaknesses that are causing such unsatisfactory performance. However, the 
literature search found no publications that had assessed or compared the existing overall 
practices and performance of government organisations in Iraq with world-class standards. 
Thus, the third objective of this research was to explore the overall practice and performance 
of an Iraqi government organisation responsible for infrastructure development and identify 
its weaknesses and strengths.   
OBJECTIVE THREE – To explore the overall practice and performance of government 
organisations in Iraq and identify key weaknesses and strengths 
To collect the data necessary for achieving this objective, the philosophical stance of the 
research and a suitable research design and data collection methods were established, as 
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described in chapter five of this thesis. A case study approach was found to be appropriate, 
and selection criteria identified a government organisation responsible for infrastructure 
development in one of the biggest cities in Iraq, as a suitable case for the exploratory study. 
This case study organisation is responsible for all stages of infrastructure project delivery, and 
three data collection steps were employed in chapter six (illustrated in Figure 6.2).    
• The first step focused on developing a set of questions, conducting a series of semi-
structured interviews and performing observations to understand the organisation’s 
structure, overall system, approach in carrying out its projects and key problems. The 
set of data collected also highlights customers’ (local contracting companies) 
satisfaction level with some of the key practices adopted by the government 
organisation.   
• The second step focused on assessing the organisation’s overall practices and 
performance and comparing them to world-class standards, identifying the gap 
between them using the PROBE benchmarking tool described in chapter 2.  
• The third step first focused on delivering an awareness workshop to show 
interviewees a summary of the findings obtained during steps one and two of the 
exploratory stage, as well as delivering information about the best practices currently 
used world-wide to enhance organisations’ performance. The step then focused on 
soliciting feedback from the interviewees about the organisational issues that 
considered required immediate attention from top management to improve their 
organisation’s performance.  
The overall findings from this exploratory stage revealed numerous organisational 
weaknesses and identified a significant gap between the overall practice and performance of 
the government organisation and that of world-class organisations working in the same field. 
The following are some of the key organisational weaknesses identified:  
• Poor planning 
• Lack of strategic planning,  
• Weak procurement system,  
• Conflicting regulations  
• Lack of effective project management,  
• Lack of effective communication among key project stakeholders during the lifecycle 
of infrastructure projects,  
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• Poor performance management,  
• Poor leadership in developing a service culture  
• Poor customer orientation 
• Poor service processes 
• Ineffective use of IT  
• Poor personnel management 
• Lack of skilled personnel and effective professional development programmes.  
These findings set a baseline from which a suitable step-change organisational performance 
improvement approach was created. Objective four was established to achieve this goal.   
OBJECTIVE FOUR – To propose an approach to help Iraqi decision makers create an 
organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion. 
Achieving this objective meant looking at the overall findings (obtained to address objective 
three) through the lens of the SIX critical steps synthesised in chapter 3. This has been done 
during the development stage of this research. The general outcome of the exploratory stage 
clearly showed a significant gap between the overall practice and performance of the case 
study government organisation and those of world-class standard. For example, the PROBE 
benchmarking results positioned the government organisation in the could-do-better category 
of the world-class grid. As discussed in chapter 3, organisations falling into this category 
normally require 5 to 10 years to emulate the best in class (see discussion in section 2.5). 
Examination through the lens of the innovation models of Christensen and Overdorf (2000) 
and Davila et al. (2006, 2012)  made it clear that the case study organisation requires a 
significant change to its existing business model and use of technology to deliver world-class 
performance during the lifecycle of infrastructure projects implementation. This means that 
organisational improvement of this kind would be radical and disruptive to the existing 
system of government organisations and thus can face considerable resistance, as discussed in 
chapter 3. The overall findings of the exploratory stage satisfied the requirements of the first 
synthesised step, discussed in chapter 3 and explained in objective three above. 
Accordingly, the researcher proposed that initially, and to attract MNCs to foster FDI inflows, 
decision makers (mainly change champions) in government organisations should establish a 
Separate Spinout Organisation (SSO) and dedicate it to work exclusively with MNCs 
during the lifecycle of those infrastructure projects that decision makers were willing to award 
to MNCs. This conclusion satisfied the requirements of the second synthesised step, discussed 
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in chapter 3 and explained in objective three above. The remaining four synthesised steps 
helped in shaping the body of the approach to guide Iraqi decision makers through 
overcoming their performance weaknesses and creating the desired organisational 
environment. Thus, the proposed approach consisted of four main phases: 
➢ Phase One concerned with the need for key decision makers’ support and 
commitment to the proposed change. Given that the leadership index of the explored 
case study organisation, obtained via the PROBE tool, was far below that of world-
class organisations, key decision makers should be made aware of the details of the 
proposed approach, especially of the SSO and the resources required for its 
implementation. Thus, phase one required change champions to first ensure a vision 
for change was set and then utilise training workshops to make key decision makers 
aware of the details of the proposed approach and its corresponding benefits.  
➢ Phase Two concerned with the actual establishment of the SSO, with the help of an 
external consultant. The findings obtained during the exploratory stage highlighted a 
number of key organisational weaknesses, including the lack of strategic planning, 
poor project management, and poor use of IT, poor customer orientation, poor service 
processes and poor performance management. In line with the synthesised findings in 
chapter 3, this phase proposed that change champions should include a strategic 
planning office (SPO) and project management office (PMO) as key elements of the 
SSO. This would ensure that the SSO clearly identified the government organisation’s 
customers, understood their needs and developed strategic plans to address them. 
These offices would also ensure that projects are prioritised effectively and new 
processes and procedures for project implementation designed from start to finish. An 
effective IT solution should be integrated in the SSO system, with development of a 
client single window to ensure that the SSO operated as smoothly as possible, showing 
high transparency, simplicity and integrity.          
➢ Phase Three concerned with the SSO carrying out projects and producing “quick 
wins”. Predefined success criteria or KPIs for the SSO should have been set during 
phase one of this approach. This phase was to ensure that the SSO had been assigned 
the responsibility previously agreed on, with authority to carry out its work efficiently 
and effectively. During this phase, ongoing training and support to the heavyweight 
team running the SSO was proposed, with ongoing communication and marketing of 
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the successes of the SSO to key decision makers to ensure their continuing support 
and commitment.   
➢ Phase Four concerned with convincing key decision makers to gradually 
institutionalise best practices (those successfully adopted by the SSO) throughout the 
organisation, via sub-PMOs. Change champions should continue to broadcast the 
SSO’s successes, paving the way for acceptance of the holistic performance 
improvement programme, to emulate that of the SSO.  
This proposed four-phase approach was presented to key decision makers of three 
government organisations in Iraq, to validate its applicability, suitability and effectiveness in 
helping them overcome their performance weaknesses and create an organisational 
environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion. This process has been carried out to 
satisfy the fifth objective of this research.       
OBJECTIVE FIVE – To validate the applicability, suitability and effectiveness of the 
proposed approach using case studies; and to develop the final strategic approach.   
To achieve this objective, supporting data was collected by: 
➢ First confirming the two underlying aspects or factors that led to the development of 
the proposed approach, which are the need to attract FDI and the need for 
organisational performance improvement; and  
➢ Second, evaluating and confirming the core elements of the proposed approach, i.e. its 
four phases and their underlying components; see in Figure 6.17.  
In order to collect the required data, three Iraqi government organisations were selected as 
suitable case study subjects, by applying the criteria specified in chapter 5. Semi-structured 
interviews were used as the primary data collection method, supported by document review as 
a secondary source to confirm some of the outcomes generated during the interviews. The 
cross-case discussion of the outcome of these three case studies confirmed government 
organisations need to attract MNCs for two main reasons: 
• To address their infrastructure investment needs; and  
• To fill the gap in expertise.  
The three case studies confirmed the need for organisational performance improvement by 
highlighting a number of existing practice and performance weaknesses. These weaknesses 
confirmed the need for significant organisational performance improvement to ensure 
successful delivery of projects and transparent relationship with MNCs. They were 
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categorised under headings: leadership, people, service processes, performance management 
and how long the interviewees thought it would take their organisations to emulate world-
class standards. The cross-case discussion confirmed that the proposed approach was 
applicable to the context of government organisations in Iraq, and an effective tool in helping 
change champions to overcome their organisations’ performance weaknesses and create an 
environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion. However, for such an approach to 
succeed, they identified certain considerations:  
• Regulations and bylaws, and political intervention  
• Effective communication and marketing of the proposed change among key decision 
makers/government officials 
• The support and commitment of key decision makers/government officials for 
carrying out the proposed approach  
• Hiring external consultants. 
These findings validated the proposed approach in addressing the aim of this study.  
9.3 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS   
This section summarises the key findings of the research. 
• Iraq has a considerable lack of infrastructure on various levels, and government of Iraq 
(GOI) is struggling to address this problem. The validation stage confirmed that lack 
of finance and poor performance in both government and private organisations were 
the main contributors to GOI’s inability to address the problem. The overall research 
outcome has highlighted the need to attract MNCs to foster FDI inflows to address 
Iraq’s infrastructure investment needs and to fill the gap in expertise. This finding was 
confirmed by the views solicited from government organisations’ professionals, who 
agreed that the available financial resources are insufficient to meet the infrastructure 
needs within their jurisdictions. They emphasised that local contracting companies do 
not have sufficient capacity or expertise to carry out most of the strategic projects 
required. This finding supports the literature discussed in sections 4.4.5 and 4.4.6 and 
adds to the findings of Fay and Toman (2010) and UNCTAD (2013). 
• The existing organisational environment in Iraq has resulted in few international 
corporations agreeing to work and invest in the country. This view was supported by 
the professionals interviewed, who confirmed that a number of organisational practice 
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weaknesses had caused both international and local companies to refuse to, or 
complain about, working with these government organisations. For example, the 
complex and non-transparent organisational processes and procedures followed during 
the procurement stage triggered many complaints and explained why so few 
international corporation were willing to work in Iraq. The case was similar in the 
construction stage, where complex procedures caused unnecessary delays. This added 
to the literature discussion in section 4.4.2, that Iraqi government organisations are 
seriously corrupt and hard to do business with.  
• Government organisations responsible for the delivery of infrastructure in Iraq have 
poor planning at both the strategic and project levels. This was indicated during both 
the exploratory and validation stages of the study, which confirmed the absence of 
clear procedures to prioritise projects, the lack of clear communication among key 
stakeholders, and the absence of strategic planning, as weaknesses identified during 
the data analysis. This adds to the sparse literature, as discussed in section 4.4.3, on 
the lack of proper planning among government organisations in Iraq. It also supports 
the discussion of the literature in section 3.5, that good planning can significantly 
contribute to achieving effective and efficient organisational performance during the 
lifecycle of infrastructure development programmes.  
• The procurement system adopted by government organisations is weak, bureaucratic 
and non-transparent. This was evident from the findings obtained in both the 
exploratory and validation stages of this research. It was clear that service processes 
adopted in the procurement phase are bureaucratic and non-transparent, that staff do 
not follow standard procedures, and that no use was made of available tools and 
techniques, such as e-procurement and client single window, to facilitate the execution 
of this stage. This finding supports the literature discussed in sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.4.  
• The overall project management practices of the government organisations are poor, 
as clearly highlighted during the exploratory and the validation stages, where many 
examples were given: the increased number of failed projects, failure to use effective 
project management tools and techniques, lack of competent project managers, poor 
project supervision and performance measurement. This finding adds to the limited 
literature discussed in section 4.4.3. The findings also agreed with the literature 
highlighted in section 3.5, which underlined the effectiveness of using project 
management best practices and the establishment of PMOs.  
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• Numerous weaknesses relating to leadership, people management, service processes 
and performance management practices adopted by Iraqi government organisations 
were identified. A significant gap was found between the practices in these areas and 
those of world-class organisations. Issues of leadership included their inadequate in 
developing a service culture, the absence of an organisational vision, mission and 
goals, leaders not being customer oriented, resistance to change among key decision 
makers, and serious intervention from influential members of political parties. 
Personnel issues included lack of effective professional development programmes, 
lack of expertise and poor real-time handling of service problems/failure. Service 
process issues included poor strategic procurement, poor use of IT, complex and 
highly bureaucratic processes and procedures, an increased number of non-value 
adding activities, absence of continuous improvement practices and poor quality 
procedures. Performance management issues included lack of support for staff, no use 
of customer complaint data to improve practices, discrimination against customers 
(local/international companies) and no measurement of customer satisfaction. These 
findings adds to the scarce literature on the organisational environment in Iraq. 
• Regulations and the intervention of political parties in internal organisational policies 
are badly affecting the performance of Iraqi government organisations and their ability 
to initiate organisational performance improvement programmes. Several of the Iraqi 
government professionals interviewed stressed that government regulations, bylaws 
and procedures hindered organisational improvement. Political parties interfered with 
the internal decisions made by government organisations’ CEOs and managers, and 
with other key organisational activities. Identification of this problem adds to the few 
studies discussing the factors affecting the performance of government organisations 
in Iraq.  
• There was general agreement among the government organisations’ professionals that 
their organisations will require a long time to fully absorb best practice and emulate 
world-class performance. This arose from their genuine belief that following a holistic 
organisational performance improvement approach would face considerable resistance 
from key decision makers and influential political parties within the country. It 
supports the literature discussed in section 2.3.3, which underlined a number of 
barriers to holistic organisational performance improvement within the context of the 
public sector.  
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• Establishing a separate spinout organisation (SSO) and dedicating it to work with 
MNCs would be an effective approach for change champions to follow, enabling them 
to deliver effective performance in a shorter period of time and without disrupting 
their organisation’s existing system. This approach was greatly welcomed by the case 
study interviewees as an alternative approach to creating an attractive organisational 
environment for MNCs. These Iraqi professionals believed that resistance to 
innovation normally accompanies attempts to introduce changes to the existing 
organisational system, structure and way of working. However, the SSO is new, 
independent and under the direct authority of the change champions such as CEOs, 
governors; it works in parallel with the parent government organisation, making it less 
prone to resistance. This finding confirmed the argument made in section 3.4 and adds 
to the base of knowledge about new concepts for organisational performance 
improvement within the public sector. 
• To initiate a holistic organisational performance improvement programme 
(institutionalisation of best practices) in Iraqi government organisations, key decision 
makers need to be firmly introduced to the benefits to organisational performance of 
adopting best practices. This agrees with the literature reviewed in section 3.6, which 
underlined the importance of top management’s acceptance of and support for any 
proposed change within the context of public sector organisations.     
9.4 MAIN CONCLUSIONS  
The following section describes the main conclusions drawn from both the literature review 
and the case studies.  
Main conclusions from the literature review stage: 
• Infrastructure development is considered a key contributor to economic growth in 
countries worldwide. Developing countries, such as Iraq, have a considerable lack of 
infrastructure, and a key factor impeding infrastructure development is insufficient 
financial resources. Other factors relative to the context of Iraq include weak overall 
performance of government organisations and a high level of non-transparency and 
corruption, lack for proper planning, project management and qualified civil servants, 
and an underdeveloped private sector. FDI is a key pillar in helping developing 
countries address their infrastructure investment needs, as well as providing positive 
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spillovers such as transfer of skills and technology, and human capital development. 
Given Iraq’s urgent need for infrastructure development, attracting FDI must be 
considered a high priority by the GOI.  
• Attracting FDI is not easy, requiring the decision makers of host countries to create an 
environment attractive for MNCs to foster FDI inflow. Governments must address two 
key levels: government/national level and organisation level factors. The former 
include political and social stability, market size and business conditions. This level of 
factors has been widely discussed in the literature with studies offering 
recommendations for decision makers on how to address them effectively. Non-
transparency, bureaucracy and corruption, which are indicators of the quality of 
government organisations’ performance, are commonly cited as interrelated 
organisational factors that have a significant impact on the number of MNCs accepting 
work in a given country. Thus, improving the performance of government 
organisations in the developing world should significantly help in attracting MNCs 
and fostering FDI inflow. However, the available literature proposes no approach, 
framework or model to help decision makers in the developing world or elsewhere 
overcome their organisational performance weaknesses and create an organisational 
environment attractive to MNCs.  
• The available organisational performance improvement methodologies reviewed in 
this thesis were highlighted as effective tools for decision makers to identify 
weaknesses in their practices, and to develop improvement plans to address these and 
achieve the desired performance. However, it was stressed that the perceived benefits 
of these models can only be gained in the long run, especially in the public sector, 
especially if the organisations using them have particularly weak overall practices. 
The reasons for this are many, but on top of them comes resistance to change, as best 
practices normally require decision makers to ask staff to change their current habitual 
way of doing things and follow new, unfamiliar methods.  
• An alternative approach was synthesised from the literature, potentially capable of 
helping decision makers of government organisations in the developing world 
overcome the performance weaknesses and deliver a performance attractive to MNCs 
in a step-change fashion, during the lifecycle of infrastructure development 
programmes, without disrupting their organisations’ existing systems, and facing the 
inevitable challenge of resistance to change. This approach suggests that decision 
makers first need to identify the gap between the existing practices and best practices, 
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using any relevant self-assessment practice and performance benchmarking tool. 
Secondly, if the gap is significant, the approach suggests they establish a separate 
spinout organisation (SSO), in line with best practices, and dedicate it to work 
exclusively with MNCs, in parallel with the parent government organisation. If the 
gap is small it would be sufficient to establish a functional or lightweight team within 
the parent organisation, to work with MNCs during the lifecycle of the infrastructure 
development programme.  
• The literature strongly emphasised the role of strategic planning, project management 
and integrated IT solutions in helping public sector organisations deliver effective and 
efficient products and/or services to customers. Effective strategic planning helps them 
understand and prioritise their customers’ needs, and develops focused plans to 
address these. Project management, on the other hand, helps organisations develop 
appropriate processes and procedures to deliver projects successfully throughout their 
lifecycle. Integrated IT solutions, such as e-procurement and project management 
software, are found to significantly contribute to improving transparency and reducing 
bureaucracy and corruption, as well as carrying out their project successfully.  
•  The literature emphasised that achieving top management support for change, 
producing “quick wins” and institutionalising best practices are the key change 
facilitators which public sector change champions must not overlook while carrying 
out organisational performance improvement programmes. Ensuring top management 
support for change has been identified as a prerequisite for any change initiative 
within the context of public sector organisations. Achieving the predefined success 
criteria of the proposed change, in the form of “quick wins”, is another important 
change management factor that contributes to sustaining top management support and 
commitment, as well as engaging staff in the change. The change management 
literature identifies institutionalising a successful change initiative, such as the 
adoption of best practices, as the goal that change champions should strive towards. 
However, especially in the public sector, institutionalisation can take a long time, 
requiring managers to be patient and set long-term plans to achieve the desired 
outcome.  
• Few studies were found on the organisational environment of government 
organisations in Iraq, making it difficult for the researcher to understand how weak are 
the practices adopted by such organisations compared to peer world-class 
organisations. Proposing an approach to improve organisations’ performance in Iraq 
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required the researcher to investigate such practices and highlight their weaknesses 
and strengths.    
Main conclusions from the case studies 
• The case study process stressed the considerable lack of infrastructure in Iraq and the 
effective role MNCs can play in helping address this lack, as well as the lack of 
expertise, emphasising that few MNCs have decided to work/invest in the country. 
• The overall practice and performance of the government organisations responsible for 
the delivery of infrastructure in Iraq is weak and contributes to the underdevelopment 
of the country’s infrastructure. The case study process identified a number of 
weaknesses associated with the planning, procurement and construction stages carried 
out by the government organisations, and confirmed that local contracting companies 
as especially dissatisfied with the performance of the organisations. The case study 
process also showed up the significant gap between the overall practice and 
performance of Iraqi organisations and world-class organisations, concluding that they 
will take a long time to fully absorb best practices and holistically emulate world-class 
performance.  
• Ineffective regulations and bylaws, and excessive intervention by government and 
political parties in the internal operations of government organisations in Iraq, were 
indicated as a solid barrier preventing change champions from successfully carrying 
out any holistic performance improvement initiative. 
• The case study process revealed that an applicable, suitable and effective approach for 
change champions of any Iraqi government organisation responsible for the delivery 
of infrastructure to overcome performance weaknesses and create an appropriate 
organisational environment attractive for MNCs in a step change fashion, without 
disrupting existing systems, would be by establishing a SSO. This would conform to 
best practice, with the help of an external consultant, and be dedicated to work 
exclusively with MNCs during the lifecycle of those infrastructure projects that 
decision makers were willing to award to MNCs. It would take into account the 
effective utilisation of strategic planning, project management and integrated IT 
solutions. To successfully implement this approach, change champions should first 
obtain key decision makers’ support and commitment by showing the need for and 
benefit of the approach in helping deliver better performance in a short period of time, 
without disrupting the existing organisational system. Secondly, after receiving 
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approval and establishing the SSO, change champions should confirm that the SSO 
was performing effectively and achieving the predefined success criteria. Sustaining 
key decision makers’ support and commitment would require active communication 
and marketing of the successes of the SSO.  
• The case study process concluded that even after the SSO achieved its aim, approval 
to institutionalise its system to the rest of the parent government organisations would 
take a long time. This time might be reduced by the active communication and 
marketing of the SSO’s successes.  
9.5 RESEARCH MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
The contribution to knowledge of this research is as follows: 
1. Contribution to Research 
• Other studies have underlined the urgent need for governments in the developing 
world to address their countries’ considerable lack of infrastructure, and how FDI can 
significantly address this lack. The quality of government organisations’ performance 
in the host country has been highlighted as a key factor in attracting MNCs and 
fostering FDI inflows. However, no research to date has suggested a framework, 
model or approach to guide decision makers in the developing world, or elsewhere, in 
how to overcome their organisations’ performance weaknesses and deliver 
organisational performance attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion. This research 
has attempted to fill this gap by proposing such an approach for decision makers of 
government organisations in Iraq. It can be considered as a trigger for further research 
in this field.  
• Studies have stressed the benefits of using existing organisational performance 
improvement methodologies, such as EFQM, Baldrige and Six Sigma, to help public 
sector organisations address their practice weaknesses and deliver excellent 
performance. However, these studies have shown that, depending on their level of 
maturity, such organisations can take a long time to emulate the concepts encapsulated 
in these models. Nevertheless, the available literature has not attempted to bridge the 
gap between these existing performance improvement methodologies and the speed 
with which public sector organisations need to transform their performance so as to 
overcome their weaknesses and attract FDI. This research has attempted to bridge this 
gap by synthesising six interconnected critical steps from the literature, with the aim 
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of guiding researchers to develop and propose an approach capable of helping change 
champions in the developing world to deliver effective performance to satisfy 
customers in a step-change fashion, and gradually institutionalise best practices. This 
study is the first to apply these steps and produce a step-change performance 
improvement approach, although more research is required to apply these steps in 
different contexts to improve their validity.  
• Few studies have discussed the overall practice and performance of government 
organisations in Iraq or highlighted their performance weaknesses, which represent 
only the tip of the iceberg of the Iraqi organisational environment. This study has 
investigated the subject in more depth and has identified numerous practice 
weaknesses and their impact on government organisations’ performance, helping to 
uncover what is underneath the iceberg.  It is the first research to use a standard 
practice and performance benchmarking tool to compare the overall practice and 
performance of Iraqi government organisations and world-class standards, and to 
identify the extent of the gap. These findings will help researchers interested in 
developing solutions to help decision makers in Iraq transform the performance of 
government organisations to emulate those best in class.   
2. Contribution to Industry  
• Iraq is clearly a country with great potential for investment. However, the findings 
from the both literature and the case studies have clearly shown that its organisational 
environment is not investor friendly, and that improvement is urgently required to 
attract MNCs. The strategic approach proposed by this study contributes to the process 
of building an environment attractive to MNCs to foster FDI inflow to Iraq.    
3. Contribution to Governments 
• Governments in developing countries such as Iraq demonstrate an overwhelming and 
urgent need to attract FDI to overcome the lack of financial resources necessary to 
address their infrastructure investment needs. Studies have provided recommendations 
to help governments officials set the right policies, laws and incentives to attract 
MNCs and foster FDI inflow, but they have said little about how to help government 
officials create a suitable organisational environment. This study contributes by 
proposing a strategic approach for decision makers in Iraq, which aims to help guide 
them in creating an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change 
fashion, and in gradually institutionalising best practices.  
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9.6 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
Although the aim and objectives of this research have been met, this section highlights some 
limitations. The research focused on the public sector in Iraq, and more specifically on 
government organisations responsible for the delivery of infrastructure. It might be expected 
that factors other than those covered here would emerge if this study were expanded to cover 
other types of organisation or countries other than Iraq. Due to time and other practical 
limitations, the strategic approach could not be implemented in real government 
organisations, and validation of the research relies only on Iraqi decision makers’ views to 
validate the applicability and suitability of the proposed approach in the given context. An 
actual application of the proposed strategic approach would have provided more data and 
perhaps revealed other factors that, if taken into account, would have contributed to a more 
effective implementation. However, time limitations prevented this. 
9.7 FUTURE RESEARCH  
This study examined available organisational performance improvement methodologies used 
across the public and private sectors and then produced a strategic approach to achieve the 
aim of the research. However, during the study, areas were identified for further research. 
These are listed below: 
• The strategic approach, detailed in chapter 7, should be applied in a real government 
organisation in Iraq and be further improved in accordance with the outcomes of the 
study. The strategic approach should be tested following a longitudinal case study or 
action research. 
• The general aim of the six critical steps synthesised in chapter 3 was to help guide the 
research towards developing an organisational performance improvement approach 
capable at helping decision makers of any government organisation to overcome their 
performance weaknesses and deliver effective performance in a short period of time. 
In this research, following these steps helped the researcher to develop and propose an 
approach capable of helping decision makers in government organisations responsible 
for infrastructure development in Iraq, overcome their performance weaknesses and 
create an organisational environment attractive to MNCs in a step-change fashion. 
However, this was just one real-life scenario, and to confirm that these steps can 
actually improve organisational performance they should be applied in other real-life 
scenarios to see how far they can be generalised. 
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APPENDICES  
Appendix 1 Interviews Questions Relative to the Exploratory Stage  
I. Interview Guide for Data Collection Step 1: Task One 
a) Interviewee name and contact details  
b) Job title and brief profile 
c) Organisation size and structure 
d) What are the organisation’s role and responsibilities during the lifecycle of 
infrastructure projects implementation in the city? 
e) Explain in detail the various processes and activities the organisation performs to carry 
out its projects  
f) What is your opinion about your organisation’s overall practices and performance? 
 
 Page | 287  
 
II. Detailed Process Model for The Procurement Phase 
 
Figure 6.6: Detailed Process Model for The Procurement Phase 
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III. Interview Guide for Data Collection Step 1: Task Two 
a) Interviewee name and contact details  
b) Type of organisation  
c) Job title and brief profile 
Customer Satisfaction with the Advertisement phase 
d) Is the period between advertising tenders and closing bids corresponding 
to/appropriate for the size of the projects? 
e) Are projects advertised in the right places? 
f) How easy is it to get the information relative to the newly advertised projects?  
g) How satisfied are you with the information provided in the adverts? 
h) How satisfied are you with the advertisement phase? 
Customer Satisfaction with the Selling tenders phase 
i) Are the procedures for buying tenders clear and easy to follow? 
j) How long does it take to get a tender? 
k) Does the organisation clearly specify project requirements? 
l) Does the contractor receive a complete tender document? If so 
m) Are the project specifications detailed clearly?    
n) Are project designs prepared by qualified consultants? 
o) Are projects’ bill of quantities accurate? 
p) How satisfied are you with the selling tender phase? 
Customer Satisfaction with the Submitting Tenders Phase 
a) Are the procedures for submitting tenders clear and easy to follow? 
b)  How satisfied are you with staff treatment?  
c) How long does it take to submit a bid? 
d) How satisfied are you with the submitting tenders phase? 
Customer Satisfaction with the Awarding Phase 
e) Are contractors invited to an open tender ceremony/day? 
f) How long does the process of open tender and tender analysis normally take?  
g) Is the process of announcement of the selected contractor/consultant transparent and 
quick? 
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h) Does the selected contractor/consultant receive a complete set of drawings, project 
specifications and contract? 
i) How satisfied are you with staff treatment?  
j) How satisfied are you with the awarding phase?  
IV. PROBE Questionnaire Survey 
The PROBE™ concept is based on the Made in Europe studies 1996, 1998. See PROBE User 
Guide for acknowledgements.  
PROBE for Public Service: Copyright © PROBE Network LLP 2006-2016. All rights 
reserved. 
This work is registered with the UK Copyright Service: Registration Number 284706143 and 
protected under UK and international law.     
All rights reserved. No part of this questionnaire may be reproduced, distributed, or 
transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other 
electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the copyright 
holder. For permission requests, write to the copyright holder at the contact details listed 
below. 
Website www.probe-network.com      
e-Mail:  Dr David Yarrow, PROBE Development Lead   david.yarrow@probe-network.com  
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V. Assessment of Interviewees’ Views About What Needs to Be Changed  
The questions ask what interviewees think about their current organisational system and what 
should be immediately changed  
Name:  
Job Title: 
Q1) After attending the training programme, I feel that: 
(Please rank: 3  Agree; 2 Not Sure; 1 Disagree) 
 
1 2 3 Comments 
The performance of the organisation can be significantly improved         
Strategic planning principles/best practice are not being used by top 
management         
There is a lack of using project management best practices in the 
management of the organisation’s projects          
Strategic planning and project management best practices can help 
reduce the high rate of failed projects          
My job description needs to be clearly defined         
My role and responsibility need to be clearly defined         
The role of the Heads of Departments needs to be more of a visionary 
nature rather than an approval role         
Current regulations are hindering improvements         
Employees need to be empowered to take responsibility for their own 
work         
Many of the current processes have no value and could be eliminated 
to improve performance         
Work is based on individual performance rather than teamwork         
Our services to customers can be improved         
The current structure of the organisation makes it difficult to improve 
our contact with customers          
There is a need for a quality assurance process to ensure that 
customers receive the best service         
Is there anything else you want to add? 
    Q2) After attending the training programme, I feel that there is an immediate need for: 
(Please rank: 3  Agree; 2 Not Sure; 1 Disagree) 
  
 
1 2 3 Comments 
Change         
Improving business processes of the department         
Strategic planning          
Project management office         
Client single window         
Focused training and capacity building          
Better use of IT         
Develop a common vision among employees         
Redefinition of roles and responsibilities to match clear objectives of 
the department         
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Need to empower employees         
Is there anything else you want to add?     
VI. Details about PROBE Overall Practice and Performance 
 
Figure: Themes of the Overall Practice and Performance (Source: PROBE, 2009) 
According to PROBE (2016) the Leadership theme is divided into two sub-themes, namely 
Quality Leadership and Market Acuity.  
Note that the meaning of customer in this research is “the local and/or international 
companies/MNCs”. 
Quality leadership means that: 
• The senior management of the organisation demonstrate their leadership through 
communicating and reinforcing clear values and performance orientation, and exert 
personal leadership of the organisation’s quality programmes 
• Quality values are actively promoted throughout the organisation 
• There are shared vision and goals 
• Managers are leaders of empowered people 
• Openness inside the organisation is encouraged 
• There is a problem-solving culture 
• Customers are the focus of business planning. 
Market acuity means that: 
• The organisation listens to customers, understands what drives value for them, and builds 
strong customer relationships 
• It listens to the employees as well and uses teams and teamwork effectively 
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• It benchmarks itself against other organisations to understand better how they serve 
customers. 
People, central to the effective delivery of service, is divided into the cycle of virtue, and 
empowerment. The cycle of virtue is a set of three activities, each of which mutually 
reinforces the others (PROBE, 2016): 
• The first is training and education. There is a strong focus and resources invested in 
developing the knowledge and skills of employees 
• This is supported by employee involvement, for example in improvement programmes and 
ongoing contributions to the organisation’s development 
• Recognition and reward of exceptional performance, in both front office and support roles, 
reinforce the virtuous cycle. This in turn leads to motivated and retained employees, ready 
and willing to continue to develop their knowledge and skills, raising the overall standards 
within the organisation. 
Empowerment, on the other hand, has many aspects: 
• The first is giving employees the discretion to act within a wide range, often supported by 
self-managed teams. This leads to and is supported by widening the flexibility of 
employees; 
• A key area where employees can effectively exploit empowerment is in handling problems 
and complaints: service recovery. 
In terms of service processes, four sub-themes to which leading-edge service organisations 
pay attention to are: process management, moment of truth, kaizen, and service innovation. 
Process management within world-class organisation means that: 
• Core processes have been identified and redesigned or improved. The organisation thinks 
‘process’. 
• Information technology is used to make business processes more effective and sometimes 
to create whole new ways of doing business. 
• The organisation has stable, long-term relationships with suppliers, who are viewed as 
partners. 
Moments of truth within world-class organisations means that: 
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• Customer-facing processes are mapped and the key interactions – the moments of truth – 
are known and managed 
• This is supported by proactive support functions 
• Service recovery processes are in place to deal with service problems and failures 
• There is a focus on process, ensuring high levels of accessibility of service 
• Non-value-adding activities (waste) are eliminated. 
While kaizen:  
• Implies a continuous improvement of processes. Quality problems are addressed and 
employees frequently use a wide range of quality tools 
• Organisations that are committed to continuous improvement emphasise training and 
education of employees in quality-focused techniques and approaches 
• This in turn is supported by quality assurance procedures and use of 
assessment/improvement models such as the EFQM Excellence Model or the Baldrige 
Approach. 
Service innovation within world-class organisation means that: 
• There is an innovative environment  
• There is a reproducible process for improving existing services, designing new services 
and responding to service innovations from competitors and peers. Customer input is seen 
as vital. 
Performance management, on the other hand, is concerned with ensuring that the processes 
described above lead to improved performance, increasing value for both the customer and 
the organisation. Performance measurement and standards means that: 
• Effective organisations set standards that are based on customer needs and are challenging 
• These standards will be visible to both employees and customers 
• To ensure effective performance, leading organisations ensure that they provide employees 
with the resources and support to achieve these standards of performance 
• Organisations use measures from a wide range of sources to drive service quality and 
business performance and improve processes; these include: 
➢ Proactively measuring customer satisfaction. 
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➢ Using customer complaint and feedback data for process improvement, not just 
for measuring performance. 
Effective adoption and implementation of all the practices encapsulated in these four themes, 
namely leadership, people, service processes and performance management should lead to 
effective and efficient overall performance results. According to PROBE, good service 
management will lead to improved performance on a number of dimensions as follows: 
1) Service Quality 
• Good service management leads to high service quality on dimensions such as reliability 
and staff responsiveness  
• A well designed and delivered service will meet customer needs, providing a clarity of 
service concept and a distinctive service 
• These in turn will lead to perceived value and quality, growth in customer satisfaction. 
2) Customer Growth 
• Quality and productivity lead to both increasing the customer base through expanded sales 
and to increased customer retention which can, over time, result in more profitable 
customers 
• These organisations tend to also have fast and repeatable service/product development, and 
to be innovative. 
3) Results for Stakeholders 
• Contemporary developments emphasise the importance of both satisfying employees and 
paying attention to the organisation’s impact on society and the broader environment. 
Leading organisations combine proactive attention to society and to employee loyalty, 
displaying altruism and a sense of balance in their pursuit of business performance. 
4) Business Performance 
• A key measure of a successful service organisation is its overall business/financial 
performance, on dimensions including: 
➢ margins (or budget achievement) 
➢ cash flow 
➢ market share 
➢ productivity/efficiency 
• Leading service organisations are able to combine the benefits of cost leadership with the 
ability to charge premium prices for their high-quality services. 
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Appendix 2 Interviews Questions Relative to the Validation Stage 
The interview questions were constructed around the two main themes of the research 
enquiry, depicted in the table below. 
Table: Interview Themes and Questions  
Themes  Interview Questions 
a) The need for FDI, current 
organisational environment and 
MNCs and how long it will take 
an organisation to emulate best 
practice 
Q1. Given the current situation, how do you see 
the need for MNCs to address your 
infrastructure investment needs? Please explain 
your answers.  
Q2. How do you evaluate the favourability of 
your organisational environment to MNCs? 
Please explain your answers. 
Q3. How easy would it be to improve the 
performance of the organisation and make it 
emulate best practice? And how long would 
such a process take? Please explain your 
answers. 
b) The feasibility of having a 
Separate Spinout Organisation 
to work with MNCs in the 
context of Iraq, and the 
effectiveness of the components 
incorporated within the 
proposed approach 
Q4. How feasible and effective would it be to 
establish a separate spinout organisation to work 
with MNCs? Please explain your answers.    
Q5. As a key member of the organisation, are 
the activities/processes within phase I of the 
proposed approach are enough to ensure the 
need for change and key stakeholders’ 
commitment to establish the spinout 
organisation? Please explain your answers. 
Q6. As a key member of the organisation, what 
is your opinion of the proposed activities to be 
carried out by the spinout organisation? Please 
explain your answers. 
Q7. As a key member of the organisation, what 
are the types of “quick wins” the spinout 
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organisation needs to deliver to be considered as 
a worthwhile investment? Please explain your 
answers. 
Q8. As a key member of the organisation, what 
is your opinion about phase IV of the approach, 
designed for the gradual performance 
transformation of your parent organisation to 
emulate the spinout organisation example? 
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15. 
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